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ABSTRACT
In order to provide timely authoritative guidance to facilitate reporting under the
European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) issued IFRIC 3 Emission Rights through the International
Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) in 2004. The IFRIC consensus
concludes that ETS gives rises to an intangible asset for emission rights held, a
provisional liability for emission rights purchased to offset emissions, and a government
grant when emission rights are allocated for less than their fair value. The withdrawal of
IFRIC 3 and the absence of authoritative accounting guidance for emission rights
provide a window of opportunity to reconsider accounting for emission rights from an
alternative perspective. Informed by the tenets of social ecology as an environmental
ethics approach, this thesis seeks to critically examine and problematise the accounting
recognition of emission rights in IFRIC 3. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is used as
a critical research method to examine texts from three sources: IFRIC 3 Emission
Rights, draft IFRIC 3 comment letters and two IASB press releases on the withdrawal of
IFRIC 3. CDA consists of three levels of analysis: (1) Text analysis: who is saying
what? (2) Discourse analysis: what does the text mean? (3) Social analysis: who are the
key players in the discourse construction?
Key findings of CDA show that while the proposed recognition of emission rights is
consistent with the IASB Conceptual Framework 1 and existing accounting standards, it
fails to reflect the ecological substance of ETS, of which emission rights become an
integral component. CDA highlights that a mainstream accounting framework does not
comfortably address the complex nature of emission rights. Furthermore, this thesis
argues that the mainstream accounting approach adopted in IFRIC 3 reinforces the
status quo of a business-as-usual approach and represents a superficial approach to a
complex environmental and social issue. A new accounting standard for emission rights
needs to consider qualitative characteristics that reflect the ecological substance of
emission rights.

1

The IASB Conceptual Framework will simply be referred to as the ‘Framework’ from this point on.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 CONTEXT: CLIMATE CHANGE AND A CARBON-CONSTRAINED
ECONOMY
The evidence and cause of climate change have been in the public domain since the
1970s. Scientists from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a
scientific intergovernmental body set up by the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO) and by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), warns that
“global green house gases emissions due to human activities have grown since preindustrial times, with an increase of 70% between 1970 and 2004” (IPCC, 2007, p36).
Scientists have gathered an increasing amount of evidence which suggests that the
global average net effect of human activities has been the main cause of global
warming. As the IPCC (2007, p37) points out, “the atmospheric concentrations of CO2
and CH4 2 in 2005 exceed by far the natural range over the last 650,000 years. Global
increases in CO2 concentrations are due primarily to fossil fuel use…”. The IPCC
(2007, p48) urges, that in order to prevent the eco-systems from being damaged beyond
repair, immediate action needs to be taken to cut green house gas (GHG) 3 emissions, as
“the resilience of many ecosystems is likely to be exceeded this century by an
unprecedented combination of climate change, associated disturbances and other global
change drivers”.
Climate change is no longer just an environmental issue that affects some, but an
everyday challenge for all stakeholders- individuals, policy makers, industries,
accounting standard setters, users, preparers of financial reports and the eco-system
(IPCC, 2007; Garnaut 4 , 2008). In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was released as an
international response to climate change, whereby industrialised countries agree to
reduce combined quantity of GHG emissions by 8% compared to 1990 levels between
2008 and 2012 (Braun, 2009; Fernández & Blass, 2006). One of the Australian
government responses has been to change the focus of the Australian economy, from a
traditional fossil-fuel driven economy to an environmentally friendly carbon one. In

2

CH4 refers to methane.
GHG, CO2 and carbon are used synonymously.
4
Professor Ross Garnaut was the official advisor for the Australian Labor government’s Carbon Pollution
Reduction Scheme (CPRS).
3
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order to facilitate a shift in global practices, emissions trading schemes (ETS) 5 have
emerged to reduce GHG emissions in some industrialised countries.
1.2 ETS AS A MARKET RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
The dominant response of industrialised countries to climate change has been to apply
market mechanisms to assign a cost of emissions and ultimately lower emissions
(Lohmann, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009). Under the Kyoto Protocol, countries are offered
three market mechanisms to meet their emissions reduction targets: the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and Emissions Trading
Scheme (ETS) (UNFCCC, 2009a). ETS is created on the assumption that a price for
GHG emissions can be obtained through the establishment of an emission rights 6
market. An emissions cap is linked to GHG emissions reduction targets set in the Kyoto
Protocol, and the ‘right to emit’ becomes a tradable private property in an emission
rights market. As the IASB (2008a; 2008b) describes, the functionality of ETS relies on
the notion of a tradable private property through which emissions are valued and priced.
The cost of emissions has been traditionally treated as an externality and thus excluded
from the costs of production. As Zhang-Debreceny et al (2009) suggest, the price of
emission rights is a key factor for emitters when deciding to adopt carbon friendly
technology or simply purchase emission rights to offset emissions. Despite the fact that
ETS is still at its infancy stage, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) (2008, p18) suggests
that:
Such transactions are fuelling the carbon trading market – estimated by the
World Bank to be worth around £15bn last year. Most trading currently involves
the sale of allowances under the EU’s emissions trading scheme, which covers
large carbon emitters.
Emerging ETSs give rise to reporting implications to both emitters and accounting
standard setters (Zhang-Debreceny et al, 2009). As a consequence, the IASB is expected
to engage with this new emissions-reduction mechanism. The need to internalise costs
of GHG emissions via emission rights trading has shifted what was traditionally a

5

An Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS) has also been referred as a ‘cap-and-trade’, carbon trading and
emissions trading scheme. In this thesis, the term Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) will be used
throughout this thesis to ensure consistency.
6
An emission right has also been referred to as a carbon permit, an emissions permit, a carbon/emissions
allowance and credit. In this thesis, the term ‘emission right’ will be used throughout this thesis to ensure
consistency.
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costless externality into a costly business activity, putting accounting for emission rights
“at the heart of the challenge posed to standard setters” (Cook, 2009, p457).
1.3 CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTING FOR EMISSION RIGHTS
The emergence of ETS opens up a moral debate of how to report and disclose the
impact of climate change. The notion of emissions trading not only challenges society’s
capacity to meet the expectations of emissions reduction, but also creates challenges in
the way emissions are measured and disclosed in accounting. As emissions trading
schemes emerge worldwide (e.g. the proposed Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction
Scheme (CPRS), the New Zealand and EU ETS), the lack of a uniform accounting
standard for reporting emission rights presents challenges for accounting standard
setters in the light of this unprecedented phenomenon. Challenges of climate change and
emerging emission rights trading give rise to a need to “engage in ethical approaches to
the environment, not only by immediate stakeholders, but by accounting standard
setters” (Zhang-Debreceny et al, 2009, p19). The creation and subsequent withdrawal of
IFRIC 3 Emission Rights is an indication of the challenges the IASB faces, and this
thesis will explore those challenges concerning the accounting recognition of emission
rights.
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND CONTRIBUTIONS
This thesis regards the IASB’s struggle to arrive at an authoritative guidance of
accounting for emission rights as an opportunity to re-consider and re-examine this
unprecedented phenomenon from an alternative perspective that is socially and
ecologically informed. Due to a limited scope, this thesis is only able to explore the
recognition issues of accounting for emission rights. This thesis seeks to use Critical
Discourse Analysis (CDA) to critically examine the discourse represented in the
accounting recognition of emission rights in IFRIC 3 Emission Rights in order to shed
some light on the role accounting plays in a wider social and ecological context. The
research objective of this thesis is three-fold:
1. Critically evaluate the accounting approach to the recognition of emission rights
adopted by the IFRIC/IASB and their constituents.
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2. Highlight and problematise the implication of the IFRIC’s accounting
recognition of emission rights in a wider social and environmental context;
3. Engage in accounting for emission rights from an environmental ethics
perspective;
This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature in accounting for emission rights and
represents work which is at the frontier of contemporary accounting research, and of
global significance. The theoretical and practical contributions of this thesis are:
1. This thesis expands the application of CDA (see Chapter Four for a detailed
discussion on CDA as a research method) to a new context of accounting for
emission rights. CDA is not a new method in critical research, and is commonly
applied in analysing political, social, legal, cultural and educational texts (Luke,
2002). Furthermore, Luck (2002, p 99) points out that while “…it would hardly
be appropriate to define CDA as a newcomer…CDA still considered a fringe
dweller in mainstream analysis”. A key theoretical contribution of this thesis is
to expand the application of an established, yet, alternative research method, like
CDA, to an emerging field of inquiry-accounting for emission rights, which has
social, environmental, economic and political ramifications. In other words, this
thesis seeks to ‘revitalise’ CDA by applying it to examine a contemporary
phenomenon that has significant mainstream implications.
2. This thesis seeks to examine the accounting implications of emission rights
trading. An international accounting standard for emission rights can be
expected to facilitate emerging emissions trading schemes worldwide. The IASB
(2010b, p9) notes that it has been working with the U.S. FASB on accounting
for emission rights, and expects to “publish an exposure draft together in 2010
with the aim of issuing common standards in 2011”. One key practical
contribution of this thesis is to inform accounting standards setters of an
alternative approach to an accounting standard for emission rights. This thesis
seeks to contribute to the debate regarding the accounting nature of emission
rights, and facilitate the development of an international standard on emission
rights. Another practical contribution of this thesis is to provide an alternative
benchmark of evaluating existing accounting standards on emission rights.
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1.5 THESIS OUTLINE
The following chapter provides background information on the Kyoto Protocol as a
global response to climate change. Chapter Two provides an outline of ETS as a market
mechanism intended to reduce emissions and introduces existing and emerging ETSs
such as the EU ETS and the Australian CPRS. Chapter Two also introduces existing
reporting frameworks, past attempts to standardise accounting for emission rights (e.g.
IFRIC 3) and the reporting and ethical challenges associated with accounting for
emission rights.
Chapter Three introduces environmental ethics as a theoretical framework and
specifically, a social ecology approach to environmental ethics, which informs the
critical examination of accounting for emission rights in Chapter Eight.
Chapter Four presents Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the research method to
analyse texts concerning accounting for emission rights. This thesis will analyse texts
surrounding IFRIC 3 in order to shed some light on the accounting recognition of
emission rights existing efforts have adopted and its implications. The data examined in
CDA consists of texts from 7 :
1. IFRIC 3 Emission Rights
2. 39 draft IFRIC 3 (D1) comment letters from stakeholders of IFRIC 3
3. Two IASB press releases concerning the withdrawal of IFRIC 3
The data will be analysed from three levels identified by CDA in Chapter Five, Six and
Seven:
1. Text analysis level
2. Discourse analysis level
3. Social analysis level.

7

This thesis uses the Urgent Issues Group (UIG)’s Interpretation 3 instead of IFRIC 3 released by the
IASB, as UIG Interpretation 3 is equivalent to IFRIC 3, and a copy of UIG Interpretation 3 is publicly
available. Electronic copies of comment letters on the draft IFRIC 3 are obtained from the IASB staff via
email after the author of this thesis contacted the IASB staff who is directly responsible for the IASB
Emission Trading Schemes project. The IASB’s press releases concerning its decision to withdrawal
IFRIC 3 in 2005 are publicly available.
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These three levels of CDA, as affiliated to the discourse of accounting for emission
rights, are expected to provide insights to:
1. Who is saying what?
2. What does it mean?
3. What are the key social relations/players that contribute to discourse production?
In Chapter Five, data is analysed on the textual level, where ‘who said what’ will be
examined. In Chapter Six, data is analysed from a discourse level, where the meaning of
‘what is said’ in the texts and how they interact will be explored. In Chapter Seven,
social analysis of CDA seeks to reveal the key players and social relations that shape the
dominant discourses on the accounting recognition of emission rights.
Chapter Eight is informed by the tenets of social ecology, which provides an alternative
lens through which the discourses of accounting for emission rights are (re) examined.
Chapter Eight seeks to problematise a mainstream approach to accounting for emission
rights from an alternative perspective and offer an insight into the social and ecological
implications of the mainstream approach past efforts have taken to account for emission
rights. Chapter Nine draws conclusion on how environmental ethics can offer an
applicable alternative perspective to addressing accounting for emission rights, and
suggests a potential way forward for accounting standard setters regarding the
development of a new accounting standard that is ecologically informed.
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CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND: AUSTRALIAN AND
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF A CARBONCONSTRAINED ECONOMY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Underlying accounting for emission rights is the emergence of Australian and
international responses to climate change. Since accounting is a social practice that
reflects and shapes the underlying social context (Arrington and Francis, 1993; Hopper
et al, 1987), an examination of social developments on climate change cannot be
disconnected from the analysis of accounting for emission rights. The following chapter
examines key responses to climate change, such as the Kyoto protocol, the EU ETS and
proposed Australian CPRS. Accordingly, the reporting and disclosure implications of
climate change policies, in particular, past attempts to standardise accounting for
emission rights, are also presented in this chapter.
2.2 KYOTO PROTOCOL AND ETS: A GLOBAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE
CHANGE
Climate change is induced by humans’ heavy reliance on carbon for energy generation
(Garnaut, 2008). The current mode of short-term economic growth continues to push
ecological limits and the carrying capacity of eco-systems. As Daly (2002, p48) argues:
Ecological limits are rapidly converting ‘economic growth’ into ‘uneconomic
growth’-growth which increases costs by more than it increases benefits, thus
making us poorer not richer. The macroeconomy is not the whole-it is Part of a
larger Whole, the ecosystem. As the macroeconomy grows in its physical
dimensions (population and per capita resource use), it does not grow into the
Void. It grows into and encroaches on the larger ecosystem, thereby incurring an
opportunity cost of pre-empted natural capital and services. These opportunity
costs of sacrificed natural services can be, and often are, worth more than the
extra production benefits of growth.
Climate change presents a new kind of global challenge to business, policy makers and
individuals. It challenges society’s willingness and capacity to adapt to a carbonconstrained environment. For instance, MacKenzie (2009) suggests that climate change
policies such as ETS are often driven and constrained by political factors. Persistent
political pressure from emitting countries and industries against climate change actions
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further reinforces an ‘all talk and no action’ approach to climate change. In order to
reach a global consensus on climate change and develop a global climate change policy,
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 8 was
negotiated between 1990 and 1992 in preparation for the UN conference on
Environment and Development (Yamin, 2005, p37). Established in 1994 and ratified by
192 countries, the UNFCCC sets an international framework for intergovernmental
consensus and efforts to tackle climate change (UNFCCC, 2009b). The Kyoto Protocol
is a binding international agreement linked to the UNFCCC, which was adopted on 11
December 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 2005. According to the Kyoto
protocol, other than national measures adopted by each participating country, there are
three additional market-based mechanisms offered in the treaty to achieve GHG
reduction targets (UNFCCC, 2009a):
1. ETS, where the allowable level of GHG emissions are represented by tradable
emission rights that are auctioned or allocated by a central authority, for
instance, a government.
2. CDM, whereby an industrialised country under the Kyoto Protocol invests in
emissions-reduction projects/technologies in developing countries in order to
earn tradable Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits (each equivalent to
one tonne of GHG emissions), which can be used to meet Kyoto Protocol
emissions reduction targets.
3. JI, where an industrialised country under the Kyoto Protocol earns Emissions
Reduction Units (ERU) from an emissions-reduction project in another
industrialised country to meet its Kyoto Protocol emissions reduction targets.
Industrialised countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol have begun to develop
ETS to meet their Kyoto reduction targets. For instance, in Australia, the New South
Wales Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme (GGAS) commenced on 1 January 2003 and
was one of the first ETSs in the world (New South Wales Government, 2009). The
largest emissions trading scheme in the world is the EU ETS. Established on 1 January
2005, the EU ETS is the EU member countries’ response to achieving emissions
reduction targets set by the Kyoto Protocol. Fernández and Blass (2006) argue that ETS
8

The UNFCCC provides a platform for governments of member countries to share information on
climate change policies as well as to cooperate in the development of a global action against climate
change. The last milestone UNFCCC meeting was held in Copenhagen, Denmark in December 2009.
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is the most cost-effective means of achieving emissions reduction. The European
Commission estimates that ETS will allow the EU to achieve its Kyoto emissions
reduction targets at a cost of between €2.9 and €3.7 billion annually (which is 0.1% of
GDP in the EU), compared to around €6.8 billion a year in compliance costs without the
scheme (European Commission, 2006, p7).
The characteristics of ETS include:
1. A central authority (a government or an environmental protection agency) sets a
maximum limit on the amount of allowable GHG emissions that may be
released in a specified compliance period (typically one year).
2. This limit (or cap) is represented by the number of emission rights that are
issued by a central authority.
3. Emissions rights are either allocated free of charge or auctioned by the central
authority to ETS participants at the beginning of a compliance cycle.
4. Following its issue, an emissions right can also be traded across markets and
countries. For emitters who are unable to meet their emissions reduction targets,
they would have to purchase additional emission rights to offset their actual
emissions or face a fine.
IASB (2008a, para 5) suggests that “the theory behind emissions trading relies on the
creation of value through the allocation of a right to emit pollutants”. Solomon and Lee
(2000, p35) describe ETS as “a means of internalizing externalities”. Externalities occur
as a result of the market’s inability to include social and environmental costs of
production for various reasons, including control and measurement issues. According to
economic rational choice theory, utility-maximisation, in particular, economic
incentives, drives decision-making (Boudon, 2003). Consistent with economic rational
choice theory, the creation of a tradable ‘right to emit’ can encourage emitters to reduce
emissions to avoid the financial burden of having to purchase emission rights to offset
emissions. It is assumed that as a result of limited supply of emission rights, the market
would eventually drive up the price of emission rights to a point when carbon friendly
technologies become more affordable than emission rights. In other words, it is
expected that the cost of purchasing emission rights would eventually exceed the cost of
acquiring carbon efficient technologies, creating a genuine economic incentive for
emitting entities to reduce GHG emissions, rather than paying a premium to buy the
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rights to emit. Patrick Birley from the European Climate Exchange, summarise the
notion of ETS as:
…a perfectly acceptable and clever approach to reducing greenhouse gases. This
scheme is allowing those who change early to make money…you put
technology on top of your smokestacks that will stop the carbon going into the
atmosphere, you can profit from it (Lazaredes, 2008).
Therefore, ETS is premised on an economic rationalist argument which assumes that a
market can efficiently allocate resources and provide public goods in terms of lower
GHG emissions.
2.3 CPRS: AN AUSTRALIAN RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
States and territories in Australia formed the National Emissions Trading Taskforce
(NETT) in 2004 to develop a model for a national ETS (Australian Government
Department of Climate Change, 2008a, p57). Since then, the Australian government has
ratified the Kyoto Protocol in December 2007 and committed to “a medium-term
national target to reduce Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions by between 5 per cent
and 15 per cent below 2000 levels by the end 2020”, and a “long-term target of a 60 per
cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 2000 levels by 2050” (Australian
Government Department of Climate Change, 2008b, p19). The Australian government
also agreed to reduce emissions “by 25% below 2000 levels by 2020 if the rest of the
world also takes strong action on climate change” (Australian Government Department
of Climate Change, 2010a, p14). To achieve Australia’s Kyoto Protocol targets, a CPRS
was on the Australian government agenda to begin in 2011 (Australian Government
Department of Climate Change, 2010a). The Australian government released a CPRS
‘Green paper’ for public discussion in July 2008 and announced its final decision on the
implementation of the CPRS in a ‘White paper’ in December 2008. After two failed
attempts to pass the CPRS legislation in 2009, the Australian government announced on
the 27th of April, 2010, that the CPRS will be delayed until after the Kyoto Protocol
expires at the end of 2012 (Australian Government Department of Climate Change,
2010b). As the then Prime Minister of Australia (2010) explains:
The implementation of a Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme in Australia will
therefore be extended until after the conclusion of the current Kyoto
commitment period, which finishes at the end of 2012. By the end of that period,
the Governments around the world will be required to make clear their
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commitments for the post-2012 period. And that will provide therefore the
Australian Government at that time, at the end of 2012, with a better position to
assess the level of global action on climate change prior to the implementation
of a CPRS in Australia.
The proposed Australian CPRS is largely adapted from the EU ETS (Australian
Government Department of Climate Change, 2008; Garnaut, 2008). According to the
Australian Government Department of Climate Change (2008), the key emissions
reduction mechanic of the CPRS relies on a central distribution authority (e.g. a
government) to monitor and control the number of emission rights issued every year.
The CPRS primarily targets the largest emitters in Australia that produce more than
25,000 tonnes of carbon emissions each year (Australian Government Department of
Climate Change, 2008). The Government also recognises that there will be adjustment
costs for emitters as they move to a low carbon economy. Government assistance to
help these businesses in the transition period includes providing free emission rights to
the most emissions intensive industries (Australian Government Department of Climate
Change, 2008).
While it is the notion of an emissions cap that is expected to deliver emissions
reduction, it is the accounting of emission rights that is expected to provide
transparency and disclosure to facilitate decision-making. The question of how emitters
will report these emissions rights is in debate. The following discussion provides an
outline of Australian and international efforts to standardise accounting for emission
rights.
2.4 EMISSION RIGHTS REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE: A MAJOR
CHALLENGE
ETS, along with CDM and JI, rely on the creation of a private property right to quantify
the cost of GHG emissions. The creation of a new commodity such as an emission right
has triggered debates in the accounting profession concerning how to account for such
transactions and report under those market mechanisms.
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2.4.1 NATIONAL GREENHOUSE AND ENERGY REPORTING FRAMEWORK
(NGER): AN AUSTRALIAN ATTEMPT TO STANDARDISE ACCOUNTING FOR
EMISSION RIGHTS

On the reporting and compliance front, the Australian government has introduced the
National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Framework (NGER) Act in 2007 in
preparation for the implementation of the CPRS (Shying & Wong, 2007). According to
the Australian Government Department of Climate Change (2008a, p23):
The National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (NGER Act)
introduces a single national reporting framework for the reporting and assurance
of information related to greenhouse gas emissions, greenhouse gas projects,
energy consumption and energy production. The NGER Act states that one of its
key objectives is to underpin the introduction of emissions trading…
On the international front, as Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez (2008, p704) suggest,
“much of the research carried out on the accounting of pollution allowance markets has
been inspired by the SO2 emission trading scheme created by the U.S. EPA 9 in 1990”.
The following discussion provides an overview of the U.S. acid rain program and the
corresponding accounting standard for SO2 emission rights.
2.4.2 PAST ATTEMPTS BY THE U.S. FASB TO STANDARDISE ACCOUNTING FOR
SO2 (SULPHUR DIOXIDE) EMISSION RIGHTS

The primary goal of the EU ETS is to curb CO2 emissions as the main GHG that
contributes to global warming. Similarly, in the 1990s in the U.S., a SO2 emissions
trading scheme was established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
under the Clean Air Act Amendments (1990) (e.g. Milne, 1996b; Wambsganss and
Sanford, 1996; U.S. EPA, 2009). According to the U.S. EPA (2009), the Clean Air Act
(1990) sets a goal of annual SO2 emissions reduction by “10 million tons below 1980
levels” in order to curb acid rain, which is largely caused by SO2 emissions. The Acid
rain program, established by the U.S. EPA in the 1990s, was implemented through an
emission rights trading system 10 , whereby the EPA grants a limited number of SO2
emission rights annually to emitters on the basis of their historical emissions level (U.S.
EPA, 2009). Similar to the EU ETS, ETS under the acid rain program also allows
9

‘EPA’ stands for Environmental Protection Agency.
The term “allowance trading” is used by the U.S. EPA. This thesis uses the term “emission rights
trading”. Both terms should be treated as synonymous.
10
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emitters to emit SO2 up to a cap level so long as they hold sufficient rights to offset
actual emissions, or they face a penalty for every excess ton of emissions. The tradable
and bankable SO2 emission rights were either allocated free of charge by the EPA or
auctioned to emitters (U.S. EPA, 2009).
On the accounting front of the SO2 emission rights trading, on March 26, 1993, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) adopted reporting requirements under
the U.S. GAAP for emission rights under the Clean Air Act amendments (1990)
(Wambsganss and Sanford, 1996, p645). As explained by Wambsganss and Sanford
(1996, p645):
According to accounting and reporting procedures set forth by FERC, pollution
allowances are recorded in one of two possible accounts at historic cost based on
intended use. Costs of allowances to be used to cover current pollution
emissions are reported in the “Allowance Inventory” account, while costs of
allowances intended for use as investments are reported in the “other
Investments” account. Purchased allowances are recorded at the amount paid by
the purchasing firm in one of the two previously mentioned accounts…If
management anticipates using the allowances as compensation for emissions
emitted during the current period, the cost of the allowances is included in the
allowances inventory account. If, on the other hand, the allowances are intended
to be held for future use in operations or are to be sold at some future date, the
cost is placed in the investments account.
One major difference between the U.S. and the IFRIC’s approach to accounting for
emission rights is that “U.S. GAAP accounts for EAs on a historical cost basis, while
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) supports a fair value approach”
(Elfrink and Ellison, 2009, p30-31). Despite the difference in approaches, FASB’s
experience in standardising accounting for emission rights may explain its active
involvement in the IASB’s Emissions Trading Schemes project.
The IASB has not issued any authoritative international guidance on accounting for
emission rights since the withdrawal of IFRIC 3 Emission Rights in 2005. The
following discussion provides a brief overview of the IASB’s past attempt to account
for emission rights.
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2.4.3 IFRIC 3: A FAILED ATTEMPT BY THE IASB TO STANDARDISE
ACCOUNTING FOR EMISSION RIGHTS

The creation of an emission rights market raises accounting implications (Hopwood,
2009; MacKenzie, 2009). Lohmann (2009) and Cook (2009) point out that accounting
for emission rights poses great challenges to accounting standard setters. Accounting for
emission rights is an integral part of a functioning ETS as it provides the mechanism for
transparency, decision-making and accountability. The absence of specific authoritative
guidance on accounting for emission rights from the IASB adds to uncertainties
surrounding the implementation of emission rights trading, which depends on the
development of new accounting procedures to recognise and measure emission rights.
In order to address the urgent need for reporting guidance in time for the 2005 EU ETS,
the IASB decided to provide accounting guidance via the International Financial
Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) 11 . The IFRIC developed an interpretation:
IFRIC 3 Emission Rights, based on existing IASs (IAS 20 Accounting for Government
Grants and Disclosure for Government Assistance, IAS 38 Intangible Assets and IAS
37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets) to provide guidance on
how emitters should account for emission rights. The IFRIC consensus concludes the
following accounting recognitions of emission rights (AASB 2005, para 5):
1. An intangible asset for emission rights held by an entity;
2. A liability for the obligation to deliver emission rights equal to an entity’s actual
emissions level during a compliance period (usually one year);
3. A government grant for the difference between the amount paid and the fair
value of the emission rights when they are issued for less than fair value of
consideration.
The IFRIC published a draft IFRIC 3 (D1) for public comment in 2003 and received 40
comment letters. In December 2004, the final IFRIC 3 was issued by the IASB (e.g.
IASB, 2008, 2010a). In 2005, the Urgent Issues Group (UIG) under the AASB issued
its IFRIC 3 equivalent: UIG Interpretation 3 Emission rights (AASB, 2005). However,

11

IFRIC is the standards interpretation arm of the IASC foundation. Their authority is limited to
providing interpretations and guidance on existing IASs.
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within less than one year of release, the IASB made the decision to withdraw IFRIC 3
with immediate effect in 2005 (IASB 2005).
In December 2007, the IASB decided to activate the Emissions Trading Schemes
Project since the withdrawal of IFRIC 3 in 2005 (IASB 2008). The IASB also called for
cooperation from several national accounting standard setters to address accounting for
emission rights and subsequently received support from the FASB, who has added
accounting for emission rights to its project agenda since 2007 (e.g. IASB 2008; Elfrink
and Ellison, 2009; FASB 2007, 2008; IASB, 2010b). At the joint IASB and FASB
board meeting in October 2008, the board members discussed accounting for emission
rights in an educational session, however, no consensus was reached (FASB 2008). In
the light of an active accounting for emission rights project and the absence of
authoritative guidance on accounting for emission rights, the IASB (2008b, para 22)
confirms that “in addressing the accounting issues the staff should not be constrained by
existing IFRSs, but the Framework would still be relevant”.
The following discussion provides an overview on the role of the IFRIC and its
interpretation process, which underlies the ‘rise and fall’ of IFRIC 3.
2.4.3.1 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING INTERPRETATIONS
COMMITTEE (IFRIC) AND ITS INTERPRETATION PROCESS

The IFRIC is the interpretative arm of the International Accounting Standards
Committee foundation (IASCF), while the IASB is its standards-setting arm. The IFRIC
provides interpretations of existing International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs)
and guidance on the implementation of IFRSs (IASB, 2009).
IASCF (2007, para 5) states that the responsibility of the IFRIC is to review:
newly identified financial reporting issues not specifically addressed in IFRSs or
issues where unsatisfactory or conflicting interpretations have developed, or
seem likely to develop in the absence of authoritative guidance, with a view to
reaching a consensus on the appropriate treatment.
Being an interpretative arm of the IASCF, the IFRIC does not have the authority to
amend IASB standards. Its authority is limited to providing interpretations on existing
IFRSs released by the IASB. The interpretation process follows the IFRIC’s due process
of seven steps (IASCF, 2007, para 17-43):
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1. Identification of issues
According to IASCF (2007, para 18), while “the primary responsibility for identifying
issues to be considered by the IFRIC is that of its members and appointed
observers…others with an interest in financial reporting are encouraged to refer issues
to the IFRIC when they believe that divergent practices have emerged regarding the
accounting for particular transactions…”. For instance, in the case of IFRIC 3, the
IFRIC identified the issue of lack of accounting guidance for emission rights trading
when it noted that several governments have, or are developing ETSs to meet their
Kyoto Protocol targets.
2. Setting the agenda
Prior to adding an issue to its agenda, the IFRIC assesses agenda items against a number
of criteria, one of which is whether “the issue can be resolved efficiently within the
confines of existing IFRSs and the Framework, and the demands of the interpretation
process” (IASCF, 2007, para 24). Issues that are added to the IFRIC’s agenda are
limited to those that can be “appropriately addressed within the mandate” (IASCF, 207,
para 27). Issues on which the IFRIC is not able to reach a consensus will be referred to
the IASB for further action.
3. The IFRIC meetings and voting
The IASCF (2007, para 28) describes the IFRIC’s meeting policy as “similar to the
IASB’s general policy for its Board meetings”. At the IFRIC meetings, issues such as
accounting for emission rights are debated and discussed by the IFRIC members and
appointed observers. In between meetings, the IFRIC members carry out a number of
responsibilities, such as confirming the drafting of an interpretation, or work with the
IASB staff to develop relevant topics appropriate for public discussion. The votes of the
nine voting members of the IFRIC are expected to represent their own views, not those
of any organisation.
4. Development of a draft Interpretation
The development of a draft interpretation (e.g. the draft IFRIC 3), is undertaken under
the supervision of IASB staff. An issue summary is developed by the IASB staff for the
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IFRIC’s consideration after extensive literature review, discussions and consultation
with constituents from the accounting profession, such as national accounting standard
setters. An issues summary may include contents such as the relevant accounting
concepts from the Framework and a list of relevant accounting standards. Bradbury
(2007, p114) describes a draft interpretations as “the immediate output of the IFRIC”.
5. The IASB's role in the issue of a draft Interpretation
The IASB plays a crucial role in the IFRIC interpretations process. For instance, IASB
members have access to all the IFRIC agenda papers. They are also expected to
comment on technical accounting issues that are under the IFRIC’s consideration. The
IASB members are informed of the IFRIC consensus on a draft interpretation to ensure
its appropriateness. The IASB has the power to interrupt the public comment process of
a draft interpretation if four or more IASB members object to the IFRIC consensus. Any
draft interpretation objected by the IASB will be discussed at the following IASB
meeting. In other words, the IASB has the final say in whether a draft interpretation will
be published or referred back to the IFRIC for further action.
6. Comment period and deliberation
As explained in IASCF (2007, para 39), all draft interpretations are exposed to public
comment for no less than 60 days before the final interpretations are issued. Comment
letters are made publicly available and an analysis of the comment letters is provided to
the IFRIC for consideration. The consensus in a final interpretation is achieved when
no more than three IFRIC members vote against the proposed accounting treatment
(IASCF, 2007, para 41).
7. The IASB's role in an Interpretation
Prior to the issue of a final interpretation, a draft interpretation requires at least nine
IASB members to vote in its favour in order to get the final green light. Any IFRIC
interpretation that is not approved by the IASB may be referred back to the IFRIC with
an analysis of the IASB objections. A close relationship between the IFRIC and IASB
indicates that the IASB has the final vote on all IFRIC interpretations, and that the
IFRIC’s interpretations are constrained by the Framework and accounting standards.
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2.5 SUMMARY
The absence of specific authoritative guidance on accounting for emission rights in
addition to IASB’s failed attempt to provide guidance on accounting for emission rights
via the IFRIC have put accounting at the forefront of emission rights trading. This thesis
argues that accounting standard setters’ difficulty in arriving at an appropriate standard
to account for emission rights provides an opportunity to pause and re-consider this
unprecedented practice from an alternative perspective. The IASB (2008) recognises
that there are not only measurement, but also recognition issues of emission rights that
need to be appropriately addressed. For example, the IASB (2008a, para 1) identifies a
number of key recognition issues, such as: “Are emission allowances assets? Is this
conclusion affected by how the allowance is acquired? What is the nature of the
allowance (e.g. licence to emit or form of emission currency)”?
Before a commodity can be measured, it must first be defined. Without resolving the
recognition of emission rights, accounting standard setters would not be able to identify
what attributes there are to measure and how to measure those attributes of emission
rights. Chapter Three introduces a social ecology approach to environmental ethics as a
theoretical framework in the (re) examination and critique of IFRIC 3.
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
SOCIAL ECOLOGY
3.1 INTRODUCTION: ACCOUNTING FOR EMISSION RIGHTS: IDEOLOGY
VS ETHICS?
The application of accounting for emission rights has not only raised economic, but also
ethical challenges to accounting standard setters. Lefevere (2005) suggests that the
notion of emission rights trading is a morally grey issue. Public goods are expected to
be provided via an emission rights market. By assigning costs to GHG emissions
through the recognition and valuation of emission rights, policy makers intend to
encourage emitters to recognise explicitly what used to be a costless externality (Cook,
2009). MacKenzie (2009) suggests that the notion of an emission rights market is an
attempt to challenge a capitalist status quo of profit maximisation. However, the market
approach behind ETS relies on a business-as-usual mindset to challenge a mainstream
ideology 12 , which runs counter to the underlying ecological intent. As Gray (2006,
p795) suggests, a mainstream ideology is influenced by:
liberal economic democracy…That is, rational economic information (in this
case financial reporting) provides rational actors (typically shareholders and
other financial market participants) with the wherewithal to pursue their
economic self-interest.
The mainstream market approach behind ETS reflects a fundamentally capitalist view
of environmental responsibility, which focuses on “the empowerment of the rational
investor (sic)” (Gray, 2006, p795). Accounting for emission rights as an attempt to
measure and recognise an environmental externality raises the question of whether it is
able to capture not only the economic and legal, but also the ecological substance of
emission rights trading. As Hopwood (2009, p435) questions:
Can, one wonders, the ethical considerations of the environmentalists be
transferred to the economic market place? Or will the values of the market place
overwhelm those of the environmental sphere, introducing a totally new set of
unanticipated consequences and actions which are likely to be to the longer term
detriment of the original concerns?

12

While the author of this thesis recognises the flaws in the notion of emissions rights trading, this thesis
does not seek to critique ETS as the focus is on accounting for emission rights.
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Zimmerman (1994, p3) also argues that “ecological problems cannot be solved by
simply tinkering with the attitudes and practices that generated those problems”.
Therefore, the question of whether accounting for emission rights can facilitate an
emissions trading scheme to achieve its intended ecological purpose is important.
Accounting for emission rights is an important social choice that accounting standard
setters have to make in order to facilitate rational decision-making, transparency and
accountability. In order for accounting to capture the ecological substance of emission
rights, one must ask: what is it that we are trying to represent in accounting terms? What
are the attributes of emission rights that need to be represented in accounting? How can
accounting represent those attributes in a socially and ecologically rational manner? The
fundamental question of ‘what to represent’ is built on value judgements, which need to
be examined in order to shed some light on the questions of ‘how to represent’ and
‘how much do they represent’. As environmental crusader Gore (2007) urges:
a re-examination of accounting systems and measurement protocols to include
the environment in the routine, everyday calculations by which our economy is
governed, comes about as close as you can get to the heart of why we have this
crisis…Yet, accounting systems are required to hold routinely in mind factors
that are deemed to be important and significant in weighing the pros and cons of
any decision. There has been progress to reform and redesign the accounting
system. But not nearly enough.
This thesis seeks to think outside the mainstream economic paradigm and to re-consider
the existing accounting approach in the context of emerging ETS. This chapter presents
a social ecology approach to environmental ethics as an alternative perspective from
which accounting for emission rights is (re) considered and (re) examined.
3.2 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
Ethics has been broadly defined as “a branch of philosophy that investigates morality
and in particular the varieties of thinking by which human conduct is guided and may be
appraised” (Bullock and Stallybrass, 1977, p214, cited in Andrew, 2000, p201).
Environmental ethics seek to “examines how human beings should interact with the
nonhuman world around them” (Palmer, 1997, p6). Nash (1990, p4) suggests that
environmental ethics give rise to “an evolution of ethics from the natural rights of a
limited group of humans to the rights of parts or…all of nature”. Environmental ethics
provide a normative theoretical framework that “develops, suggests and analyses ways
out of environmental crisis” (Andrew, 2000, p197). There are various philosophical
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approaches to radical environmental ethics, for example, deep ecology, social ecology,
and eco-feminism (e.g. Zimmerman, 1994; Nash, 1990; Palmer, 1997; Andrew, 2000).
While various environmental ethics approaches all seek to guide what is morally right
and wrong in an ecological context, there are two broad divisions that differentiate
various approaches to environmental ethics. As Nash (1990, p124) explains:

Much of the controversy turned on the question of whether environmental ethics
were utilitarian and instrumental-derived from human self-interest-or whether
nature possessed interests, value, or perhaps, rights which people ought to
respect even at considerable personal sacrifice. Another division in the
philosophical community concerned moral eligibility. Was everything in the
environmental to be included in humankind’s moral community? If not, where
did the ethical cut-off fall?
In other words, different approaches to environmental ethics reflect divided views on
the role of humans in ecology and where to draw the line in terms of our ethical
responsibility towards nature. In the centre of various approaches lie the notions of
hierarchy, domination, and the question of how far we should go to reject the dominant
social hierarchy and the order of things. The notion of anthropocentrism-a humancentred ideology, is debated in radical environmental ethics. The following discussion
introduces deep ecology, eco-feminism and social ecology as three key approaches to
environmental ethics. Deep ecology and eco-feminism will be critiqued in order to
explain why a social ecology approach is adopted in this thesis as a relevant theoretical
framework.
3.2.1 DEEP ECOLOGY

Deep ecology was developed by Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess in the 1970s
(Palmer, 1997; Zimmerman, 1994). Naess (1973, p96) argues that anthropocentrism,
which fosters a hierarchical “master-slave” relationship between humans and nature, is
the fundamental cause of our ecological crisis. Naess (1973) suggests that
environmentalism can be categorised into shallow and deep ecology. Fox (1983) argues
that one key distinction between the ‘shallow’ and the ‘deep’ is that shallow ecology is
anthropocentric and conservative, which regards all things in nature as inferior to
humans, and hence, environmental protection is merely driven by self interest of the
humans. As Zimmerman (1994, p20) explains:
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”shallow” environmentalism…only seeks to reform certain socioeconomic
practices (e.g. curtailing industrial pollution) without altering modernity’s
anthropocentric attitude, which is held to be largely responsible for the growing
ecological crisis.
In contrast, deep ecology is a more radical environmental ethics approach that
thoroughly rejects an anthropocentric ideology, which puts humans in the centre of
nature and denies the right of nature to co-exist. Deep ecologists believe that the only
way forward to a better society is to reject anthropocentrism, rather than merely fighting
the ‘symptoms’ of an anthropocentric attitude.

As Andrew (2000, p204) points out, deep ecology attempts to “unmask
anthropocentrism

as

an

environmental

hazardous

legitimating

ideology”.

Anthropocentrism is manifested in various social and ideological institutions, such as
capitalism (Zimmerman, 1994; Palmer, 1997). Naess (1973, p99) describes deep
ecology as “clearly and forcefully normative”. The radical and forceful nature of deep
ecology is evidenced by its complete rejection of capitalism, which nurtures an
anthropocentric ideology and humans’ domination over nature. Eckersley (1998, p165)
illustrates the controversial view of deep ecology with a confronting question from
Tony Lynch and David Wells: “Should we rescue a human from a violent animal attack
by shooting the animal”? As Eckersley (1998, p166) explains:
Indeed, the exemplary ethical choice according to Lynch and Wells 13 ’
understanding of deep ecology would be to shoot the human and allow the
animal attacker a decent meal, especially if it was known that the human was
‘badly crippled’ or ‘particularly unintelligent’ and the animal was an endangered
‘prime specimen,’ such as a wolf. Such a morally repugnant conclusion to this
‘killing scenario’ is intended to serve as a ‘killing objection’ to the entire case
for a non-anthropocentric environmental morality.
In rejecting the ideology that man is not the master of all things, deep ecology looks the
other way and goes as far as being anti-humanism and eco-centric. Anthropocentrism in
this thesis is manifested in the notion of humans facilitating a resolution to an ecological
crisis via the establishment of a market-based emissions trading scheme. The purpose of
this thesis is not only to critically examine the role accounting, a man-made institution
plays in a wider social and ecological context, but also to suggest a way forward for
13

Dr. Tony Lynch is a political ecologist and senior lecturer at the School of Social Science, University
of New England, Australia. Lynch has co-written a number of publications with Dr. David Wells, such as
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accounting standard setters to appropriately account for emission rights. This thesis
suggests that anti-humanistic and anti-anthropocentric sentiments embedded in deep
ecology are too radical to inform an applicable way forward for policy makers and
accounting standard setters. Despite problematising anthropocentrism as a flawed
ideology, deep ecology as a forcefully normative theoretical framework, fails to provide
a viable way forward for policy makers to reduce negative environmental impact of
human activities. For example, Naess (1973, p97) argues that:
In this fight ecologists have found powerful supporters, but sometimes to the
detriment of their total stand. This happens when attention is focused on
pollution and resource depletion rather than on the other points, or when projects
are implemented which reduce pollution but increase evils of the other kinds.
Thus, if prices of life necessities increase because of the installation of antipollution devices, class differences increase too. An ethics of responsibility
implies that ecologists do not serve the shallow, but the deep ecological
movement.
In other words, pollution reduction projects are rejected from a deep ecology
perspective on the basis that it represents a ‘shallow’ movement, despite the fact that
pollution reduction is one of many applicable and viable solutions to environmental
issues. The moral stance of deep ecology is just as flawed as anthropocentrism, as the
notion of a hierarchy still prevails, except that in an anti-humanistic and eco-centric
society, the interest of nature is above that of humans.
Apart from its radical ethical stance, deep ecology is also internally contradictory and
represents a paradox, which is consequently created in the logic behind the approach.
For instance, Hayward (1997) argues that the anthropocentric elements in
environmental ethics are unavoidable and inevitable, as the very notion of deep ecology
is created by the humans to apply to all things in ecology. In other words, the notion of
applying environmental ethics to challenge the status quo is an anthropocentric act in
itself. As Hayward (1997, p55) points out, “however good their intentions, humans can
never be sure of being completely free of speciesist attitudes”.
3.2.2 ECO-FEMINISM

Cooper (1992, p19) suggests that the word ‘feminine’ “is not only intended to connote a
chain of concepts such as caring, warmth, kindness, softness, and so on…It is intended
also as something different…a revolutionary potential, a new way of thinking, non38

competitiveness and giving”. In comparison, masculinity is based on “egocentrism
(unsatisfied desire), fear and outright rejection or denial of difference, hierarchical
oppositions, and a neurotic fixation on a phallic monosexuality” (Cooper, 1992, p33).
While deep ecology rejects anthropocentrism, eco-feminism, on the other hand, rejects
“androcentrism”, in other words, male-centrism (Zimmerman, 1994, p277). Ecofeminists believe that our ecological crisis is the outcome of a male-dominated society
that defines superiority on the basis of masculinity, regards nature and femininity as
inferior, and forces all other things in nature to conform to a patriarchal social order
(Zimmerman, 1994; Palmer, 1997). Informed by the feminist movement and emerged in
the 1970s, eco-feminism argues that “oppression of women and the natural world are
twin oppressions that must be addressed together” (Palmer, 1997, p18). While deep
ecologists seek to challenge human domination and a master-slave hierarchy between
humans and nature, eco-feminists seek to challenge the male domination and a
patriarchal hierarchy. As Andrew (2000, p211) points out, eco-feminism is about “the
systems of domination that are invoked by patriarchy”. For example, eco-feminism
regards problems such as overproduction of waste and environmental deterioration as
the outcomes of a patriarchal/masculine culture, which is manifested in “patriarchal,
nature-fearing, militaristic, hierarchical politicoeconomic systems” (Zimmerman, 1994,
p234). As Salleh (1989, cited in Zimmerman, 1994, p239) explains:
Ecofeminists…argue that by constructing feminine experience in this way (i.e.,
as closer to nature), patriarchy placed women in a privileged nurturant relation
to other living things. Hence the value of feminine insights in a time of ecocatastrophe. It’s not that women are actually closer to nature than men, clearly
we all live in continuity with gaia. But throughout history, men have chosen to
set themselves apart, usually “over and above” nature and women.
According to eco-feminists, an ecological society is one that is non-patriarchal and nonandrocentric, where women are liberated from male domination, and mother nature is
liberated from the domination of a patriarchal and masculine culture. Cooper (1992)
problematises mainstream accounting on the basis of its promotion of masculine traits,
which fail to capture and respect the essence of all things in nature.
Andrew (2000, p211) describes eco-feminism as an environmental ethics approach
which engages in “a sophisticated analysis of gender and the role that patriarchy plays
in the marginalization of nature”. This thesis, however, argues that eco-feminism is a
flawed approach to environmental ethics, as its ethical stance is subjectively
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constructed. The feminine traits that eco-feminists consider as building blocks of a
superior alternative to masculinity and androcentrism are subjectively constructed
ideals, which cannot be used as a basis of generalisation (Archambault, 1993). Apart
from the subjectively and ambiguously constructed feminine ideals that underlie ecofeminism, this thesis also rejects eco-feminism on the basis of its sexist approach to
environmental ethics. As Plumwood (1988, p20, cited in Archambault, 1993):
Perhaps the most obvious way to interpret the ecofeminist argument is as one
which replaces the masculine model of the human character by a new feminine
model. ..this feminizing strategy rejects the masculine character ideal and
affirms a feminine one for both sexes.
In other words, eco-feminism adopts the assumption that the feminine character is
always more superior and desirable than the masculine one, and rejects the reality that
femininity has both desirable and undesirable traits. This thesis concludes that ecofeminism is too subjective and radical to be used as a basis of informing a rational way
forward on the issue of accounting for emission rights.
The social ecology approach to environmental ethics is discussed in details in the
following section.
3.3 SOCIAL ECOLOGY
3.3.1 AN OVERVIEW

Social ecology is an applicable environmental ethics approach relevant to our ecological
crisis. As defined by Clark (1997, cited from Light, 1998, p9), social ecology:
investigates the ontological, epistemological, ethical and political dimensions of
the relationship between society and the ecological, and seeks the practical
wisdom that results from such reflections.
Founded by Bookchin and influenced by Marxism, social ecology recognises the
unbreakable link between the natural world and human society, and their possible unity
into an ecologically rational society (Callicott and Frodeman, 2009; Bookchin 1980,
1989). As Bookchin (1981, p15) suggests:
Marx was entirely correct to emphasize that the revolution required by our time
must draw its poetry…from the humanistic potentialities that lie on the horizons
of social life...
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The philosophical foundation of social ecology is the recognition that nature is a
socially constructed concept, influenced by culture and human knowledge, and that
there is interdependency between human society and nature. From a social ecological
perspective, the exploitation of nature not only destroys the intrinsic value of ecosystems, but also the life line essential for human survival. Based on the interdependent
relationship between humans and nature, social ecology suggests that humans have an
obligation to prevent the deterioration of nature in order to ensure self preservation
(Bookchin, 1980, 1981, 1989, 1990). Social ecology challenges a mainstream ‘tick-abox’ approach to the environment as it ignores the dialectic nature of things (Bookchin,
1990). As explained by Bookchin (1990, p14):
Conventional reason thus serves the practical function of describing a given
entity’s identify and tells us how an entity is organized to be itself. But it ignores
the need to systematically explore processes of change, indeed, how a living
entity is so constructed as a potentiality to phase from one stage of its
development into another…Dialectical reason acknowledges the developmental
nature of reality by asserting in one fashion or another that A equals not only A
but also not-A”.
Bookchin (1981) argues that things are always in the process of becoming, changing,
developing and growing. Social ecology adopts dialectical reasoning, and regards social
reality as not just what it is (being), but what we make it to be (becoming). From a
social ecological perspective, our ecological crisis is a social crisis. As Bookchin (1980,
1981, 1989, 1990) points out, social ecology does not merely seek to critique the
mainstream thought which disconnects humans from nature, but rather seeks to apply
environmental wisdom and conscience to make positive social changes. Central to
social ecology is a “desire to find viable ways to resolve the contradiction between
production and ecology” (Andrew, 2000, p208). For instance, Bookchin (1981) and
Gore (1989) argue that humans can shape the future of the natural world, and that the
same human technologies that have caused environmental destruction can be used to
reconstruct our ecosystems, if applied with an ecological conscience.
Social ecology raises some important questions in ecological thought. For instance,
Bookchin (1990, p7) raises a number of fundamental questions that can inform policy
makers: “what is nature? What is humanity’s place in nature? And what is the
relationship of society to the natural world”. In order to answer those questions, one
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must examine the ethical premises adopted in social ecology as well as a mainstream
approach.
Table 1 below provides a comparison of ethical premises under both a mainstream and
social ecological paradigm.
Table 1: A comparison between a social ecology and mainstream approach

(Adapted from Zhang-Debreceny et al, 2009, p23)
Assumptions

Mainstream

Social Ecology

Ontological & epistemological

Realist, Anthropocentric

Social constructionist, Anthronon-hierarchical

About nature

Externality

Humans’ equal/essential for
human survival

About the role of humans

Maximise personal utility only

Nature’s guardian to protect
inter-generational equity

About the role of accounting

Integral to capital markets,

To represent nature, inform

maintains a capitalist ideology

economic and ecologically
rational behaviours, reflect a
long-term focus

As Table 1 illustrates, social ecology challenges various aspects of a mainstream
ideology. In the following discussion, four key ethical premises of social ecology are
introduced and contrasted with those of a mainstream approach. They are: (1) the
ontological and epistemological assumptions; (2) assumption about nature; (3)
assumption about the role of humans; (4) assumption about the role of accounting.
3.3.2 ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS

Dillard (1991, p11) refers to ontology and epistemology as “the nature of being or
reality” and “the means or process of knowing” respectively. In other words, ontology is
one’s worldview, and epistemology is one’s understanding of how and where valid
knowledge should be derived. A realist ontology is “fundamental to objectivism”
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(Dillard, 1991, p11). Chua (1986) suggests that a mainstream accounting approach is
dominated by a reality ontology, a worldview that:
accepts that accounting phenomena (a) are identical to the technical, asocial
occurrences of the natural world; and (b) may be studied as a detached entity
which is divorced from the ‘independent’ researcher. Accounting reality is not
seen as a constituted domain which emerges, changes (Chua, 1986a, p. 583)…
In other words, a mainstream accounting approach is built on the assumption that
accounting information is an objective and a true reflection of economic reality. Chua
(1986b, p604) suggests that the ontological assumption that accounting is an objective
and neutral reflection of economic reality “lies prior to and governs” the subsequent
epistemological assumption. A realist ontology subsequently leads to a positivist and
reductionist mainstream accounting approach, which considers knowledge of the social
world as “gained through an accumulation of activities by ‘observers’ searching for
consistencies and causal relationships” (Dillard, 1991, p11). Therefore, any valid
accounting guidance must demonstrate objectivity, empiricism, and most importantly,
consistency with the existing Framework. A positivist approach also limits accounting
practice to an exclusively numerical view of social and economic reality, which creates
an impression of objectivity and neutrality. The pursuit of objectivity and neutrality in
mainstream accounting creates a rigid accounting framework that excludes nature from
the accounting equation (e.g. Hines, 1988; Hines, 1991a; Cooper, 1992; Spence, 2007;
Birkin, 1996). Mainstream accounting also lacks ethical considerations (Gray, 1992).
For instance, mainstream accounting promotes an anthropocentric view of nature, which
is “centred around humanity” (Andrew, 2000, p198).
In contrast, social ecology adopts an anthro-non-hierarchical and social constructionist
approach to nature. A fundamental premise of social ecology is the vital link between
human survival and nature’s preservation. Social ecology challenges the major
presupposition that human institutions are organised to be capable of standing on their
own, independent of the natural world (Bookchin, 1989, 1990). In other words, instead
of seeing things as both differentiated and yet inter-related in social ecology, a
mainstream accounting approach tends to treat all things in nature as, in Hegel’s remark,
“a night in which all cows are black” (Bookchin, 1990, p24).
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As Gore (1989) suggests:

Humankind has suddenly entered into a new relationship with the planet Earth.
Our survival depends on our capacity to grasp, and quickly, the extent to which
the current pattern of world civilization threatens the ecological system that
sustains life as we know it.
From a social ecology perspective, the interdependency between humans and nature
implies that humans have an undeniable role to play in ecological matters. Social
ecology adopts a constructionist approach to nature, which posits that:

Social reality is emergent, subjectively created, and objectified through human
interaction. All actions have meaning and intention that are retrospectively
endowed and that are grounded in social and historical practices (Chua, 1986b,
p615).
Social ecology regards the reality of nature as a socially constructed notion and a
product of social decisions. As Palmer (1994) suggests, nature is a socially constructed
notion, defined by and manifested via social practices. Social ecology recognises the
interconnectedness between the ‘social’ and the ‘natural’, and seeks to examine
environmental issues through a social lens. For instance, social ecology regards our
ecological crisis as a social crisis, as it is predominately caused by irresponsible social
actions, such as industrial pollution and environmental exploitation.

Bookchin (1980, 1981, 1989, 1990) suggests that social ecology binds the interests of
humans with that of nature and considers it misleading to separate social matters from
ecological ones. Bookchin (1990, p116) argues that “it would be grossly misleading to
invoke ‘biocentricity’, ‘natural law’, and ‘antihumanism’ for ends that deny what is
most distinctive in all human natural attributes”. Social ecology argues that humans not
only depend on nature for survival, but also shape the future of nature because of our
power status in the natural world. Therefore, Hayward (1997, p58) considers radical,
anti-social and anti-anthropocentric views as:

not only unhelpful, but positively counterproductive…if the point of antianthropocentric rhetoric is to highlight problems, to make them vivid in order to
get action, then misrepresenting the problem is liable to make solutions all the
harder.
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Instead of rejecting anthropocentrism altogether, social ecology adopts an open and
inclusive approach to nature and seeks to provide a viable solution that is integral to the
“social realm and not divorced therefrom” (Gallhofer and Haslam, 1997, p163). In other
words, anthropocentrism is “not directly challenged” in social ecology as it recognises
the powerful status of humans in the natural community (Andrew, 2000, p207). Social
ecology does not entirely reject the notion of anthropocentrism, but rather supports an
anthro-non-hierarchical relationship between humans and nature.
Social ecology regards humans as nature’s equal, instead of its superior. It proposes a
shift from humans as the conqueror of nature to citizens of it, and challenges
anthropocentrism, which justifies humans’ exploitation of nature (Bookchin, 1980,
1990). However, unlike deep ecology, social ecology does not completely reject the
notion of human domination, as the advancement of human science and technology
implies that humans are capable of standing apart from the less developed life forms in
nature. Social ecology acknowledges the reality that humans are the most progressed
species in the natural community and the only ones that are capable of comprehending
and formulating the notions of environmental responsibility, ethics and morality.
Hayward (1997, p49) suggests that “…the clearest instances of overcoming
anthropocentrism involve precisely the sort of objectivating knowledge which many
ecological critics see as itself archetypically anthropocentric…”. The undeniable power
and knowledge humankind possesses over non-human entities in nature therefore
creates a paradox to the notion of overcoming anthropocentrism completely (Hayward,
1997). Hence, it is not the powerful status of humans in nature, but rather, the intent of
anthropocentrism that social ecology seeks to challenge. Social ecology recognises that
an ecological crisis cannot be overcome with the same social values and actions that
generate the crisis to begin with. As Gore (1989) argues, it would be impossible for
humans to forget or give up our advanced technology, knowledge and skills capable of
destruction, which we have acquired over a long history of human civilisation. Gore
(1989) proposes that humans must learn to use our knowledge for the good order of the
world and if we were to accept the premise that humans and nature have an inseparable
relationship, the role of a guardian would appear appropriate in the human-nature
relationship. In other words, humans carry a new responsibility not only to our own
survival but also to a wider natural community and the future of all things. Taylor
(1981) describes social ecology is a “life-centered” ethics perspective, in contrast with a
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‘human-centred’ anthropocentric view in a mainstream approach, and a ‘nature-centred’
radical view in a deep ecology approach.
3.3.3 ASSUMPTION ABOUT NATURE

Mainstream accounting generally does not include nature within its scope due to its
narrow recognition and measurement criteria, hence in an accounting sense, nature is
largely an externality. For instance, the definition of an asset rests on four main
qualities: exclusiveness, profitability, measurability and a past contractual transaction.
Nature as a common good demonstrates inclusiveness, non-monetary benefits, and the
result of a non-contractual arrangement, which make nature fall outside the realm of
mainstream accounting (Hines, 1988; 1991a; Gray, 1992).
The exclusive and calculative approach adopted in mainstream accounting promotes an
anthropocentric view and human superiority (Andrew, 2000; Geno, 1995). As Eckersley
(1998) and Andrew (2000) argue, in cases of direct conflict between the interests of
humans and nature, the interest of humans always prevails in an anthropocentric
society. In other words, anthropocentrism promotes a hierarchical social order between
the humans and nature, and as nature’s superior, humans have the inherent right to
exploit nature for self interest. Mainstream accounting creates a false sense of social
reality that is detached from the very nature that provides the lifeline essential for
human existence. Gray (1992) suggests that mainstream accounting excludes morality
and considers economics as the only benchmark for rationality. For instance, the
anthropocentric view of mainstream accounting is manifested in the assumption of
utility maximisation, often at the expense of the environment. Anthropocentrism is also
manifested in the reductionist approach adopted by mainstream accounting, which
reduces nature to numbers. A reductionist approach underestimates the value of nature,
which consequently represents environmentally irresponsible activities as “rational and
desirable” (Spence, 2007, p858).
Rather than seeing nature as external to the responsibility of an entity, social ecology
assumes that nature is humans’ equal, essential for our survival (Bookchin 1980, 1981,
1989, 1990). Aldo Leopold, an environmental ethics pioneer, suggested that the
boundaries of community should include nature as part of it. Social ecologists propose
that, in a sustainable society, humans and nature should co-exist in a non-hierarchical
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relationship (Nash, 1990; Bookchin, 1990). Social ecology advocates a closer and
deeper human-nature relationship, rather than a mainstream relationship of nature as the
‘resource provider’ and humans as ‘resource users’. To use a simple metaphor to
illustrate social ecology’s view of nature, each organ plays a crucial part in the
functionality of the whole-nature. As Leopold writes in his 1933 paper named A Sand
Country Almanac:
We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When we
see land as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love
and respect (Nash, 1990, p69).
Social ecology sees no boundary between humans and nature, no notions of duality and
internal/external dichotomy in an ecological society. Hence, from a social ecological
perspective, nature should be an integral part of economics, and costs to nature incurred
by economic activities should be appropriately accounted for.
3.3.4 ASSUMPTION ABOUT THE ROLE OF HUMANS

A mainstream approach assumes that humans are self-interested, opportunistic beings
whose behaviours are driven by wealth-maximisation (Chua, 1986b). Chua (1986b,
p609) explains that such an assumption about the social world is:
necessary because accounting information has long been ascribed a technical
rationale for its existence and prosperity: the provision of “useful” and
“relevant” financial information for the making of economic decisions.
Given the conflict often found between economic interests of humans and the ecological
interests of nature, mainstream accounting defines rational behaviours as those that
maximise economic interests and stands on “exploitationist values” (Milne, 1996a,
p141). The opportunistic and self-interest assumption about the social world suggests
that the exploitation of natural resources is the ‘norm’, and the natural world is
considered relevant and valuable to humans only when it becomes a private property
which generates quantifiable economic benefits. Cooper (1992, p21) problematises the
mainstream approach that promotes utility maximisation by highlighting that nature is
often “appropriated, controlled and destroyed in the present patriarchal/capitalist order”.
In contrary to a mainstream approach which only recognises nature in economic terms,
Bookchin (1990, p47) points out that the “most fundamental message” of social ecology
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is that “our basic ecological problems stem from social problems”. In other words,
social ecologists recognise nature in social terms. Social ecology highlights the reality
that ecological problems are often the result of social causes and the role humans can
play in ecology. Social ecology rejects the utility maximisation assumption of human
nature, but rather, emphasises the importance of “the understanding of the self not as
primarily individualistic, but as relational in line with the primacy of ecosystemic
wholes”(Westra, 1994, p9). Social ecology seeks to challenge the dominant ideology,
the focus on economics and a lack of respect for the intrinsic value of nature and the
wellbeing of society. Bookchin (1990) criticises humans’ domination of nature, and the
exploitationist role humans play in the natural community. Contrary to hierarchy,
domination, exploitation and disconnection between humans and nature, social ecology
is built on the principles of “unity in diversity, spontaneity, and non-hierarchical
relationships” (Bookchin, 1990, p86). Consistent with the tenets of social ecology,
Jones (1990, cited in Geno, 1995, p182) suggests that a sustainable society should be
based on the principles of “interdependence, mutuality, and interrelatedness”. Social
ecology believes that there are sustainable ways to reconcile human self-interest and the
preservation of the eco-system (Andrew, 2000). The reconciliation process involves the
“integration of economic, social and ecological values” (Milne, 1996a, p147). It is the
recognition that our ecological crisis is integral to the social world that makes social
ecology an applicable environmental ethics approach. As Bookchin (1980) suggests,
social ecology is consistent with the view that human potentialities can shape the future
of our planet, and need to be brought to the forefront of humans’ environmental actions.
While social ecology accepts the notion of humans altering, managing and using natural
resources, it is not the acts, but rather, the intent of such acts that social ecology seeks to
challenge. It challenges environmental exploitations driven by an exploitationist attitude
and intent of wealth-maximisation and supports responsible alteration, management and
use of natural resources on the principles of co-existence and mutual respect (Nash,
1990).

A social ecology approach has acquired more social relevance and applicability than
other radical environmental ethics (such as deep ecology and eco-feminism), as it
proposes a feasible way to balance human self-realisation and nature’s preservation
through sustainability, which “meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generation to meet their own meeds” (United Nations World
48

Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p24). Social ecology suggests
that sustainability can be achieved in an anthro-non-hierarchical social order where
humans act as nature’s guardians instead of exploitionists. As Bookchin (1990, p53)
suggests, by raising environmental consciousness to a social conscience level, social
ecology can “serve in the highest ethical sense as a guide for human conduct and
provide an awareness of humanity’s ‘place in nature’”. Social ecology provides an
applicable moral insight which can help us re-examine the role of humans in the natural
world.
3.3.5 ASSUMPTION ABOUT THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTING

As Carruthers and Espeland (1991, p32) suggest, “accounting makes it possible for
capitalists to evaluate rationally the consequences of their past decisions”. Mainstream
accounting is an integral part of capital markets as it informs rational economic
behaviour essential for the functionality of capital markets. An example of the role of
mainstream accounting as an agent of capitalism is the promotion of capital
maintenance, which typically excludes the notion of natural capital maintenance (Geno,
1995). In other words, mainstream accounting as agent of a capitalist ideology
prioritises economic interests and marginalises environmental interests.
Social ecology recognises the fundamental flaws of capitalism as a hierarchical, unjust
and exploitationist ideology (Nash, 1990; Bookchin, 1980, 1982, 1990). It recognises
that humans have a responsibility to represent the ‘voice’ of a voiceless nature, rather
than merely agents of self interest. In a sense, social ecology adopts a deontological
moral stance, which calls for an ecological conscience, which is absent from a capitalist
ideology. Social ecology takes on a more ecologically inclusive ethical stance by
recognising that individuals make choices, and that we can strive towards an
ecologically rational society by “developing new technologies, cultivating new social
relations, creating new legal relations, critically re-examining human consumption
patterns, needs, desires, and re-evaluating and enlarging what passes for human virtues”
(Eckersley, 1998, p169). Holbrook (1997) argues that humans are capable of achieving
sustainability, and that it is a matter of developing an ecological conscience that
appreciates the intrinsic value of nature. Such an attitude can assist us in making
rational decisions-rational not only in an economic sense, but also an ecological sense.
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As suggested by Schweitzer, (1935, cited from Nash, 1990, p61-62), the “powerful and
privileged status humans enjoy in the natural community entailed...not a right to exploit
but a responsibility to protect”. In other words, social ecology argues that the dominant
status of humans in the natural world demands greater ecological conscience. While
mainstream accounting provides an exclusively numerical and economic view of reality,
Bookchin (1990, p46-47) calls for “an expanded view of reality, a dialectical view of
natural evolution, and a distinctive-albeit by no means hierarchical-place for humanity
and society in natural evolution”. Informed by social ecology, accounting can play a
role in the environment, however, it is the question of ‘how to account for the
environment’ that is put at the forefront of environmental accounting.
3.4 SUMMARY
Social ecology is based on the premise that “the social can no longer be separated from
the ecological any more than humanity can be separated from nature” (Bookchin, 1990,
p47). Social ecology challenges the status quo dominated by anthropocentrism and
utility-maximisation, and proposes a shift away from cultures of consumption to
cultures of sustainable and responsible use of natural resources (Andrew, 2000; Geno,
1995). Social ecology provides an applicable theoretical framework for this thesis. It
informs a way forward for climate change policy makers and accounting standards
setters to account for emission rights in a socially and ecologically rational manner.
Contrary to deep ecology, which is anti-anthropocentric and eco-centric, social ecology
is an environmental ethics approach that “does not seek to destabilise anthropocentrism”
(Andrew, 2000, p207), but rather seeks to challenge the intent of mainstream
environmental management. Environmental management is seen by social ecologists as
a way to “exercise the powerful and privileged status humans enjoy in the natural
community” (Schweitzer, 1935, cited in Nash, 1990, p61). Social ecology argues that
nature should be protected as humans’ equal, rather than exploited as humans’ inferior.
Compared to eco-feminism, which regards patriarchy as the cause of our ecological
crisis, social ecology, on the other hand, considers an anthropocentric attitude as the
driver of ecologically irresponsible actions. While a mainstream approach assumes
humans to be self-interested and opportunistic, social ecology assumes that humans are
capable of positive social transformations. Social ecologists consider humans to be
guardians of nature, who bear the responsibility of protecting intergenerational equity
that is essential for survival. In order to balance the interests of humans and nature, the
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anthropocentric view implicit in a mainstream approach is suspended by social ecology
in favour of an anthro-non-hierarchical and a co-existing relationship between humans
and nature. While a mainstream approach considers accounting an integral part of
informing economically rational behaviour in capital markets, a social ecology approach
considers accounting an integral part of informing socially and ecologically rational
behaviour. In other words, from a social ecology perspective, the role of accounting is
to facilitate and reflect a custodial relationship between the humans and nature.

In the context of this thesis, the social and ecological objectives of ETS depend on how
emission rights are accounted for. Accounting for emission rights plays an important
role in facilitating emissions reduction. In order for accounting to facilitate the intended
environmental purpose of ETS, accounting for emission rights should capture the
ecological substance of an emission right. Social ecology challenges accounting
standards setters and policy makers to make “a fundamental shift from the dominant
language of finance that currently operates within mainstream accounting discourse”
(Andrew 2000, p210). In the light of our ecological crisis, this thesis argues that a social
ecology-based approach to a standard for emission rights is an applicable way forward
for accounting standards setters. This argument is further developed in Chapters Eight
and Nine.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AS
A RESEARCH METHOD
4.1 INTRODUCTION
A large body of academic literatures suggest that accounting is more than just numbers
and quantifying economic activities-it represents economic, social and political reality
(e.g. Llewellyn and Milne, 2007; Lehman and Tinker, 1987). This thesis adopts a
qualitative research methodology, as it seeks to examine accounting texts in the context
of accounting for emission rights. In this thesis, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is
used to analyse accounting texts surrounding IFRIC 3 Emission Rights. CDA is
consistent with the view that accounting not only communicates, but also constructs
social and economic reality (e.g. Hines, 1988). CDA is also methodologically consistent
with social ecology as a theoretical perspective for the following reasons:
1. They are both built on a social constructionist view, which suggests that
knowledge and social reality are socially constructed notions.
2. They both challenge power asymmetries in society.
3. They both adopt the belief that humans are agents of radical social changes.
CDA adopts a social constructionist view which considers language as a social and
ideological device which contributes to the (re)shaping and maintenance of social
relations. (e.g. Locke, 2004; Halliday, 1978; Fairclough, 1989, 1993, 1995). CDA views
knowledge, meaning and reality as socially constructed concepts shaped by various
social institutions. CDA suggests that language plays a role in constructing the
underlining social context. Both CDA and social ecology are committed to dialectical
reasoning, which “grasps things…essentially in their interconnection, in their
concatenation, their motion, their coming into and passing out of existence” (Engels,
1976, p27, cited in Fairclough 1995, p36). While social ecology seeks to explore the
human-nature relationship on a dialectical naturalist level by recognising the
interconnectedness between humans and nature, CDA seeks to explore the power of
language and discourse in a wider social and political context. For instance, it
recognises that social dominance and power relations are “enacted and reproduced
by…everyday forms of text and talk” (Van Dijk, 1993, p254). Consistent with the
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principles of dialectical naturalist approach adopted in social ecology, CDA is a critical
research method that seeks to make explicit the interconnectedness of social institutions.
Consistent with social ecology, which challenges the mainstream ideology of
anthropocentrism, utility maximisation and hierarchy, CDA seeks to challenge the
status quo, power asymmetries and social domination (Fairclough, 1993, 1995).
In this thesis, CDA is used to analyse and problematise the discourses represented in the
recognition of emission rights in IFRIC 3 Emission Rights. Chapter Five uses CDA to
analyse texts from:
1. IFRIC 3 Emission Rights
2. Comment letters on the Draft IFRIC 3 (D1)
3. Two public releases of the IASB’s decision to withdraw IFRIC 3
The following discussion introduces the socio-linguistic and critical theory influences,
principles and three levels of CDA.
4.2 THREE LEVELS OF CDA
4.2.1 INFLUENCES AND PRINCIPLES OF CDA

Fairclough (1995, p132-133) defines CDA as a research method that aims to:
systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination
between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and
cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices,
events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power
and struggles over power and to explore how the opacity of these relationships
between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony.
As Locke (2004, p11) suggests, language is “at the heart of critical discourse analysis”.
Discourse analysis is traditionally a linguistic research method, which analyses the way
sentences work to produce “coherent stretches” of language (Crystal, 1994, p116).
However, the aim of CDA extends beyond its linguistic roots. As Van Dijk (1993,
p252) suggests:
CDA does not primarily aim to contribute to a specific discipline, paradigm or
school of discourse theory. It is primarily interested and motivated by pressing
social issues, which it hopes to better understand through discourse
analysis…central to this theoretical endeavour is the analysis of the complex
relationships between dominance and discourse.
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Fairclough’s CDA draws on Halliday’s social linguistics and Foucault’s critical social
theories. Wodak and Meyer (2009) suggest that CDA is profoundly influenced by
Halliday’s theory of social linguistics, which analyse the social functions of language.
According to Halliday (1978), language is many things, such as a linguistic structure, a
meaning construction instrument and a discoursal device. As Halliday (1978, p2)
suggests:
language is one of the semiotic systems that constitute a culture; one that is
distinctive in that it also serves as an encoding system for many of the
others…language does not consist of sentences; it consists of text, or discoursethe exchange of meanings in interpersonal contexts of one kind or another.
Halliday (1973, 1978) is particularly interested in the social semiotic aspect of language
that creates meaning via a sign system (text) in a network of social relationships. In
other words, from a critical linguistic perspective, language is more of a social
institution than merely a linguistic structure.
CDA also makes particular references to Foucault’s critical social theory (Wodak and
Meyer, 2009; O’Halloran, 2003; Fairclough, 1993). According to Hoy (1986, p7),
Foucault “sees social life as systematically interconnected”. For instance, Foucault was
particularly interested in the relationship between knowledge and power, and the role
various social institutions play in maintaining the status quo. As Foucault (1976)
suggests:
power is taken to be a right, which one is able to possess like a
commodity…power is that concrete power which every individual holds, and
whose partial or total cession enables political power or sovereignty to be
established…power is conceived primarily in terms of the role it plays in the
maintenance simultaneously of the relations of production and of a class
domination which the development and specific forms of the forces of
production have rendered possible.
In other words, Foucault adopts a critical structuralist perspective in his theory of
knowledge and power, and regards knowledge as an agent in maintaining the dominant
ideology and hence, a tool of control, rather than enlightenment.
Given its socio-linguistic and critical social theory influences, CDA is concerned with
“the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance…what
structures, strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction or
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communicative events play a role in these modes of reproduction” (Van Dijk, 1993,
p249-250). While there are many approaches of discourse analysis (see Figure 1 below),
what distinguishes CDA from other types of discourse analysis are the presupposition
and the focus of inquiry.
Context
Interpretative structuralism

Critical Discourse Analysis

Social Linguistic Analysis

Critical Linguistic Analysis

Constructivist

Critical
Text

Figure 1: Different approaches to discourse analysis
(Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p20)

As Figure 1 suggests, CDA:
(1) Adopts a critical analytical approach and focuses on “the relations
between discourse, power, dominance, social inequality and the position
of the discourse analyst in such social relationships” (Van Dijk, 1993,
p249);
(2) Considers text as part of the underlying context and recognises that
discourse is a social practice.
As Fairclough (1993, p64) suggests, there is a “dialectical relationship between
discourse and social structure...the latter being both a condition for and an effect of the
former”. In other words, discourse is shaped and constrained by the underlying social
structure, yet, at the same time, possesses the power to be socially constitutive. The aim
of CDA is to discover the processes of discourse construction, key players in the
discourse construction and the discoursal norms they represent. Fairclough (1989, 1993,
1995) identifies three levels of CDA:
(1) Text analysis, describing the meaning of the text and its author(s), in short, ‘who
says what’?
(2) Discourse analysis, interpreting the connections and interactions of texts to
identify and make sense of the text, in other words, ‘what does the text mean’?
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(3) Social analysis, linking the meaning of the discourse with its social context, in
other words, ‘what are the key players and social relations that shape the
discourse’?
The following discussion provides a summary of the three levels of CDA.
4.2.2 LEVEL 1: TEXT ANALYSIS

Text forms the most basic unit of analysis in CDA. Hodge and Kress (1988, p5-6, cited
in Locke, 2004, p14) describe discourse as the “social process in which texts are
embedded”. While CDA examines the ideological and cultural meanings in both spoken
language (conversation) and written language (text) (O’Halloran, 2003), in this thesis,
only language in its written form, in other words, text will be used as the primary unit of
analysis.
CDA recognises that text is a vehicle of meaning and discourse construction. CDA
seeks to examine the explicit details in a text in order to make visible the underlying
discourse/meaning. As Foucault (2004, p96) points out, “words are as deliberately
absent as things themselves”. CDA examines both what is said as well as what is not
said in a text as social domination can manifest implicitly and the lack of a ‘voice’
might be the result of a lack of power within a particular social order (Van Dijk, 1993).
4.2.3 LEVEL 2: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

The discourse analysis of CDA seeks to reveal the underlying meaning and discoursal
practice via an examination of the interactions of texts. The discourse analysis level is a
process of interpretation, where linguistic tactics and rhetoric in a text are examined to
discover the deeper embedded meaning. Discourse analysis seeks to reveal not only the
explicit, but also the implicit discourse in a text. CDA recognises that while a discourse
is shaped by social structures, it, on the other hand, also contributes to shaping new
social structures/relations and disturbing existing ones. As Fairclough (1995, p73)
suggests:
the constitutive work of discourse necessarily takes place within the constraints
of the complex of economic, political and discoursal/ideological structures…The
result is that the ideological and discoursal shaping of the real is always caught
up in the networks of the real.
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While discourse possesses the power to (re) shape the underlying social context, it can
only exist within the constraint of the status quo. Maintenance and dominance of the
status quo can be manifested in, for instance, the type of language used in producing a
discourse, the level of access to discourse production, or the “lack of active or
controlled access to discourse” (Van Dijk, 1993, p256).
4.2.4 LEVEL 3: SOCIAL ANALYSIS

The social and ideological functions of language have been widely recognised by CDA
researchers (Cameron, 2006). By taking a critical approach, CDA takes the position of
“wanting to understand, expose, and ultimately resist social inequality” (Van Dijk,
2001, p352, cited from O’Halloran, 2003, p11). Linguistic tactics and rhetoric are
interpreted by CDA in order to discover the social, political, cultural and ideological
functions of language and the underlying power relations that are usually invisible to
discourse participants (Fairclough, 1993). CDA examines text in relation to its social
context, rather than at its face value. As Van Dijk (1996, p84) suggests, one of the most
crucial tasks of CDA is “to account for the relationships between discourse and social
power…such an analysis should describe and explain how power abuse is enacted,
reproduced or legitimised by the text and talk of dominant groups or institutions”.
Social analysis seeks to shed some light on the question of why a particular discourse is
produced by linking the discourse with its social context. CDA ultimately seeks to
uncover forms of domination and power relations among social institutions via a social
analysis of discourse construction.
Social analysis of CDA seeks to reveal ways in which language (text) is used to
manipulate power relations, sustain the status quo, and silence alternative paradigms.
Through social analysis, CDA seeks to reveal how language serves as a social tool by
powerful institutions to sustain the status quo at the expense of those who are less
powerful (e.g. Philips and Hardy, 2002; Van Dijk, 1993, 1996, 2006, 2009; Jørgensen&
Phillips, 2002; Fairclough, 1989, 1993, 1995; Wodak and Meyer, 2009).
4.3 CDA OF ACCOUNTING FOR EMISSION RIGHTS
While accounting is traditionally perceived as merely an information system to facilitate
rational economic decision making, a large body of academic literature describes
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accounting as more than just a representation of economic activities, but rather, a
powerful social and discoursal practice (e.g. Llewellyn & Milne, 2007; Ferguson, 2007;
Spence, 2007; Cooper, 1995). Accounting imposes social, political, cultural, ideological
influences on society (e.g. Arrington and Francis, 1989, 1993; Arrington and
Schweiker, 1992; Lehman and Tinker, 1987). This thesis seeks to gain an insight into
the social and ideological role of accounting language/discourse in
sustaining/reinforcing a particular status quo by analysing key texts and discourses
surrounding accounting for emission rights. Figure 2 below illustrates the application of
Fairclough’s three levels of CDA in the examination of texts of accounting for emission
rights in this thesis:

3. Social: what is the context?

How do the texts interact?

2. Discourse: what does it mean by what is
said and what is not said?

1.Text: who said
what?
IFRIC 3, 39 comment
letters sent to IASB
and the IASB’s press
releases

Who are the key players in the discourse?

Figure 2: The application of Fairclough's three levels of CDA

(Adapted from Fairclough, 1989, p25)

As shown in Figure 2 above, the text analysis stage of CDA involves an examination of
key texts of accounting for emission rights (text analysis). The text analysis stage of
CDA involves finding out ‘who said what’ in the IFRIC3 process. Prior to the issue of
the final IFRIC 3, the IFRIC received 40 comment letters in 2003 after the release of a
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draft interpretation (D1) for public comment. However, one of the 40 comment letters
came from an anonymous commentator. Given the importance of social context and
underlining social relations in CDA, the examination of an anonymous source is
restricted to its face value due to the absence of an identifiable authorship, and
consequently hidden social relations underlying the discourse construction. As a result,
this thesis will examine 39 comment letters from identifiable commentators.

The discourse analysis stage of CDA examines the interactions of the texts, the
relationship between the texts (for instance, similarities and differences of ‘who said
what’), and the discourse behind ‘what is said’ as well as ‘what is not said’.
The social analysis stage of CDA examines the social context of dominant discourses
that emerge from the text analysis, and identifies the key players and social relations
that shape the discourses. Table 2 describes the CDA process adopted in this thesis.
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Table 2: An overview of the CDA process

Three levels of

Overview

CDA
Level 1: text

Who said what?

analysis
•

Description of texts from IFRIC 3,
comment letters and IASB press releases

•

Level 2:

Description of authors

What does it mean?

discourse
analysis

•

How do the texts interact?

•

What is the relationship between texts?

•

What is the dominant discourse and what
does it mean?

Level 3: social

How and why is the dominant discourse

analysis

constructed?
•

Context of the discourse?

•

Key players and social relations that shape
the discourse?

The texts chosen for CDA represent key public discourses of IFRIC 3, and therefore,
provide sufficient materials to allow a comprehensive examination of accounting for
emission rights. The text analysis (level 1) is divided into:
1. IFRIC 3 text. The text analysis of IFRIC 3 will examine three key recognition
issues of emission rights:
a. initial recognition of purchased emission rights
b. subsequent recognition of purchased emission rights
60

c. recognition of emission rights issued for less than fair value
2. Comment letters. The text analysis of the comment letters is divided into two
sections:
a. Who are the commentators? This section of the text analysis identifies
the commentators in terms of the industry sectors and countries they
represent.
b. Key recognition issues raised by the commentators. In this section, the
analysis of key recognition issues is structured according to the industry
sector of the commentators in order to link ‘who’ with ‘what is said’.
3. IASB’s press releases regarding the withdrawal of IFRIC 3
Prior to the text analysis, the comment letters are organised into seven folders according
to their industry sector (seven industry sectors have been identified). The text analysis is
predominately carried out in Microsoft Word and Excel, where key accounting
recognition issues raised in IFRIC 3, the comment letters and IASB’s press releases are
identified, summarised and organised into tables. Comments on each key recognition
issue of emission rights are summarised in tables to highlight who said what.
Frequently used words and terminologies used in the texts are also identified and
analysed on a textual (linguistic) level.
Similarly, the discourse analysis (level 2) draws on discourses produced in:
1. IFRIC 3
2. Comment letters
3. IASB’s press releases
The social analysis (level 3) seeks to reveal the key social players in the IFRIC 3
comment process, the relationships amongst them, and the roles they play in discourse
construction.
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CHAPTER FIVE: TEXT ANALYSIS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The text analysis of CDA seeks to analyse texts surrounding the recognition of emission
rights in IFRIC 3, the comment letters and the IASB press releases. The text analysis is
divided into:

(1) Recognition issues of emission rights in IFRIC 3

IFRIC3 Emission Rights was released in 2004 by the IFRIC to provide guidance on
accounting for emission rights. IFRIC 3 is an interpretation of three existing IASs (IAS
20 Government Grants, IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent
Assets and IAS 38 Intangible Assets). The Urgent Issues Group (UIG) of the AASB in
Australia released its IFRIC 3 equivalent: UIG Interpretation 3 14 in 2005 (AASB,
2005). The draft IFRIC 3 (D1) was released by the IFRIC in 2003 for public comment.
Despite acknowledging that the draft interpretation needed to be improved, the IASB
decided to issue the final IFRIC 3 in 2004, which is “largely as exposed in D1” (IASB,
2010a, para 14).
The recognition of emission rights was divided into three key recognition issues, which
will be examined in details in the text analysis. They are:
(1) ETS gives rise to separate assets and liabilities.
(2) An emission right as an intangible asset and a provisional liability.
(3) Allocating emission rights for less than their fair value gives rise to a
government grant.
(2) Comment letters
1. Who are the commentators?

14

While some paragraphs that have been added to the UIG Interpretation 3 do not appear in the original
IFRIC 3, the UIG Interpretation 3 is equivalent to IFRIC 3 (AASB, 2005). This thesis will refer to the
UIG Interpretation 3 as IFRIC 3 from this point on.
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The IFRIC published a draft IFRIC 3 (D1) for public comment in May 2003 and
received 40 comment letters in response to its proposal prior to the final issue of IFRIC
3 (AASB, 2005, para BC3). The comment letters submitted to the IFRIC represent the
following industry sectors (see Appendix 2 for details of the commentators):
•

Accounting standard setters/advisory committees

•

Professional accounting bodies

•

Emissions producers

•

Industry-affiliated groups

•

Government agencies

•

Non-for-profit organisations

•

Big Four accounting firms

Geographic distribution of draft IFRIC 3 commentators

Asia
North America
Europe
Oceania
South America
Africa

Figure 3: Geographic distribution of the draft IFRIC 3 commentators
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Industry sector distribution of draft IFRIC 3 commentators

Accounting standard setter
Emissions producer
Government Agency
Industry-affiliated group
Non-for-profit
Professional Accounting body
The Big Four Accounting firm

Figure 4: Industry sector distribution of the draft IFRIC 3 commentators

As Figure 4 illustrates, accounting standard setters and professional accounting bodies
were two major groups of commentators, followed by emissions producers, industryaffiliated groups, government agencies, the big four accounting firms and not-for-profit
organisations. As illustrated in Figure 3, the majority of submissions came from EU
member countries, which coincided with the introduction of the EU ETS in 2005. Table
3 below provides a summary of emissions producers and the industries they represent.
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Table 3: A summary of emissions producers and the corresponding industry sectors

Comment letter number/

An overview of the represented industry

Commentator

14. Syngenta AG

Genetic engineering firm specialising in
Herbicides, insecticides and fungicides, Field
crops, vegetables and flower seeds, Seed care
products, Turf, garden, home care and public
health products. Being in the agriculture industry,
climate change presents a major challenge.

17. Holcim

A global cement company (the second most
affected industry within EU ETS)

26. BP group

From a local oil company to a global energy giant.
One of the most affected industries by climate
change.

30. Roche

Pharmaceuticals

38. Royal Dutch Airlines

Airline, one of the biggest carbon intensive
industries.

As shown in Table 3 above, the emissions producers who commented on the draft
IFRIC 3 represent some of the most affected emitters by ETS.

In this thesis, only 39 comment letters will be used in the CDA because one of the
comment letters came from an anonymous commentator. The anonymous comment
letter (CL 7 15 , point 3) stated that “Japan assumes to have a voluntary action plan
instead of having a cap-and-trade system”, implying the commentator’s possible
country of origin. However, no further information was given about the identity of the
commentator. This thesis suggests that discourse of the anonymous comment letter
cannot be examined in an in-depth manner, as the underlying social context of the
comment letter remains invisible.

15

‘CL’ stands for comment letter. When a copy of the comment letters was provided by the IASB, all
comment letters are numbered for easier identification and sorting.
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2. Comments on the recognition issues of emission rights
While the comment letters addressed a number of accounting issues pertaining
accounting for emission rights (such as various recognition and measurement issues of
emission rights), the text analysis in this thesis will primarily focus on comments on the
recognition issues of emission rights. Comments on the recognition of emission rights
largely focused largely on the following five issues:
(1) Initial recognition of emission rights as separate assets.
(2) Subsequent asset classification of emission rights.
(3) Emission rights as a provisional liability.
(4) Allocating emission rights for less than their fair value gives rise to a
government grant.
(5) Other disclosure-related comments.
(3) The IASB press releases of IFRIC 3’s withdrawal
Text from two IASB press releases regarding its decision to withdraw IFRIC 3 is also
examined in this thesis. The text analysis of the press releases seeks to link ‘what the
IASB says’ with ‘what the IFRIC and its commentators say’ of the proposed accounting
for emission rights.
Figure 5 below highlights key components of the text analysis.
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1: text analysis: who said what?
• Who are the commentators
• IFRIC 3
• 39 comment letters
• the IASB’s press releases of
IFRIC 3’s withdrawal

2. Discourse analysis

3. Social analysis

Figure 5: An overview of Chapter Five: text analysis

5.2 RECOGNITION ISSUES OF EMISSION RIGHTS IN IFRIC 3
The key accounting recognition issues addressed in IFRIC 3 can be summarised into
two areas:
1. Initial and subsequent accounting recognition of emission rights.
2. Initial and subsequent measurement of emission rights.

The following text analysis is confined to the recognition issues of emission rights.
IFRIC 3 addressed three key recognition issues of accounting for emission rights, which
will be discussed in details in the following text analysis:
1. ETS gives rise to separate assets and liabilities.
2. Emission rights as an intangible asset and a provisional liability.
3. Allocating emission rights for less than their fair value gives rise to a
government grant.
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5.2.1 ETS GIVES RISE TO SEPARATE ASSETS AND LIABILITIES

The IFRIC decided that an emissions right held by an entity meets the definition of an
asset in the Framework. An asset is defined in the Framework as “a resource controlled
by the entity as a result of past events and from which future economic benefits are
expected to flow to the entity” (IASB, 2006, para 49a). The IFRIC argues that an
emission right demonstrates “the nature of an allowance as a transferable certificate,
which the participant can either sell or use to settle an obligation” (AASB, 2005, para
BC12). In other words, the IFRIC regarded emission rights as a resource which arises as
a result of a past transaction (e.g. emission rights that are purchased or allocated),
controlled by an emitting entity to either offset emissions or trade. The IFRIC also
decided that once emissions have occurred, the emitting entity incurs a present
obligation to deliver emission rights to offset emissions, which fits the definition of a
liability in the Framework (AASB, 2005, para BC 12). A liability is defined in the
Framework as “a present obligation of the entity arising from past events, the settlement
of which is expected to result in an outflow from the entity of resources embodying
economic benefits” (IASB, 2006, para 49b). The IFRIC consensus suggests that a
liability arises whenever emissions are made, regardless of whether an emitter holds
sufficient emission rights to offset or not. In other words, IFRC argues that emitters
must deliver an emission right for every ton of emissions made (AASB, 2005).

The rationale behind the IFRIC’s decision to adopt a separate asset/liability recognition
model of emission rights was that “there is no contractual link between the asset and the
liability” (AASB 2005, para BC12). The IFRIC recognised that participants are allowed
to use emission rights for different purposes, whether it is to settle an emissions
obligation, or to trade excess emission rights. The IFRIC also concluded that it would
be “inappropriate to offset the asset and liability”, confirming the IFRIC’s view that
emission rights are instruments that “must be delivered in order to settle the obligation
that arises from emissions” (AASB, 2005, para BC 12).
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5.2.2 EMISSION RIGHTS AS AN INTANGIBLE ASSET AND A PROVISIONAL
LIABLITY

The IFRIC concluded that emission rights meet the definition of an intangible asset as
per IAS 38, paragraph 8, as an emission right is “an identifiable non-monetary asset
without physical substance” (AASB, 2005, para BC13). Despite concluding that the
legal form of emission right meets the definition of an intangible asset, the IFRIC
acknowledged that emission rights “have some features that are more commonly found
in financial assets than in intangible assets” (AASB, 2005, para BC 16). Having said
that, the IFRIC rejected a financial asset classification in the consensus, on the basis that
emission rights:

do not meet the definition of a financial asset in IAS 32 Financial Instruments:
disclosure and presentation, since they are neither equity instruments nor
contractual rights to receive cash or other financial assets…being readily
tradeable does not make allowances financial assets anymore than, say, a readily
tradeable commodity” (AASB, 2005, para BC 14).
The IFRIC also rejected a financial instrument (hedging instrument) classification of
emission rights, on the basis that emission rights “do not fall within the scope extension
in IAS 39 for contracts to buy or sell a non-financial item, since they are not a contract
to buy or sell a non-financial item” (AASB, 2005, para BC 14). The IFRIC further
concluded that it would be “inappropriate to ask the Board to amend the scope of IAS
38 and IAS 39 to bring allowances within the scope of IAS 39” (AASB, 2005, para BC
15).
Regarding the subsequent liability recognition, the IFRIC concluded that a provisional
liability arises whenever emissions are made, consistent with IAS 37 Provisions,
Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets. In the IFRIC’s words (AASB, 2005, para
BC 22-BC 23):
In an emission rights scheme, the obligating event…is the production of
emissions…this view is supported by paragraph 19 of IAS 37, which states: ‘It
is only those obligations arising from past events existing independently of an
entity’s future actions that are recognised as provisions’…the IFRIC therefore
concluded that once emissions are made, a liability will arise that should be
accounted for in accordance with IAS 37…the fact that a participant may hold
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assets to meet its obligation for emissions does not relieve the participant of that
obligation.
5.2.3 ALLOCATING EMISSION RIGHTS FOR LESS THAN THEIR FAIR VALUE
GIVES RISE TO A GOVERNMENT GRANT

A government grant in accordance with IAS 20 Accounting for Government Grants and
Disclosure of Government Assistance (para 3) is defined as:
assistance by government in the form of transfers of resources to an entity in
return for past or future compliance with certain conditions relating to the
operating activities of the entity. They exclude those forms of government
assistance which cannot reasonably have a value placed upon them and
transactions with government which cannot be distinguished from the normal
trading transactions of the entity.
The IFRIC (AASB, 2005, para 7) concluded that:
When allowances are issued for less than fair value, the difference between the
amount paid and fair value is a government grant that is within the scope of
AASB 120 Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure of Government
Assistance (IAS 20).
5.2.4 THE MISMATCH ISSUE OF EMISSION RIGHTS

The nature of assets and liabilities gives rise to complex measurement issues
confronting the IFRIC. While this thesis does not explicitly address the measurement
aspect of emission rights, a brief outline of the mismatch issue is provided below as a
consequence of the proposed recognition of emission rights (see Appendix 1 for more
details).
The IFRIC concluded that emission assets should be measured initially at cost and
subsequently impaired in accordance with IAS 38 and IAS 36, and liabilities measured
at present market value, consistent with IAS 37. However, as a consequence of the
proposed separate asset and liability recognition model, a mismatch measurement issue
would arise when assets are measured at historical cost and liabilities at present market
value. The IFRIC acknowledged concerns regarding the effect of the mismatch issue on
income. The IFRIC (AASB, 2005, para BC 18) explained that in order to eliminate the
volatility in earnings, it considered “whether it should ask the Board to amend IAS 38
so that all changes in the value of an allowance measured at fair value would be
recognised in profit or loss” and concluded that the it would be “unlikely” for the Board
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to amend IAS 38. The IFRIC concluded that it would be impossible to “formulate,
expose and finalise an amendment to IAS 38 in time for 2005” (AASB, 2005, para BC
18). No further comments were provided in IFRIC 3 on how the IFRIC would resolve
the mismatch measurement issue of assets and liabilities.
5.2.5 TEXT ANALYSIS OF THE IFRIC CONSENSUS ON THE RECOGNITION OF
EMISSION RIGHTS

The words “shall” and “should” appeared in IFRIC 3 a total of 44 times. Strong and
authoritative words such as “reject” and “should” were used in IFRIC 3 to justify the
IFRIC consensus on accounting for emission rights. IFRIC 3 is comprised of lengthy
sentences and carefully-worded technical accounting jargon, suggesting that the IFRIC
dedicated a great deal of attention to the tone, logic and wording of IFRIC 3, as well as
the rationale behind its consensus. The IFRIC consensus was largely justified by
frequently quoting definitions from existing standards and the Framework. It was also
emphasised a number of times in IFRIC 3 that all interpretations should be strictly
consistent with existing IFRSs.

At face value, the IFRIC approach on accounting for emission rights is consistent with
existing accounting practice. However, a close examination of the text in IFRIC 3
brings to light a number of internal inconsistencies and unresolved issues. For instance,
IFRIC 3 proposed a separate asset/liability recognition model of emission rights. The
IFRIC’s rationale behind adopting such a complex recognition model was justified by
its consistency to existing asset and liability definitions in the Framework. The IFRIC
suggests that emissions assets and liabilities “exist independently” because:
Although a participant may intend to use the allowances it holds to settle its
obligation, it cannot be compelled to do so. Instead it may choose to sell
allowances and either reduce emissions or buy allowances at a future date. Thus,
there is no contractual link between the asset and the liability, even though many
participants will hold the allowances solely for the purpose of settling their
obligations (AASB, 2005, para BC 12).
However, the IFRIC (AASB, 2005, para BC21) concluded that an emission right “is not
a right to produce emissions…is the instrument that a participant surrenders to settle its
obligation that arises from its emissions”. It suggests that emission rights are expected
to be used solely for compliance purposes. The view that emitters are not compelled to
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use emission rights solely to settle their obligations contradicts with and the view that
emission rights are instruments to settle compliance obligations.
Another internal contradiction arose in paragraph BC7, where the IFRIC acknowledged
that one of the biggest unresolved issues in accounting for emission rights was
“particularly the question of whether there is a net asset (or liability) or a separate asset
and liability” (AASB, 2005, para BC 7). It suggests that the IFRIC had already
concluded that the categorisations of asset and liability were a ‘given’. However, the
IFRIC (AASB, 2005, para BC10) noted that some cases “raise the question whether
allowances should be recognised as assets”, for instance:

A company may pay a cash sum to a second company to enable that second
company to undertake a project to reduce emissions, which it is hoped will result
in verified emission rights that would then be delivered back to the first
company.
In other words, the IFRIC questioned whether unverified emission rights give rise to
assets, implying that it did not automatically consider all emission rights to be assets,
which contradicts with the view that an asset categorisation was a ‘given’.
5.3 COMMENT LETTERS
5.3.1 THE COMMENTATORS

The 39 comment letters examined in this thesis represent 39 commentators, which are
categorised into the following industry sectors (see Appendix 2 for details of the
commentators):
•

Twelve accounting standard setters/advisory committees

•

Nine professional accounting bodies

•

Five emissions producers

•

Five industry-affiliated groups (industry unions and representatives)

•

Three government agencies

•

Two non-for-profit organisations

•

Three Big Four accounting firms
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5.3.2 COMMENTS ON THE RECOGNITION ISSUES OF EMISSION RIGHTS

The text analysis below provides a summary of comments on the recognition of
emission rights. The text analysis focuses on comments concerning four key recognition
issues of emission rights and other disclosure-related comments:
(1) Initial recognition of emission rights as separate assets.
(2) Subsequent asset classification of emission rights.
(3) Emission rights as a provisional liability.
(4) Allocating emission rights for less than their fair value gives rise to a government
grant.
5.3.2.1 INITIAL RECOGNITION OF EMISSION RIGHTS AS SEPARATE ASSETS

The IFRIC argues that an emission right meets the definition of an asset in the
Framework, evidenced by the nature of an emission right as “a transferable certificate,
which the participant can either sell or use to settle an obligation” (AASB, 2005, para
BC 12). The IFRIC suggests that the proposed separate asset and liability recognition
reflects the independent nature of assets and liabilities. The text analysis below
examines comments on the initial recognition of emission rights as separate assets (see
Appendix 3 for more details). The comments are organised according to the represented
industry sectors in order to highlight ‘who said what’.

1.

Accounting Standard Setters

Ten out of 12 accounting standard setters either explicitly stated or implied that
emission rights qualify as assets according to the definition of asset in the Framework.
However, four out of those ten who supported an asset categorisation of emission rights
disagreed with the proposed separate asset/liability recognition model on the basis that
assets and liabilities are linked transactions. Two accounting standard setters did not
comment on the proposed asset recognition of emission rights.
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2.

Professional Accounting bodies

The majority of professional accounting bodies agreed that emission rights qualify as
assets. Eight out of nine professional accounting bodies either explicitly stated or
implied that emission rights qualify as assets, three of whom expressed concerns about
the separate asset/liability model and its effect on the measurement of assets and
liabilities. One did not comment on the asset recognition of emission rights.
3.

Industry-affiliated groups

All five industry-affiliated groups agreed that emission rights are assets. However, four
out of five challenged the proposed separate asset/liability model on the basis that assets
and liabilities are linked transactions in substance, and the proposed recognition model
of emission rights was overly complicated.
4.

Government agencies

Overall, government agencies did not address the technical aspect of the proposed asset
recognition of emission rights to the extent demonstrated in comment letters from
accounting standards setters and professional accounting bodies. Two out of three
government agencies implied that they agree with the asset recognition of emission
rights, one of whom expressed concerns about the separate asset/liability model and its
effect on measurement. One did not make explicit comments on the issue.
5.

Non-for-profit organisations

The International Emissions Trading Association (IETA, CL 6) supported the proposed
asset recognition of emission rights as well as the separate asset/liability recognition
model. The Dresden University of Technology (TUD, CL 31) did not comment on the
asset recognition of emission rights.
6.

The Big Four

All three Big Four accounting firms implied that emission rights are separate assets,
consistent with the IFRIC consensus.
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7.

Emissions producers

All five emissions producers considered the asset classification of emission rights as a
‘given’. However, four out of five emissions producers were not in favour of the
proposed separate asset/liability recognition model.
8.

Summary

In summary, Table 4 below provides a summary of comments on the proposed initial
recognition of emission rights.
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Table 4: A summary of comments on the initial recognition of emission rights
Emission rights are assets
Emission rights are

Agree with the asset

separate assets

recognition, but

No comment

disagrees with the
separate asset/liability
model
Accounting standard

6

4

2

3

1

4

0

4

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

setters (12)
10
Professional

5

accounting bodies (9)
8
Emissions producers

1

(5)
5
Industry-affiliated

1

groups (5)
5
Government agencies

1

(3)
2
The Big Four (3)

3
3

Non-for-profit (2)

1
1

Total:39

34

5

As Table 4 suggests, the majority of commentators either explicitly or implicitly
suggested that emission rights should be recognised as assets. The proposed asset
recognition of emission rights was consistent with the definition of asset in the
Framework, making it difficult for commentators to challenge it on conceptual grounds.
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The asset recognition of emission rights was considered a ‘given’ by most
commentators. However, 16 out of 34 commentators were not in favour of the proposed
separate asset/liability recognition model. Key rationales behind the rejection of the
proposed separate asset/liability recognition model are summarised below:
1. Assets and liabilities are linked transactions in substance;
2. Recognising assets and liabilities separately could lead to complex measurement
implications, such as the mismatch of assets and liabilities.
Accounting Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ, CL 4) was the only commentator that
projected beyond the immediate accounting consequences of the separate asset
recognition and argued that recognising separate assets and liabilities could potentially
encourage emitters to engage in broker’s activities by trading emission rights to offset
liabilities (see Appendix 3 for more details).
5.3.2.2 SUBSEQUENT ASSET CLASSIFICATION OF EMISSION RIGHTS

The IFRIC concluded that an emission right meets the definition of intangible asset
because it is “an identifiable non-monetary asset without physical substance” (AASB,
2005, para BC 13). However, the subsequent asset classification of emission rights was
in debate. The commentators pointed out that emission rights qualify as intangible
assets, current assets, financial assets, and financial instruments. To add to the
complexity of the issue, there were diverse opinions regarding the type of current asset
emission rights should be classified as, for instance, whether an emission right should
be classified as inventory or pre-paid expense. There was also considerable debate on
whether emission rights qualify as financial assets or financial instruments. Financial
assets and instruments are addressed in IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and
Presentation and IAS 39 Financial instruments: Recognition and Measurement. A
financial asset according to IAS 32 (para. 11) is defined as
(a) Cash;
(b) An equity instrument of another entity; or
(c) A contractual right to receive cash or another financial asset from another
entity; or to exchange financial assets or financial liabilities with another entity
under conditions that are potentially favourable to the entity; or
(d) A contract that will or may be settled in the entity’s own equity instruments
and is:
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(i) A non-derivative for which the entity is or may be obliged to receive a
variable number of the entity’s own equity instruments; or
(ii) A derivative that will or may be settled other than by the exchange of a fixed
amount of cash or another financial asset for a fixed number of the entity’s own
equity instruments. For this purpose the entity’s own equity instruments do not
include instruments that are themselves contracts for the future receipt or
delivery of the entity’s own equity instruments.
A financial instrument according to IAS 32 (para 11) is “any contract that gives rise to a
financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or equity instrument of another
entity”. IAS 39 (para AG 14) states that “financial instruments held for trading
generally are used with the objective of generating a profit from short-term fluctuations
in price of dealer’s margin”.
The IFRIC suggests that emission rights do not meet the definition of financial asset or
instrument. It argues that emission assets do not meet the definition of financial asset in
IAS 32, as they are “neither equity instruments nor contractual rights to receive cash or
other financial assets” (AASB, 2005, para BC 14). The IFRIC (AASB, 2005, para BC
14) explains that emission assets do not qualify as financial instruments on the
following basis:
1. Emission rights are “not a contract to buy or sell a non-financial item”.
2. Emission rights are not designated as a hedging instrument because they do not
have “no initial net investment or an initial net investment that is smaller than
would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a
similar response to changes in market factors” and “are not settled at a future
date”.
3. The tradable nature of emission rights merely make them a “readily tradable
commodity”, instead of a financial instrument designated for trading purposes.
The following text analysis of comments on the subsequent asset recognition of
emission rights is organised according to the asset classifications proposed by the
commentators: intangible asset, current asset, financial asset and financial instrument. A
number of commentators provided ambiguous comments on the subsequent asset
recognition of emission rights, which will be analysed separately.
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1.

Emission rights as intangible assets

Accounting Standard Setters

The Argentine Federation of Professional Councils of Economic Sciences (FACPCE)
(CL 24) endorsed an intangible asset classification of emission rights in a definitive
manner. European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) (CL 34) held the
view that emission rights are intangible assets, evidenced by the alternative linked
transaction accounting model proposed in its comment letter, in which emission rights
were recorded as “consumable” intangible assets (see CL 34, p2).
Danish Accounting Standards Committee (FSR) (CL 29) endorsed the alternative
accounting model proposed by EFRAG, in which emission rights were recognised as
intangible assets. Netherlands Council for Annual Reporting (CAR) proposed that “both
alternative models suggested by EFRAG merit further consideration by IFRIC” (CL 1,
para 5), implying that it agreed that emission rights are intangible assets, consistent with
of the view of EFRAG.
Accounting Standards Committee in Poland (KSR) (CL 16) also supported an intangible
asset classification of emission assets, evidenced by its proposal that the IFRIC should
apply IAS 38 Intangible assets and allow fair value measurement to accommodate
accounting for emission assets.
Accounting Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ) (CL 4) observed that the proposed
separate asset/liability recognition of emission rights could send the wrong message to
emitters and potentially encourage trading of emission rights for a profit. ASBJ
proposed an alternative accounting treatment of emission rights, in which emission
rights held were classified as intangible assets (see CL 4, p3).
Professional Accounting bodies

The comment letter from the Swedish Organisation of Certified Public Accountants
(FAR) (CL 19) consisted of only three short paragraphs, in which the proposed
intangible asset classification was endorsed.
Emissions producers

Holcim (CL 17) agreed with the IFRIC that emission assets are intangible assets,
evidenced by its accounting proposals which treated emission rights as intangible assets.
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Industry-affiliated groups

The Federation of Swiss Industrial Holding Companies (CL 10), Eurelectric (CL 13)
and French Association of Private Enterprises (APEF) (CL 18) all argued that emission
rights should be classified as intangible assets. The Federation of Swiss Industrial
Holding Companies pointed out that they had examined a number of classifications of
emission assets, such as “inventories, intangible assets or financial assets” (CL 10, p3).
It concluded that emission rights should be treated as intangible assets. Despite
suggesting two alternative accounting treatments aimed at eliminating the mismatch
measurement issue, most of the comments from the Federation of Swiss Industrial
Holding Companies focused on how to measure emission rights to eliminate the
mismatch issue, rather than the effect of the proposed asset classification on the
measurement of emission rights.
Eurelectric did not explicitly comment on whether emission assets are intangible assets.
However, Eurelectric (CL 13, p 3) noted that “we agree with EFRAG’s analysis”,
suggesting that Eurelectric also considered emission assets to be intangible assets.
Similarly, AFEP also commented heavily on the measurement issue, but made no
explicit comments on the intangible asset classification of emission assets. Despite
making no explicit comments, AFEP did imply that emission rights are intangible
assets, evidenced by making references to IAS 38 Intangible Assets and acknowledging
its relevance in accounting for emission rights.
The Big Four

Deloitte (CL 2) provided straight-forward and definitive support of the IFRIC’s
conclusion that emission assets are intangible assets. PWC (CL 20) did not explicitly
comment on the nature of assets in its comment letter. However, it implied that
emission assets are intangible assets by referring to emission rights as intangible assets
(see CL 20, para 4).
2.

Emission rights as current assets

Accounting Standard Setters

National Accounting Council in France (CNC) (CL 9, p1) noted that “depending on the
scheme and the use or purpose of the allowances, the classification in current assets
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should be considered”. However, no further details were provided regarding what type
of current asset emission rights should be recognised as.
Emissions producers

Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) (CL 38), Roche (CL 30) and BP (CL 26) all considered
emission rights to be current assets. KLM pointed out that emission rights “share certain
characteristics with intangible assets, financial assets, inventory and prepayments” (CL
38, p3). KLM (CL 38, p3) concluded that “on balance we prefer a categorisation of
inventory under paragraph 4 (c) of IAS 2 Inventories rather than one of an intangible
asset under IAS 38 Intangible assets as the latter are typically of a longer term nature
than the emission rights”. KLM also noted that for the airline industry, the cost of fuel
(which would include the cost of emission rights to cover emissions that arise from fuel
usage) is considered “consumable stocks” and hence inventory (CL 38, p3).
Roche likened emission assets to “a prepaid rent”, a prepaid expense amortised on a
“usage/consumption basis” (CL 30, p1). It concluded that emission rights held should
be classified as a prepaid expense under current assets.

BP did not endorse the IFRIC consensus that emission assets should be classified as
intangible assets and measured at fair value, on the basis that the market value of
emission assets may be unobtainable in the early years of an emissions trading scheme
due to “illiquid” market conditions (CL 26, p2). BP argued that emission rights held by
a trader or broker for trading represent inventory (current asset), whose market value
would “probably” be available (CL 26, p2). BP held the view that in order to reflect the
substance of ETS, which allows participants to emit up to a cap level, emission rights
held for compliance purposes should be recognised as “a prepayment” for the cost of
pollution (CL 26, p3). In other words, while BP considered emission assets to be current
assets, it recognised that the current asset classification would depend on the purpose of
holding emission rights.
Industry-affiliated groups

Association for the participation of French companies to international accounting
harmonisation-Movement of the French Enterprises (Acteo-Medef) (CL 5) argues that
emission assets do not qualify as intangible assets, despite “meeting the definition of an
intangible asset literally, as they do not have any material substance and are used in the
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production process of the entity” (CL 5, para 1). Acteo-Medef concluded that emission
rights are “countable” assets with a “determinable useful life” that are “consumed” by
an emitter, which satisfy the definition of inventories defined in IAS 2 Inventories (CL
5, para 1). Acteo-Medef’s rationale behind an inventory (current asset) classification
was supported by the view that emission rights are “assets in the form…of supplies to
be consumed in the production process…” (CL 5, para 1), which was cited from IAS 2
Inventories, paragraph 6.
3.

Emission rights as financial assets

While a financial asset classification was mentioned in a number of comment letters,
none of the commentators provided clear and definitive comments regarding a financial
asset classification and its relevance to emission rights.
4.

Emission rights as financial instruments

Accounting Standard Setters

German Accounting Standards Committee (DRSC) (CL 21, p2) suggests that “the best
estimate of the expenditure rather depends upon the question whether an entity hold
emission rights to settle the obligation”. As DRSC (CL 21, p2) explained:
To the extent the emissions exceed the number of allowances held by the entity
the additional liability has to be measured at fair value being the current market
price (unless the entity hedges this risk by buying a financial instrument. In this
case IAS 39 applies.). This is due to the fact that the entity has to buy additional
allowances and pay the current market price (or pay a penalty). Thus it is
guaranteed that the full obligation is recognised.
In other words, it concurred with the view that additional emission rights purchased to
offset emissions qualify as hedging financial instruments in which case IAS 39 applies.
Professional Accounting bodies

South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) (CL 25) concurred with the
view that emission rights are financial instruments. However, it acknowledged that the
nature of emission rights would depend on the purpose of holding such rights.
According to SAICA (CL 25, p 3):
We are of the opinion that these excess rights are financial instruments in terms
of IAS 39 and not intangible assets, despite the argument in BC8, as we believe
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these rights meet the definition of commodity-based contracts as described in
IAS 32.05. Whilst we understand that, at the time of drafting IAS 32 emission
rights were not contemplated, the economic substance of these emission rights
are similar to the definition of commodity based contracts. If the participants
purchase rights, from the government or a broker, these rights should be treated
as financial instruments in terms of IAS 39. If the participants plan to hold onto
the rights for their own use, they would be classified as “held to maturity” per
IAS 39. Whereas, if the participants plan to sell these purchased rights, they
should be classified as “held for trading” in terms of IAS 39.

Emissions producers

Syngenta (CL 14, Para 3) noted that:
IAS 39 does not currently allow emission rights, as a non-financial asset, to be
designated as a hedging instrument for emission liabilities. However, in our
view a process similar to IAS 39 hedge accounting is essential if the financial
statements are to reflect economic reality.
In other words, Syngenta considered emission assets to be hedging financial instruments
as per IAS 39 and recommended that the scope of IAS 39 amended to address emission
rights.
Industry-affiliated groups

EnergieNed (CL 36) did not comment explicitly on the proposed intangible asset
classification, although it noted that IAS 39 becomes applicable when “emission rights
are used in emission trading” (CL 36, p 1). It suggests that EnergieNed regarded excess
emission rights used for trading as financial instruments.
5.

No specific comment

Accounting Standard Setters

The Council on Corporate Disclosure & Governance in Singapore (CCDG) (CL 28) and
the Norwegian Accounting Standards Board (NASB) (CL 23) provided no comments
regarding the subsequent asset classification of emission rights.
Professional Accounting bodies

Institute of Public Auditors in Germany (IDW) (CL 15), Hong Kong Society of
Accountants (HKSA) (CL 3), Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(JICPA) (CL 12) and Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW)
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(CL 37) did not make any specific comments on the subsequent asset classification of
emission rights. For instance, ICAEW (CL 37, para 13) pointed out that “the last bulletpoint (note: referring to Paragraph BC 5 of the draft IFRIC 3) should refer to the
offsetting requirements of IAS 1 and not IAS 32 to be consistent with the IFRIC’s
decision that the allowances are not financial assets” (note: IAS 1 Presentation of
Financial Statements and IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation). However, it did
not represent ICAEW’s view on the subsequent asset classification of emission rights.
HKSA provided a one-page comment letter in which no specific comments were made
regarding the subsequent asset classification of emission rights. JICPA’s comments
focused predominately on the measurement issue of emission rights and no specific
comments were made on the subsequent asset classification issue. Similarly, IDW also
did not comment on the subsequent recognition of emission assets, and majority of the
comments surrounded measurement.
Government agencies

The Controller and Auditor-General NZ (CL 8) and the Ministry of Finance Canada
(CL 33) gave no comments on the subsequent asset classification of emission rights.
Non-For-Profit

The Dresden University of Technology (TUD) (CL 31) made no comments about the
subsequent asset classification of emission rights.
6.

Ambiguous comments

Accounting Standard Setters

The Financial Reporting Standards Board in NZ (FRSB) (CL 22) and Australian
Accounting Standards Board (AASB) (CL 27) both suggest that emission rights should
be recognised as financial assets. FRSB (CL 22, para 3) held the view that emission
rights purchased in an open market by “position-taking institutions” meet the definition
of financial asset. However, FRSB appeared to have mixed up the concepts of financial
asset and financial instrument, evidenced by statements such as: “could such allowances
be classified as financial instruments as they meet the definition of a financial asset”
(CL 22, para 3). AASB (CL 27, para b) also suggests that emission rights should be
recognised as financial assets. The majority of AASB’s comments referred to the
Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) scheme in Australia. AASB’s comments on
84

emission rights were predominately based on its understanding of accounting for RECs
in Australia. A high level of ambiguity emerged in AASB’s comment letter when it
referred to emission rights as both financial assets and financial instruments. For
instance, AASB considered emission rights as “commodity-related instruments”, similar
to RECs, because both emission rights and RECs possess “many of the features of
financial instruments” (CL 27, para b). It (CL 27, para b) concluded that “it is
appropriate to treat RECs as if they were financial instruments”. However, AASB (CL
27, para b) also noted that “the UIG considers that RECs and emission rights should be
recognised as financial assets or derivatives to which the principles of IAS 39 ‘Financial
instruments: Recognition and Measurement’ are applied”. The ambiguity in AASB’s
comments regarding the nature of emission rights suggests that AASB interpreted the
definitions of financial assets and financial instruments to allow the flexibility of
classifying emission rights as either financial assets or instruments. It indicates that
AASB was unable to provide clarity regarding the subsequent recognition of emission
rights.

Professional Accounting bodies

While the London Society of Chartered Accountants (LSCA) (CL 40, para b) observed
that an emission right “should be classified as a current asset and is intangible in
nature”, it also acknowledged that the changes in market value of emission assets are
“akin to fair value movements on financial instruments under the scope of IAS 39”.
However, it is unclear whether LSCA was implying that emission rights qualify as
financial instruments or current assets. LSCA’s comments on the subsequent
recognition of emission assets appeared ambiguous and indefinite.
While the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) (CL 32, p 4) agreed
with the IFRIC that emission rights are not financial assets, it argues that “emission
rights may be viewed as being similar to financial instruments held-for-trading, for
which gains and losses would be immediately recognized in income”. The term “may”
suggests ambiguity and uncertainty regarding the subsequent recognition of emission
assets.
The Federation of European Accountants (FEE) (CL 39) supported the alternative
linked transaction approach proposed by EFRAG, in which emission assets were
recognised as intangible assets. It also endorsed the IFRIC consensus that emission
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rights do not meet the definition of financial assets. However, ambiguity emerged when
FEE acknowledged the need to account for emission rights differently, depending on
their life span. As FEE (CL 39, p2) suggests, “if allowances are allocated or issued for a
compliance period of one year or less, then they are current assets…unless they are
intended to be held for use on a continuing basis, or issued for several years in
advance”.
Government agencies

The Environmental Agency in England and Wales (CL 11, para 6.6) proposed that
accounting for emission rights “could more closely mirror the treatment of Financial
Instruments in IAS 39: Financial Instruments Recognition and Measurement requiring
the company to account separately for those instruments not held for trading”. In other
words, the Environmental Agency in England and Wales argued that the nature of
emission rights should depend on whether they are used for compliance or for trading.
Furthermore, it noted that IAS 38 would “help to ensure that shareholders and
stakeholders…will be able to understand the type of asset involved” (CL 11, para 5.3).
The comments suggests that the Environmental Agency held the view that emission
rights should be classified as intangible assets when used for compliance, and financial
instruments when used for trading.
The Big Four

KPMG (CL 35)’s comments on the subsequent asset recognition of emission assets
were more lengthy than those from the other two Big Four accounting firms. First of all,
KPMG endorsed the IFRIC’s conclusion that emission rights are not financial
instruments. While KPMG acknowledged that emission assets meet the definition of
intangible asset as per IAS 38.7, it pointed out that IAS 38 is not the only accounting
standard that applies to an intangible asset, as IAS 2 Inventories and IAS 11
Construction Contracts can also apply to assets without physical substance like
emission rights (CL 35, p3). KPMG concluded that emission assets should be classified
as intangible assets when an entity intends to use emission rights solely for compliance
purposes, whereas when an entity intends to trade emission rights for a profit, those
rights should be classified as inventory (current asset).
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Non-For-Profit

The International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) (CL 6) examined a number of
possible asset classifications of emission rights, such as inventory (current asset),
intangible asset and financial asset. It acknowledged the difficulty in finding an “overall
‘better solution’ under existing GAAP” (CL 6, p 1). IETA concluded that emission
rights used for compliance purposes should be recognised as financial instruments
hedged against liabilities to deliver sufficient emission rights to offset actual emissions.
As IETA explains (CL 6, p 4):

their final use will be for compliance purposes. In these circumstances the
instruments themselves are effectively going to be held as a hedge against future
obligations, and our view is that this should be reflected in the accounting
treatment adopted.
However, the two alternative accounting treatments proposed by IETA both recognised
emission assets as either intangible or financial assets, which contradict with the
suggested financial instrument recognition.
7.

Summary

In summary, the proposed intangible asset classification of emission rights received the
most support from the commentators. Thirteen commentators endorsed the IFRIC’s
conclusion that emission rights are intangible assets. Nine commentators did not
provide explicit comments on the subsequent recognition issue of emission rights. Eight
commentators provided ambiguous and non-specific comments on the subsequent
recognition of emission rights. Furthermore, they argue that the type of asset should be
determined by the substance and purpose of holding emission rights. Five commentators
considered emission rights to be current assets. Last but not least, four commentators
supported a financial instrument classification of emission rights. Table 5 below
provides a summary of ‘who said what’ on the subsequent asset classification of
emission rights.

87

Table 5: A summary of comments on the subsequent asset classification of emission rights
Intangible
asset

Current
asset

Financial
asset

Financial
instrument

No
comment

Ambiguous
comment

Accounting
standard
setters

5

1

1

2

2

Professional
accounting
bodies

2

1

4

3

Emissions
producers

1

3

1

Industryaffiliated
groups

3

1

1

2

1

Government
agencies

The Big
Four

2

1

Non-forProfit

Total: 39

13

5

0

4

1

1

9

8

The above text analysis indicates that the nature of emission rights was in debate. The
commentators suggested a number of possible asset classifications of emission rights:
intangible assets, current assets, financial assets and financial instruments. While the
proposed intangible asset classification received some support amongst the
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commentators, a number of commentators pointed out that emission rights do not fit the
definition of an intangible asset comfortably, as they possess characteristics of all four
types of assets. Furthermore, the commentators argue that the asset classification of
emission rights should reflect the economic substance of an emission right, such as the
purpose of holding emission rights. Many commentators failed to provide clear, specific
and definitive comments on the subsequent recognition issue of emission assets,
evidenced by comments that refer to emission rights as both financial assets and
financial instruments. The notions of financial asset and financial instrument were not
clearly differentiated in a number of comment letters, including those from accounting
standard setters.
5.3.2.3 EMISSION RIGHTS AS A PROVISIONAL LIABILITY

The IFRIC (AASB, 2005, para BC 23) concluded that “once emissions are made, a
liability will arise that should be accounted for in accordance with IAS 37”. The
rationale behind the IFRIC’s conclusion was explained in paragraph BC 22 and BC 23:

In an emission rights scheme, the obligating event…is the production of
emissions (not the receipt of allowances)…the IFRIC noted that the obligation to
deliver allowances depends entirely on the participant’s future actions, i.e.
whether it produces emissions…the fact that a participant may hold assets to
meet its obligation for emissions does not relieve the participant of that
obligation.

The proposed provisional liability recognition of emission rights was another key
recognition issue in debate. The text analysis below provides a summary of comments
on the liability recognition issue of emission rights (see appendix 4 for more details).
Accounting Standard Setters

Out of 12 accounting standard setters, only two supported the proposed liability
recognition of emission rights. Five accounting standard setters were not in favour of
the proposed liability recognition. They argue that a liability should only be recognised
for the excess emission rights purchased by an entity to offset additional emissions. One
accounting standard setter pointed out that there was no need to create a parallel
liability, and proposed that the recognition and measurement of emission rights should
be covered only under IAS 38 Intangible Assets. Four did not comment on the issue.
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Professional Accounting Bodies

Three out of five professional accounting bodies who commented on the liability
recognition issue fully supported the proposed liability recognition of emission rights,
while the remaining two argued that a liability should only be recognised when
emissions exceed the allowable limit, for the additional rights purchased to offset
emissions, or the obligation to pay a fine. Four professional accounting bodies did not
comment on the issue.
Emissions producers

Three out of five emissions producers held the view that there was no need to create a
parallel liability to complicate accounting for emission rights. The remaining two
argued that a separate liability should only be recognised when emissions exceed the
allowable limit.
Industry-affiliated groups

Three industry-affiliated groups suggested that a liability should only be recognised
when emissions exceed the allowable limit in order to reflect the economic substance of
emission rights. One industry-affiliated group proposed that a parallel emission liability
should be eliminated to simplify accounting for emission rights. One did not comment
on the issue.
Government agencies

One government agency suggested that a liability should only be recognised when
emissions exceed the allowable limit of the emission rights held in order to simplify the
accounting process. Two out of three government agencies did not comment on the
liability recognition issue.
The Big Four

Out of two Big Four accounting firms who commented on the liability recognition
issue, one supported the proposed liability recognition of emissions rights, while the
other one argued that a liability only arises when emissions exceed the allowable limit
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of the emission rights held. One did not comment on the liability recognition issue of
emission rights.
Non-for-profit organisations

IETA was not in favour of the proposed liability recognition of emission rights. IETA
(CL 6, p 4) pointed out that “under US GAAP, and even within the UK, some of our
members strongly preferred not to recognise any asset or liability except to the extent
that emissions performance did not match emission allocations”. In other words, IETA
preferred to recognise a liability only when emissions exceed the allowable limit of the
emission rights held. TUD (CL 31) did not comment on the liability recognition issue.
Summary

In summary, Table 6 below provides a summary of comments on the liability
recognition issue of emission rights.
Table 6: A summary of comments on the liability recognition of emission rights
In favour of the
proposed liability
recognition
Accounting standard

Not in favour of the
proposed liability
recognition

No comment

2

6

4

3

2

4

0

5

0

0

4

1

0

1

2

The Big Four (3)

1

1

1

Non-for-profit (2)

0

1

1

Total: 39

6

20

13

setters (12)

Professional
accounting bodies (9)
Emissions producers
(5)
Industry-affiliated
groups (5)
Government agencies
(3)
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As Table 6 suggests, the majority of commentators were not in favour of the proposed
liability recognition of emission rights. The only commentators who supported the
proposed liability recognition represent the accounting profession (e.g. accounting
standard setters, professional accounting bodies and the Big Four). Dominant opinions
emerged from the comment letters regarding the liability recognition issue are
summarised below:
1. There is no need to create a parallel liability as it complicates accounting for
emission rights;
2. On order to reflect the economic substance of an emission right, no liability
should be recognised so long as emissions are made within the allowable limit of
the emission rights held.
5.3.2.4 ALLOCATING EMISSION RIGHTS FOR LESS THAN THEIR FAIR VALUE GIVES
RISE TO A GOVERNMENT GRANT

The IFRIC concluded that when emission rights are allocated for less than fair value
(e.g. free of charge), the “difference between the amount paid and fair value is a
government grant” (AASB, 2005, para 7). The text analysis below provides a summary
of comments on the proposed government grant recognition of emission rights (see
Appendix 5 for more details).
Accounting Standard Setters

Out of 12 commentators, only three agreed with the proposed government grant
recognition. Nine out of 12 did not make specific comments on whether allocating
emission rights for less than their fair value gives rise to a government grant. The
majority of comments focused on the appropriateness of the IFRIC’s decision to
interpret IAS 20 when the IASB intended to revise it, as well as the proposed deferred
income measurement of government grants.
Professional Accounting Bodies

Out of nine comment letters from professional accounting bodies, only three agreed
with the proposed government grant recognition. One suggested that a simpler approach
would be to eliminate the government grant recognition from accounting for emission
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rights. The rest of the professional accounting bodies did not make specific comments
on the recognition aspect.
Emissions producers

Three emissions producers suggested that the government grant element was a
complication in accounting for emission rights, out of whom, KLM was the only
commentator who explicitly rejected the proposed government grant recognition
(addressed under IAS 20) on the basis that it not only complicates financial statements,
but also fails to reflect the substance of ETS, which charges a penalty for noncompliance rather than handing out government assistance. Two emissions producers
implied that they agree with the proposed government grant recognition of allocated
emission rights, evidenced by recognising a government grant (deferred income) in their
illustrative examples.
Industry-affiliated groups

Two industry-affiliated groups rejected the proposed government grant recognition on
the basis that ETS, as a means of charging a penalty to emitters, does not give rise to a
government grant simply because an emitter has been granted the right to emit without
incurring a penalty. One commentator implied that allocating emission rights for less
than fair value gives rise to a government grant. Two did not comment on the
government grant recognition issue.
Government agencies

One government agency suggested that allocating emission rights should give rise to a
tax credit instead of a government grant, and the proposed government grant treatment
could potentially lead to negative political consequences. The remaining two
government agencies did not make specific comments on the proposed government
grant recognition, as the comments predominantly focus on the measurement aspect.
The Big Four

Two out of three Big Four accounting firms supported the proposed government grant
recognition of emission rights. One out of three Big Four accounting firms only
commented on the measurement aspect of government grants.
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Non-For-Profit

One non-for-profit organisation agreed that allocating emission rights gives rise to a
government grant, as indicated in two alternative treatments of emission rights proposed
in its comment letter. The other one did not comment on the issue.
Summary

In summary, Table 7 below provides a summary of comments on the proposed
government grant recognition of emission rights.
Table 7: A summary of comments on the government grant recognition of emission rights

Accounting
standard setters
(12)
Professional
accounting
bodies (9)
Emissions
producers (5)
Industryaffiliated groups
(5)
Government
agencies (3)
The Big Four
(3)
Non-for-profit
(2)
Total: 39

Allocating
emission
rights gives
rise to a
government
grant
3

Allocating
emission rights
does not give
rise to a
government
grant
0

Government
grant
element a
complication

No explicit/specific
comment on the
government grant
recognition

0

9

3

0

1

5

2

1

2

0

1

2

0

2

0

1

0

2

2

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

12

4

3

20

As Table 7 illustrates, the majority of commentators did not make specific comments on
the recognition aspect of a government grant. Comments on the government grant issue
predominantly focused on the measurement aspect, leaving the recognition aspect
largely unexamined. It suggests that measurement was prioritised over recognition. For
instance, the majority of comments focused on the initial and subsequent measurement
of government grants, and the IFRIC’s decision to remove allowable alternative
accounting measurements of government grants. Only four out of 39 commentators
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were not in favour of the proposed government grant recognition, compared to 12 out of
39 who were. One explanation behind the rejection of a government grant recognition
was that the substance of ETS is to punish entities that emit beyond the cap level,
instead of handing out government ‘freebies’. Some commentators considered a
government grant element as an unnecessary complication in accounting for emission
rights, and therefore should be eliminated. A number of commentators also raised
concerns regarding the IFRIC’s decision to issue an interpretation of IAS 20 when it
was subject to IASB revisions.
5.3.2.5 OTHER DISCLOSURE-RELATED COMMENTS

A small group of commentators commented on the wording of draft IFRIC 3. For
instance, PWC (CL 20) and FEE (CL 39) argued that the word ‘pollutants’ may not be
appropriate as not all emitted gases are necessarily pollutants, thus should be replaced
by ‘emissions’ throughout the document. While PWC and FEE avoided terms that carry
a negative connotation, such as ‘pollutants’, Environmental Agency in England and
Wales (CL 11) and KLM (CL 38) recommended further disclosure requirements of
emission rights. For instance, as KLM (CL 38, p 6) suggests:

The extent of an entity’s emissions in comparison to the level of allowances it
has been granted by a government will not necessarily be apparent from its
financial statements. Consequently, we recommend that the IFRIC require such
disclosure in the notes to all entity’s financial statements.
Environmental Agency in England and Wales (CL 11, para 6.5) demanded more
extensive disclosure by suggesting that companies “should be required to identify the
value and number of allowances held for the purpose of mitigating actual emissions and
the value (and number) held for the purpose of trading”.
Some commentators seeked further clarifications from the IFRIC on a number of issues
underlying the recognition and measurement of emission rights. For instance, CICA
(CL 32, p 2) argues that that further clarifications should be given by the IFRIC on a
number of issues. For instance:

Further definition is required of the nature of the assumed cap and trade system.
For example, paragraph 1(a) of the Background notes that allowances are
allocated by the government. Are the allowances allocated based on an intensity
rate or an absolute basis? If allowances are allocated on an intensity rate basis,
with allowances given at the beginning of the year based on a baseline intensity
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and a historical production level, what are the implications for the recognition of
the asset if production levels fall? Also, the issues of banking and the possible
discounting of banked allowances are not addressed adequately.
ICAEW (CL 37) and SAICA (CL 25) seeked clarification on the term ‘liquid market’
used in the draft IFRIC 3. ICAEW (CL 37, para 10) and SAICA (CL 25, p 5) both argue
that while the definition of an “active market” is defined in IAS 38.7, the term “liquid
market” was not defined in the draft IFRIC 3.

While the majority of commentators agreed that the draft IFRIC 3 was consistent with
the existing Framework and accounting standards, a small number of commentators
argued that an interpretation of existing standards is inadequate in addressing
accounting for emission rights. For instance, IETA (CL 6, p 1) acknowledged that
“there is no overall ‘better solution’ under existing GAAP”. JICPA (CL 12, p 2)
proposed that “accounting for emission rights be discussed by International Accounting
Standards Board to establish a new standard, rather than the IFRIC develop it”.
5.3.3 SUMMARY

To sum up the text analysis of comment letters, a number of dominant views on the
recognition issues of emission rights have emerged. They are summarised below:
1. Despite the fact that many commentators disagreed with the separate asset/liability
recognition model as proposed as it could lead to measurement mismatch, the
initial asset classification of emission rights was considered a ‘given’. The
majority of discussion on the recognition issues largely surrounded what type of
asset an emission right should be classified as, instead of whether ETS gives rise
to an asset in the first place.
2. While the asset classification of emission rights was considered a ‘given’, the
nature of emission assets was heavily debated in the comment letters. The debate
surrounding the subsequent asset classification of emission rights suggests that
emission rights possess characteristics of intangible assets, financial assets, current
assets (inventory and pre-paid expense) and financial instruments. Some
commentators, including those from accounting standard setters, mixed up
‘financial assets’ with ‘financial instruments’.
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3. Some commentators pointed out that a liability should not be recognised as long
as emissions are made within the allowable limit and should only arise when
excess emissions are made.
4. The proposed government grant recognition of emission rights was largely
unchallenged as the majority of comments focused on the measurement aspect
alone.
5.4 THE IASB’S PRESS RELEASES OF IFRIC 3’S WITHDRAWAL
The IASB issued a one-and-a-half-page press release in July 2005 to announce its
decision to withdraw IFRIC 3 one year after its release. The IASB further discussed the
rationale behind the decision to withdraw IFRIC 3 in the June 2005 edition of IASB
update. While similar issues were discussed in both releases, the June 2005 IASB
update contains more details on the rationale behind the IASB’s decision to withdraw
IFRIC 3. The IASB (2005a and 2005b) addresses three key issues regarding accounting
for emission rights, which are discussed below:

1. The IASB (2005a, 2005b) acknowledged that “the markets for emission
rights…although developing rapidly, are at present thin”. The IASB (2005a and
2005b, p1) questioned “whether there is as urgent a need for an interpretation”,
which contradicts with the IFRIC’s original conclusion that “the need for timely
guidance to prevent divergent practices developing outweighs the disadvantage
that the Interpretation might be amended in the medium term” (AASB 2005,
para BC 5). The IASB (2005a, p1) argues that “in the light of the reduced
urgency for an Interpretation, the Board decided to withdraw IFRIC 3, with
immediate effect”. The IASB (2005a, p1) further argues that it would be “more
appropriate and efficient for the Board to reconsider the accounting for cap and
trade emission right schemes itself, rather than ask the IFRIC to continue its
work on developing amendments to the relevant Standards”. In other words, the
IASB concluded that the need for more appropriate, comprehensive and specific
guidance on accounting for emission rights outweighed the urgency for a
‘rushed’ interpretation. The IASB also acknowledged that it should develop an
appropriate standard of accounting for emission rights.
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2. The IASB (2005a and 2005b) acknowledged the effect of IAS 20’s revision on
IFRIC 3. As the IASB (2005b, p1-2) explains:
The IASB is concerned that short-term amendments to Standards might
result in a series of changes in accounting for emission rights, which
would be unhelpful to both prepares and users of financial statements.
The IASB (2005a, p1) concluded that:
it would be inappropriate to amend Standards…before it had considered
the effects of the revised IAS 20 on the accounting for allowances
received from government.
The above conclusion from the IASB contradicts with the IFRIC’s decision to
issue an interpretation of IAS 20, prior to its IASB amendments.
3. The IASB (2005a) acknowledged concerns from the commentators (e.g.
EFRAG) regarding the measurement of emission rights. The IASB (2005a, p1)
also acknowledged that the “timing mismatch” issue should be addressed, for
instance, the timing of asset and liability recognition (asset recognised at the
start of the year and liability recognised during the year as it is incurred).
Regarding the measurement mismatch of assets and liabilities, the IASB
acknowledged that “an unsatisfactory consequence of the interaction of IAS 38
and IAS 37” (2005a, p1) created “unsatisfactory measurement and reporting
mismatches” (2005b, p1), despite reaffirming that IFRIC 3 was an “appropriate”
interpretation of existing accounting standards (2005a and 2005b, p1).

In summary, the July 2005 IASB Press Release was concise and straight-to-the-point,
whereas the June 2005 IASB Update was more detailed and lengthy as it explained the
basis of the IASB’s decision to withdraw IFRIC 3. Despite the fact that the IASB
(2005a, p1) acknowledged “unsatisfactory” measurement in IFRIC 3 and the fact that it
was unhelpful for the IFRIC to issue an Interpretation before amendments of IAS 20
were finalised, it reaffirmed that the IFRIC provided an “appropriate” interpretation of
relevant standards. The term “unsatisfactory” was used by the IASB, instead of terms
such as “inappropriate”, which convey a much stronger negative tone. The IASB (2005a
and 2005b) deliberately avoided adjectives that carry a strongly negative tone in
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preference over more neutral adjectives, such as “unsatisfactory”, “not helpful” and
“questionable” when explaining its basis for IFRIC 3’s withdrawal. The IASB (2005a
and 2005b) also emphasised that its decision to withdraw IFRIC 3 was not made due to
inappropriate recognition and measurement of emission rights, but rather, the reduced
urgency for an interpretation. The discourse analysis of IFRIC 3 texts will be presented
in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
6.1 INTRODUCTION: ANALYSING IFRIC 3 DISCOURSE

How do the texts interact?

2. Discourse analysis: what is the underlying
discourse behind what is said, as well as what
is not said in:
1.
2.
3.

IFRIC 3
the comment letters
the IASB press releases

1. Text analysis

3. Social analysis

Figure 3: An overview of Chapter Six: discourse analysis

As illustrated in Figure 6 above, the discourse analysis of CDA interprets the underlying
discourse IFRIC 3 texts produce. Discourse analysis seeks to discover the “the
connections between ways in which texts are put together and interpreted, how texts are
produced, distributed and consumed in a wider sense” (Fairclough, 1993, p72).
Discourse analysis examines the way IFRIC 3 texts are constructed and interact with
each other in order to discover the underlying discourse. As Halliday (1978, p109)
suggests, a text is a matter of “choice” as the author of a text selects what, how, and
how much to tell in a text. Discourse analysis seeks to examine both what is said as well
as what is not said in the IFRIC 3 texts. The following discourse analysis provides an
examination of the discourses found in IFRIC 3, the comment letters and IASB press
releases.
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6.2 DISCOURSE FOUND IN IFRIC 3 TEXT
6.2.1 ACCOUNTING TEXT AS A RHETORICAL DEVICE

The lengthy, formal and technical language in IFRIC 3 represents efforts by the IFRIC
to construct a particular image. As Young (2003, p624) suggests, accounting standard
setters seek to create an impression of accounting standards being “serious texts, a
seriousness emphasized (and amplified) by the use of lengthy sentences and formal
language”. The use of serious language to explain sophisticated technical accounting
issues can significantly limit the audience of IFRIC 3. As Young (2003, p624) asserts:

This text does not invite casual perusal by readers with only a mild interest in
accounting practices. Instead, the implied audience is an ‘accounting expert’,
one expert in untangling the complicated phrasing and in using the highly
specialized language of accounting. Even the ‘expert’ will be required to read
these paragraphs slowly and carefully in order to understand the rules contained
within them.
The sophisticated technical accounting text used throughout IFRIC3 suggests that the
primary audience can only be those who are in the accounting profession, or those who
possess sufficient knowledge of financial reporting in order to work through the
technicality of IFRIC 3. Klamer describes economic texts (such as accounting) as a
form of “tribal” communication (George, 1990, p862). The frequent application of
sophisticated technical accounting terms only reinforces the exclusiveness of accounting
knowledge, as only those who possess the knowledge are able to contribute to the
accounting standard setting process. Young (2003) suggests that the exclusiveness of
accounting text can also silence alternative views. For instance, the target audience of
IFRIC 3 was most likely to be knowledgeable mainstream interest groups.
The sophisticated and technical accounting language used in IFRIC 3 not only seeks to
emphasise the ‘seriousness’ of the interpretation, but also to persuade its target audience
that IFRIC 3 is an appropriate interpretation that is conceptually consistent and
economically rational. Accounting text is commonly used as a rhetorical device to
persuade its audience of its soundness, rationality and objectivity (Young, 2003;
Arrington and Schweiker, 1992).
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As Young (2003, p622) suggests:
Given the ambiguity and indeed fluidity of accounting categories and
classifications and the consequent controversy surrounding the standard-setting
process, this process may be regarded as an exercise in persuasion. FASB
members and staff are continuously engaged in efforts to persuade individuals
located outside this entity that its work is valuable, appropriate, useful and
correct. These persuasive efforts cover a range of activities including
that…proposed solutions to a perceived problem improve accounting practice,
that such problems are accurately framed and of appropriate scope…
In other words, language is used by the IFRIC as a rhetorical device to justify and
legitimise its consensus. It serves as a rhetorical tactic to justify the fitting of ‘a round
peg into a square hole’ to its target audience. This thesis argues that trying to fit a
sophisticated new phenomenon (such as accounting for emission rights) into the
existing ‘accounting toolbox’ is a problematic approach.
6.2.2 IFRIC 3 DISCOURSE CONSTRAINED WITHIN A MAINSTREAM PARADIGM

The text analysis of IFRIC 3 suggests that the IFRIC consensus on accounting for
emission rights was constrained by the existing accounting framework, evidenced by
frequent references to the Framework and existing accounting standards for justification
and legitimisation. The IFRIC 3 text demonstrates the IFRIC’s inability to escape the
constraints of a mainstream accounting approach. IFRIC 3 demonstrates the IFRIC’s
efforts to simply “prod, probe, snip and make” emission rights fitted into existing
accounting classifications (Young, 2003, p621). For instance, despite the fact that
emission rights cannot be fit comfortably into any existing asset categories, the IFRIC
still concluded that it would be inappropriate to ask the IASB to bend the rules to
accommodate accounting for emission rights. As Young (2003, p630-631) asserts:
this tethering to the past has the effect of suggesting that a new standard should
not be considered a radical departure from the practices which are being
replaced (or supplanted)...Methods can also be rejected for their inconsistency
with GAAP.
While IFRIC 3 is merely an interpretation of existing standards, it demonstrates an
exercise of ‘fitting a round peg into a square hole’, conceptual purity and consistency
with the status quo of mainstream accounting practice. The text analysis of IFRIC 3
suggests that the mainstream accounting approach adopted in IFRIC 3 prioritises market
attributes such as tradability and profitability of emission rights, and considers them to
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be the cornerstones of emissions trading. Such an approach is problematic in a wider
social and ecological context.
6.2.3 FORM OVER ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE

According to the Framework (IASB, 2006, para 35):
If information is to represent faithfully the transactions and other events that it
purports to represent, it is necessary that they are accounted for and presented in
accordance with their substance and economic reality and not merely their legal
form. The substance of transactions or other events is not always consistent with
that which is apparent from their legal or contrived form.
However, the proposed accounting recognition of emission rights in IFRIC 3 fails to
reflect the economic substance of emission rights. For instance, while the legal form of
emission rights fits the definition of intangible asset, the economic substance of
emission rights suggests that it is closer to a financial/hedging instrument intended to
offset an obligation. The proposed government grant recognition also fails to reflect the
economic substance of ETS, which is designed to punish emitters who emit beyond the
cap, rather than ‘rewarding’ them with government ‘freebies’. The IFRIC consensus and
the rationale behind it suggest that the IFRIC put more emphasis on the legal form over
economic substance of emission rights. The IFRIC’s ‘form over substance’ approach to
accounting for emission rights contradicts with the qualitative characteristic of
reliability as described in the Framework. The IFRIC consensus was largely justified by
its conceptual purity alone. The internal inconsistencies examined in the text analysis of
IFRIC 3 reveal ambiguity concerning the nature of emission rights and the IFRIC’s
struggle to categorise emission rights within the existing accounting framework.
Given the multi-facet, complex and fluid nature of emission rights, the IASB took an
interim solution, ‘stop-gap’ measure by handling the challenge to the IFRIC, rather than
developing an appropriate standard for emission rights. The ‘form over substance’
approach adopted by the IFRIC ultimately led to unacceptable economic consequences,
for instance, the measurement mismatch of assets and liabilities, which largely
contributed to the withdrawal of IFRIC 3.
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6.2.4 TECHNICALITY OVER ECOLOGICAL SUBSTANCE

The accounting issues raised in IFRIC 3 largely focused on the technicality of
accounting for emission rights, especially the measurement aspect of accounting for
emission rights. While the IFRIC noted that ETS is “designed to encourage reduced
levels of emissions” (AASB 2005, para 3), there was no discussion of the ecological
substance of emission rights and how that can be represented in accounting in IFRIC 3.
In other words, the IFRIC consensus represents a disconnection between accounting for
emission rights and its underlying ecological purpose. This disconnection is largely due
to the limited authoritative power of the IFRIC and the IASB’s decision to be expedient
in a time when timely and specific authoritative accounting guidance was needed to
facilitate the introduction of the EU ETS. The IASB’s decision to issue an interpretation
of existing accounting standards through the IFRIC instead of developing a new
standard locked the scope of IFRIC 3 into technical issues alone. While the IFRIC
delved into the technical complexity of accounting for emission rights, it ignored the
fact that accounting for emission rights forms an integral part of ETS, which is designed
to achieve emissions reduction.

This thesis argues that a ‘technicality over ecological substance’ approach can lead to
unacceptable social and ecological consequences. For instance, the proposed separate
asset/liability recognition model reflects the IFRIC’s view that an emitter “cannot be
compelled” to use emission rights only to settle its environmental obligation (AASB,
2005, para BC12), when the effectiveness of ETS (as an emissions-reduction
mechanism) is built on the expectation that emitters hold emission rights solely for
compliance purposes. As a result of the proposed separate asset/liability recognition of
emission rights, emitters would be more likely to trade emission rights for a profit,
instead of delivering emission rights purely for compliance purposes. Similarly, the
proposed government grant recognition of emission rights also sends the wrong
message to emitters, as it misrepresents the purpose of ETS as a means of penalising
emitters.
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6.2.5 TIMELINESS OVER QUALITY

As the IFRIC (AASB, 2005, para BC 5) concluded in IFRIC 3:
the need for timely guidance to prevent divergent practices developing
outweighs the disadvantage that the Interpretation might be amended in the
medium term. It therefore decided to finalise its Interpretation.
IFRIC 3 represents the IASB’s decision to present a timely interpretation for the EU
ETS. It is the product of the IASB’s decision to issue timely accounting guidance for
the EU ETS, when the idea of emission rights was a new economic phenomenon. As an
interpretation, the promulgation of accounting for emission rights provided guidance
constrained by the concepts, accounting recognition and measurement in the existing
accounting practice. This thesis argues that the IASB’s decision to issue an
interpretation via the IFRIC demonstrates efforts that prioritise the timeliness over the
quality of accounting guidance for emission rights.
6.2.6 SUMMARY

In summary, IFRIC 3 represents efforts of the IASB to provide accounting guidance via
the IFRIC, instead of developing a new accounting standard. The discourse analysis of
IFRIC 3 suggests that the IFRIC 3 discourse was constrained by the Framework and
existing accounting standards. Alternative accounting approaches were effectively
silenced in IFRIC 3. The serious and technical accounting text in IFRIC 3 serves as a
rhetorical device to convince its target audience that the interpretation is appropriate and
conceptually pure. The proposed recognitions of emission rights were largely justified
on the basis of their consistency to existing definitions from the Framework and
relevant standards. Despite IFRIC 3’s conceptual purity, it represents an approach that
prioritises form, technicality and timeliness over substance and quality. IFRIC 3 not
only fails to reflect the economic substance of emission rights, but also the ecological
substance of emission rights as a key vehicle of emissions reduction. IFRIC 3 largely
focused on the technicality of accounting for emission rights (especially the
measurement aspect), leaving the ecological substance of emission rights unexamined
and unrepresented. This thesis argues that the IASB is ultimately responsible for the
demise of IFRIC 3. As a result of IASB’s decision to take the interpretation approach in
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light of the EU ETS, the IFRIC subsequently produced an outcome that would create
inappropriate economic, social and ecological consequences.
6.3 DISCOURSE IN THE COMMENT LETTERS
Young (2003) suggests that accounting standards setters deliberately construct
accounting standards to target powerful interest groups, as it is ultimately the
acceptance of those powerful groups that they actively seek. Llewellyn and Milne
(2007, p806) also suggest that it is only those “professional elites” that have the power
to influence the accounting standards setting process. The text analysis of draft IFRIC 3
comment letters brings to light a number of dominant discourses regarding the
recognition of emission rights. First of all, the text analysis reveals that the dominant
discourses overshadowed alternative views raised by a small group of commentators.
For instance, the initial asset recognition of emission rights was largely regarded as a
‘given’ by most commentators. The text analysis also suggests that the majority of
commentators held the view that accounting for emission rights should not represent a
radical departure from the Framework and existing accounting standards. The majority
of commentators considered existing accounting practice as a relevant basis of
accounting for emission rights. This thesis argues that this approach to accounting for
emission rights ultimately contributes to the maintenance and reinforcement of the
status quo and a business-as-usual scenario.
The text analysis also reveals the absence of a consensus regarding the subsequent asset
classification of emission rights. The debate over the subsequent asset classification
suggests that the characteristics of emission rights are far too complex to be
appropriately represented by any single asset classification in existing standards. As
many commentators pointed out, the accounting nature of emission rights depends on
the economic purpose of those rights, instead of on their legal form alone. While the
legal form of an emission right can be represented by an intangible asset classification,
the economic substance of which reflects characteristics of intangible asset, inventory,
pre-paid expense, financial asset and financial instrument. The complex nature of
emission rights, as either an instrument of compliance, or a tradable commodity, proves
to be a challenge for accounting to represent. For instance, the text analysis of comment
letters reveals ambiguous and tentative comments on the subsequent asset classification
of emission assets.
106

What is also highlighted in the text analysis is that the majority of commentators made
frequent references to definitions from existing standards and the Framework to justify
ambiguous and tentative views, which indicates that there was an overall lack of a
substantial understanding of the nature of emission rights. This thesis argues that the
commentators’ struggle to fit emission rights into an existing asset classification
indicates that accounting for emission rights is beyond the capacity of existing asset
definitions and classifications. A more sophisticated accounting standard is needed to
represent the complex, fluid and multi-dimensional nature of emission rights.
Similar to the discourse found in IFRIC 3, the dominant discourses found in the
comment letters also represent a disconnection between the ecological substance of ETS
and the accounting recognition of emission rights. While the majority of discussions in
the comment letters focused on the subsequent recognition and measurement issues of
emission rights, very few commentators raised the question of whether the proposed
accounting recognition can encourage the reduction of GHG emissions. Comments from
accounting standards setters, professional accounting bodies, industry-affiliated groups,
emissions producers and the Big Four accounting firms were more technical than those
from government agencies and non-for-profit organizations. The majority of
commentators also disconnected the ‘measurement’ from ‘recognition’ of emission
rights, and instead, focused on the complexity of the separate recognition and
measurement model proposed by the IFRIC. While the proposed accounting recognition
was criticised on the basis of its unnecessary complexity and inability to reflect the
economic substance of ETS, very few commentators raised concerns as to whether the
proposed accounting treatment of emission rights reflects the underlying ecological
substance of ETS. Only a small number of commentators, such as ASBJ and the
Environmental Agency England and Wales suggest that accounting for emission rights
should reflect the ecological substance of ETS. For instance, ASBJ (CL4, para 4) argues
that:
Although an allowance can be sold at market on its own, to sell it before the end
of the compliance period is similar to broker’s activities intended for generating
a profit from fluctuations in market price. Such a transaction that is considered
exceptional for a participant should not be the cornerstone of accounting for
emission rights.
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Similarly, the Environmental Agency England and Wales (CL11, para 6.3) also argues
that accounting for emission rights should reflect the “environmental intent” of ETS.
6.4 DISCOURSE IN THE IASB PRESS RELEASES
6.4.1 PRESS RELEASE A VEHICLE OF ‘DAMAGE CONTROL’

Text analysis of the press releases suggests that text in the press releases was carefully
worded by the IASB to ‘play down’ the magnitude of IFRIC3’s failure, evidenced by
the choice of neutral words such as “questionable” in preference over words that
express a stronger negative tone. The text analysis also reveals that the IASB seeked to
disconnect its decision to withdraw IFRIC 3 from the recognition and measurement
issues in IFRIC 3 by emphasising that the decision was made “in the light of the
reduced urgency for an Interpretation” (IASB, 2005a, p1). The IASB (2005a; 2005b)
also reaffirmed that the IFRIC issued an appropriate interpretation of relevant standards.
Furthermore, the IASB (2005b, p2) announced that it would address accounting for
emission rights in a “more comprehensive way than originally envisaged by the IFRIC”.
This thesis argues that the IASB used press releases as a vehicle not only to tone down
the extent of the IFRIC’s failure to provide appropriate accounting guidance for
emission rights, but also to regain confidence from the constituents of the IASB/IFRIC.
For instance, in order to assure that appropriate actions will be taken to address
accounting for emission rights, the IASB (2005a, p1) confirmed that it would be “more
appropriate and efficient for the Board to reconsider the accounting for cap and trade
emission right schemes itself”.
6.4.2 DISCONNECTION BETWEEN RECOGNITION AND MEASUREMENT

While the IASB (2005a; 2005b) acknowledged that IFRIC 3 gave rise to a measurement
mismatch of assets and liabilities, no specific comments were made in its press releases
regarding the recognition issues that are in debate. This thesis argues that a lack of
comments on the recognition issues of emission rights indicates a disconnection
between measurement and recognition. While it is important to resolve the question of
‘what to represent in accounting’ before ‘how to measure’, the IASB failed to
acknowledge the interconnectedness between recognition and measurement, leaving the
recognition of emission rights largely unexamined. The IASB also failed to address the
effect of the proposed recognition of emission rights on measurement. The IASB’s
failure to acknowledge the importance of recognition of emission rights can be an
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impediment to the development of an appropriate standard for emission rights, as a
built-in loop of recognition and measurement issues are likely to (re)occur in the
absence of an appropriate accounting classification of emission rights.
6.5 SUMMARY
IFRIC 3 represents the IASB’s efforts to fit emission rights into mainstream accounting
classifications, despite mainstream accounting’s inability to account for the
environment. Hines (1991a, p27) suggests that nature is excluded from mainstream
accounting calculations because accounting “names, bounds and thus separates” nature
from commercial activities. The IFRIC 3 discourses reflect an overall lack of
understanding of the nature of emission rights among the IFRIC and the commentators.
The recognition of emission rights was one of the most important accounting issues in
debate, and the discourse analysis suggests that a consensus on what to represent in
accounting was not yet reached. The discourse analysis reveals that while a subsequent
asset classification of emission rights was in debate, the proposed initial asset
recognition was largely considered a ‘given’ amongst the commentators, which
demonstrates the commentators’ inability to think outside the mainstream accounting
tool box. The IFRIC, as an interpretative committee, was also constrained by the
existing accounting framework. From a mainstream accounting perspective, the
recognition of emission rights was consistent with the existing Framework and
accounting standards. However, the IFRIC’s pursuit of conceptual purity compromised
the reliability of accounting guidance in IFRIC 3. While the measurement mismatch
was largely responsibly for the withdrawal of IFRIC 3, the accounting recognition of
emission rights remained in debate. The discourse analysis brings to light a
disconnection between the measurement and recognition of emission rights in IFRIC 3,
the comment letters and IASB press releases.
From the discourse analysis, this thesis argues that IFRIC 3 represents efforts by the
IASB to create an illusion of change and maintain a business-as-usual scenario, as the
status quo remains unchallenged. While the mainstream approach to accounting for
emission rights adopted by the IFRIC and the commentators was consistent with the
existing accounting practice, it was unable to represent the underlying ecological
substance of an emission right as a means of achieving emissions reduction. A paradox
arises, when on one hand, accounting for emission rights is expected to represent the
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economic substance of emission rights as tradable commodities in an emission rights
market. On the other hand, the underlining ecological purpose of emission rights cannot
be achieved if too much emphasis is put on the economic substance alone, as it would
distract emitters from making socially and ecologically rational decisions. The discourse
analysis above suggests that the IASB’s decision to provide accounting guidance for
emission rights via the IFRIC was based on a lack of understanding of the sophistication
and complexity of emission rights. Its decision to take the expedient approach resulted
in an interpretation that lacks substance and reliability.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SOCIAL ANALYSIS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Arrington and Francis (1993, p116) argue that discourse is constructed largely by the
“force of speakers and writers as agents of the production of discourse”. Crucial to the
understanding of IFRIC3 discourses is an examination of the underlying social context
and relations that shape the discourses, as they are “produced, transmitted and received
within a series of existing power relations” (Ferguson, 2007, cited from Llewellyn and
Milne, 2007, p811). As the discourse analysis suggests, the cornerstone of the proposed
accounting recognition of emission rights was built on the representation of emissions
rights as tradable commodities, instead of instruments of compliance.
The following social analysis provides an examination of key commentators in the draft
IFRIC 3 comment process and social relations that shape the IFRIC 3 discourses.

3. Social analysis: what is the context?

1. Text analysis

2. Discourse analysis

Who are the key players in the discourse
construction?

Figure 4: An overview of Chapter Seven: social analysis

7.2 KEY PLAYERS IN THE DRAFT IFRIC 3 COMMENT PROCESS
7.2.1 EUROPEAN MNCs AND INDUSTRY-AFFILIATED GROUPS

The IASB’s decision to expedite an interpretation rather than a new standard was
closely connected to the introduction of the EU ETS in 2005. For instance, the IFRIC
(AASB, 2005) noted an absence of authoritative accounting guidance for emission
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rights when the EU ETS was due to be introduced in 2005. As indicated in Table 3,
commentators such as BP, Holcim, Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) and Syngenta,
represent the interest of some of the most powerful emitters, such as the genetic
engineering, cement, oil, and airline industry.

The interest of those MNCs is further represented, protected and advanced by industryaffiliated groups and industry unions. For instance, the Federation of Swiss industrial
Holding Companies is a business federation representing Swiss-based multinational
corporations from the manufacturing and service sectors. It is responsible for improving
the legal and business environments in Switzerland for its MNC members, including
some of the draft IFRIC 3 commentators, such as Holcim and Syngenta
(SwissHoldings, 2009).
7.2.2 EUROPEAN FINANCIAL REPORTING ADVISORY GROUP (EFRAG)

ERFAG is a private sector body established by European organisations prominent in
European capital markets, known as the “Founding Fathers” (EFRAG, 2004 16 , p4).
ERFAG was set up in 2001 to assist the European Commission in the endorsement of
IFRSs. Its role involves providing technical advice on the interpretation and application
of IFRSs (EFRAG, 2004, p4). EFRAG acts as adviser to the European commission in
terms of providing technical accounting advice to facilitate the implementation of IFRSs
in Europe. In other words, any accounting advice from EFRAG is likely to be consistent
with existing IFRSs. EFRAG’s process of commenting on the IFRIC interpretations is
explained below:
When preparing comment letters to the IASB on exposure drafts of proposed
IFRSs or IFRIC interpretations and when preparing endorsement advice to the
European Commission on these standards and interpretations, EFRAG seeks via its website - input from organisations, companies and the public on TEG 17
draft views. EFRAG also works closely with National Standard Setters in
Europe. The Chairman of the three major Standard Setters in Europe participate
in TEG meetings as non-voting members (EFRAG, 2004, p5).
EFRAG, along with two of the three major European accounting standard setters that it
works closely with, namely, CNC (France) and DRSC (Germany), were commentators
16

EFRAG’s Annual Review in 2004 was chosen in social analysis because EFRAG has only been
publishing its Annual Review on its website since 2004, and that year 2004 is most relevant to the IFRIC
3 discourse.
17
‘TEG’ stands for Technical Expert Group.
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of the draft IFRIC 3 (see EFRAG, 2004, p5). As of 1st of April 2005, EFRAG’s
supervisory board was made up of one chairman, one deputy chairman, 14 members,
eight advisors and one observer (EFRAG, 2004, p21). Four out of 14 members and one
out of eight advisors from EFRAG were also members of FEE. It indicates a close tie
between ERFAG and FEE, which explains the similarity in comments from EFRAG
and FEE on accounting for emission rights.

According to EFRAG (2004, p4), it operates through the TEG, chaired by a partner of
Deloitte and made up of 11 members from a variety of backgrounds throughout the EU.
As EFRAG (2004) suggests, the majority of TEG members came from the accounting
profession and industry sector in the European Union. The composition of TEG reveals
a close connection amongst EFRAG, the accounting profession and industry, which
explains why EFRAG’s comments on the IFRIC consensus received wide-spread
endorsement from the accounting profession and industry-affiliated groups in the EU.
7.2.3 THE FEDERATION OF EUROPEAN ACCOUNTANTS (FEE)

FEE is the representative organisation of the accounting profession in Europe, and one
of the founding organisations of ERFAG. Its membership consists of more than 500,000
European accountants from 43 professional accounting bodies in 32 countries (FEE,
2009). FEE’s objectives are to “promote and advance the interests of the European
accountancy profession in the broadest sense recognising the public interest in the work
of the profession” (FEE, 2009). IDW, FAR and ICAEW 18 are among the member
bodies of FEE (FEE, 2009). FEE’s status as a representative of the European accounting
profession explains the consistency in comments on the IFRIC consensus from FEE and
EU professional accounting bodies.
7.2.4 INTERNATIONAL EMISSIONS TRADING ASSOCATION (IETA)

IETA is a non-profit organisation created to facilitate the establishment of a functional
international framework for emissions trading. As of 2009 19 , IETA has established a
membership base of over 160 corporate members, and formed several corporate
partnerships (IETA, 2009). Among the members and partners are emissions producers,
18

Institute of Chartered Accountants England and Wales, to which LSCA is affiliated
Membership information from 2003 when the draft IFRIC 3 was released for public comment is
unavailable on IETA’s website, due to regular updates. Given its current membership structure, it can be
reasonably assumed that in 2003, IETA was chaired by individuals from the industries and accounting
profession, whose membership comprised of International companies.
19
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an industry-affiliated group, and those from the accounting profession, for instance,
Syngenta, Holcim, BP, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Eurelectric, KPMG and PWC, who
were all commentators of the draft IFRIC 3. An examination of IETA’s organisational
structure further reveals that the majority of executive positions are held by business
professionals working for emissions producers. For instance, The Vice Chairman is an
adviser from Shell, and the majority of IETA directors work for the oil, energy,
electricity, building materials and automobile industry. Given the composition of its
member body, this thesis argues that IETA is likely to support the interest of its
corporate members and associates. An example of IETA’s representation of its members
is illustrated in its comment letter to the IFRIC, in which concerns were raised that its
members preferred not to recognise a liability unless actual emissions exceed the
allowable limit of emission rights held.
7.2.5 THE IASB AND IASCF

IASCF is described as “an independent, non-for-profit private sector organisation
working in the public interest” (IASB, 2010c). One of the principle objectives of IASCF
is to develop and promote IFRSs through the IASB, its independent standard-setting
arm (IASB, 2010c). However, as Sikka (2008, p77) suggests:

The IASB claims to advance business accountability and transparency, but is
itself a highly secretive organisation…it is funded by the ‘big four’ accounting
firms…and major corporations. The same interests dominate all its structures
and committees. Many accounting trade associations, including those from the
UK, have signed-up to the IASB, as they seek to advance the narrow interests of
their members and keep public accountability at bay.
For instance, the IASCF’s annual reports from 2002 to 2008 indicate that the Big Four
accounting firms and various major corporations have been major funders of the
foundation. The Big Four accounting firms’ annual contributions to IASCF ranged
between US$1,000,000 in 2002 to US$2,000,000 each between 2002 and 2008. The
draft IFRIC 3 (D1) was issued in May 2003 and public comments were invited shortly
after the release of the draft. In 2003, around the time when the draft IFRIC 3 was
released, the Big Four accounting firms contributed US$1,000,000 to IASCF (IASCF,
2003, p23). The funding arrangement of IASCF suggests that the neutrality and
independence of IASB are “highly value-laden concepts” (Sikka, 2008, p77). In other
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words, the independence of IASB is highly questionable, as its agendas are likely to be
influenced by the major funders.

The independent status of the IASB is questionable not only because of its sources of
funding, but also its close affiliations with various national accounting standard setters.
As Bernardi and Coolahan (2005, p53) suggest, “the regime created by the IASB is only
as strong as the members who stand behind it”. According to IASB (2005, cited from
Bernardi and Coolahan, 2005, p53), the IASB as of 2005, was affiliated with the
following national standard setters:
•

Australian Accounting Standards Board

•

Financial Reporting Standards Board (NZ)

•

Accounting Standards Board (Canada)

•

Counseil Nationale de la comptabilité (France)

•

German Accounting Standards Committee

•

Accounting Standards Board of Japan

•

Accounting Standards Board (UK)

•

Financial Accounting Standards Board (US)

Five out of the eight national standard setters listed above commented on the draft
IFRIC 3. Apart from the above national accounting standard setters, the IASB also had
the support of EFRAG, who was another commentator of the draft IFRIC 3. (IASPlus,
2005, cited in Bernardi and Coolahan, 2005, p53).
Apart from the social relations amongst the IASB, IASCF and their constituents, the
examination of IASB/IASCF’s funding structure also reveals a strong presence of
Japanese funders. As a key player in the development and implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol, Japan’s strong interest in the IFRIC/IASB and their standard-setting activities
was evidenced by two comment letters submitted from both its national accounting
standard setter and professional accounting body.
7.3 SUMMARY
In summary, the above social analysis identifies key commentators of the draft IFRIC 3
as well as highlights the hidden social relations that shape the IFRIC 3 discourses. The
social analysis suggests that at face value, the public comment process of IFRIC 3 gives
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an illusion of diverse opinions. However, in reality, the comment letters only represent
dominant views from the most powerful commentators. The diversification of the draft
IFRIC 3 comments is simply an illusion, as the public comment process is largely
dominated by a number of key players. Their domination ultimately closes off
alternative ideals and keeps them at bay, for instance, the alternative view which
suggests that accounting for emission rights should reflect the environmental intent of
ETS (e.g. Environmental Agency in England and Wales, CL 11). Even the IASB’s
neutrality as a supposedly ‘independent’ accounting standard setter is a highly
questionable notion, given its reliance on funding from mainstream social institutions
such as the Big Four accounting firms and corporations.

This thesis argues that while IFRIC 3 demonstrates efforts to internalise an
environmental externality, in reality, it only maintains and reinforces a mainstream
approach to the environment and business-as-usual scenario, which prioritises
‘economic rationality’ over other forms of rationality, for instance, social and ecological
rationality. The analysis of key social relations underlining IFRIC 3 discourses suggests
that the accounting profession, MNCs and their affiliates demonstrate a greater presence
and influence over the IASB/IFRIC, compared to government agencies and non-forprofit organisations. In other words, IFRIC 3 discourses are dominated by mainstream
social institutions. IFRIC 3 discourses represent efforts from powerful mainstream
institutions to exercise their social and political influences over the accounting standard
setting process in order to maintain a business-as-usual scenario.

116

CHAPTER EIGHT: A CRITIQUE OF ACCOUNTING FOR
EMISSION RIGHTS: IS IT A REALITY OR AN
ILLUSION?
8.1 INTRODUCTION: ACCOUNTING FOR EMISSION RIGHTS AN ETHICAL
DEBATE
An efficient emission rights market needs regulated proprietary rights, which are under
exclusive control of a holding entity. As discussed in previous chapters, the attributes of
past transaction, controllability and measurable profitability qualify emission rights as
assets in accounting. When an entity fails to reduce emissions below the cap maximum,
it must purchase emission rights equivalent to the quantity of actual emissions from
their ‘cleaner’ counterparts, or a government. A provisional liability is recognised in the
financial statements whenever an entity incurs emissions. When an entity receives
allocated emission rights for less than their fair value from a government, a government
grant is recognised in the financial statements. While the IFRIC’s accounting
recognition of emission rights is consistent with existing practice, its application could
trigger unacceptable economic consequences, which subsequently contributed to the
withdrawal of IFRIC 3. The absence of a comprehensive and specific guideline on
accounting for emission rights from the IASB adds to the uncertainty surrounding
emission rights trading. It has also put accounting at the forefront of the debate
surrounding ETS.
The creation of an emissions market has raised serious implications for environmental
accounting (Hopwood, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009). Accounting for emission rights as an
integral part of ETS creates major challenges for accounting standards setters. Cook
(2009, p457) points out that accounting standards setters are facing a new challenge of
providing guidance on accounting for emission rights as “they explore the frontiers of
accounting”. Accounting for emission rights has not only presented accounting and
economic, but also ethical, challenges. As Geno (1995, p176) argues:
If human societies are to come to grips with their relationship to, and
interdependence on, natural capital in the form of indispensable resources for
survival, institutions such as accounting and economics must face the moral as
well as technical challenges in accounting for sustainability.
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This thesis regards the withdrawal of IFRIC 3 and absence of authoritative international
guidance on accounting for emission rights as a window of opportunity to reconsider
accounting for emission rights from an alternative perspective. Accounting for emission
rights raises the question of whether we able to represent the ecological substance of
emission rights with mainstream accounting classifications. Zimmerman (1994, p3)
suggests that “…ecological problems cannot be solved by simply tinkering with the
attitudes and practices that generated those problems”. In other words, accounting for
emission rights is based on an ideological premise, which requires us to think outside
the mainstream accounting ‘tool box’. Informed by the tenets of social ecology, the
following discussion provides a critique of the IFRIC’s accounting recognition of
emission rights.
8.2 A CRITIQUE OF ACCOUNTING FOR EMISSION RIGHTS
Bebbington and Gonzalez (2008, p704) suggest that “carbon emission trading schemes
raise the question of whether and how to recognise EUAs as assets and the obligation to
deliver allowances as liabilities…” This thesis argues that in order to appropriately
measure emission rights, accounting standard setters must first identify the nature and
substance of what we are trying to represent in accounting terms. The accounting
recognition of emission rights is not purely an economic issue as the intention of
accounting for emission rights to encourage emissions reduction and provide greater
accountability.
As Van Dijk (1993, p253) suggests, CDA is:
unabashedly normative: any critique by definition presupposes an applied
ethics…their structural understanding presupposes more general insights, and
sometimes indirect and long-term analyses of fundamental causes, conditions
and consequences of such issues...
Consistent with the purpose and normative nature of CDA, this chapter is an extension
of CDA of accounting for emission rights. It applies environmental ethics in a reexamination and critique of the proposed accounting recognition of emission rights. The
following critique focuses on four aspects of IFRIC 3 discourses:
•

Ontological and epistemological assumptions of a mainstream accounting
approach
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•

Mainstream accounting’s representation of nature

•

The role of humans in nature in a mainstream accounting approach

•

The role of mainstream accounting in a wider social and ecological context.

These four aspects of the critique are informed by the tenets of social ecology discussed
in Chapter Three. The critique critically examines the dominant discourses on the
recognition of emission right from a social ecology perspective. Informed by social
ecology, this critique seeks to problematise the (lack of) ethical values in a mainstream
accounting approach and highlight the role mainstream accounting plays in a wider
social and ecological context.
8.2.1 ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF A
MAINSTREAM ACCOUNTING APPROACH

As Birkin (1996, p233) suggests, “pioneers of accounting were guided significantly by
reductionist reasoning”. The proposed accounting treatment of emission rights in IFRIC
3 reflects a positive and reductionist approach to environmental accounting. In order to
emphasise the objectivity and rationality of IFRIC 3, the IFRIC rejected alternative
approaches of accounting for emission rights largely on the basis of conceptual
inconsistency. The IFRIC 3 discourses also reflect an exclusively numerical view of
reality, evidenced by heavy emphasis on the measurement of emission rights, and a
disconnection between the proposed accounting recognition of emission rights and their
ecological substance. As Cooper (1995, p183) argues: “we see the real world in terms of
hard monetary information”. As a consequence, alternative ideals and paradigms are
silenced as a result of emphasis on reducing the substance of emission rights to
numbers. As Gray (1992, p416) argues:

There are clearly profound dangers in trying to employ calculation in a world
where (1) the calculation can be identified as a root cause…and (2) any
calculation must run the risk of reinforcing analytic and scientistic
solutions…one is attempting to do quite the opposite.
IFRIC 3 reinforces a narrow view of social and environmental reality by fixating on the
measurement of emission rights, despite leaving the recognition of emission rights
largely unexamined and unresolved.
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The mainstream accounting approach to emission rights adopted in IFRIC 3 not only
represents positive and reductionist, but also anthropocentric assumptions. As discussed
in Chapter Three, anthropocentrism assumes that humans are superior to nature, and
hence, the interest of humans is prioritised over that of nature (Andrew, 2000). IFRIC 3
is built on an “inherent paradox” which is a “system-contradiction in itself” (O’Connor,
1995, cited from Milne et al, 2006, p812). While the intent of accounting for emission
rights is to include environmental externalities in the accounting equation, the proposed
mainstream recognition of emission rights, for instance, as assets, only reinforces an
exclusive nature of emission rights as tradable commodities, as opposed to instruments
of compliance. The proposed separate asset/liability recognition model of emission
rights also suggests that accounting standard setters consider assets and liabilities to be
independent transactions, and emitters should not obligated to use emission rights solely
for compliance purposes. IFRIC 3 creates an illusion that suggests that the environment
can be appropriately accounted for with a mainstream accounting approach. As Gray
(1992) suggests, while the notion of accounting for sustainability is expected to
challenge the status quo and promote sustainable business practices, a mainstream
accounting approach can only reinforce the dominant economics-centred status quo,
which runs counter to the underlining ecological intent.
As discussed in Chapter Three, the ontological foundation of social ecology is the
recognition that exploitation of nature not only destroys the intrinsic value of ecosystems, but also the life line essential for human survival. Given an overwhelming
amount of scientific evidence which suggests that commercial activities of humans is
the main cause of global warming, the question accounting standard setters should
examine is: is it our responsibility to reduce emissions, or can we simply possess the
right to emit carbon pollution, as long as we could afford to purchase emission rights
that allow us to do so? Clark (2001, p435) suggests that the very idea that humans can
possess the right to pollute the planet is not only “arrogant and absurd from an
ecological point of view”, but also “depicts humans as the heads of the planetary
household…” Furthermore, the proposed asset and liability classifications of emission
rights are built on an anthropocentric notion of ‘controllability’, which is against the
principles of non-hierarchy and co-existence in social ecology. As Birkin (1996, p234)
asserts, “nature is not represented here, only resources…the effects of industry on nature
are logged but nature still lies largely outside accountancy”. Apart from the proposed
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asset/liability classifications of emission rights, the proposed government grant
recognition of allocated rights also sends the wrong message to emitters, and runs
counter to the ETS mechanism of penalising emitters who fail to meet their emissions
reduction obligation, instead of handing out government ‘freebies’. Beder (1997)
suggests that the allocation of emission freebies would only foster exploitationist
behaviours as free hand-outs do not provide incentives to reduce emissions.
8.2.2 MAINSTREAM ACCOUNTING’S REPRESENTATION OF NATURE

Mainstream accounting has long been criticised for its inability to address the impact of
business activities on the environment (e.g. Hines, 1988; 1991a). While a mainstream
accounting approach considers nature as an externality, social ecology sees nature as
humans’ equal, whose preservation is essential for human survival. Accounting for
emission rights is an attempt to internalise an environmental externality (Cook, 2009;
Solomon and Lee, 2000). Under a mainstream accounting approach, the internalisation
process is manifested in the accounting representation of emission rights as primarily
assets that can be used to offset emissions or trade. However, from a social ecological
perspective, emission rights should be regarded as an instrument of discharging
humans’ responsibility towards nature. In light of the proposed asset recognition of
emission rights, nature continues to be “commodified, idealised and mythologised,
marginalised, and exploited” (Jagtenberg, 1994, p16-17). While the notion of emission
rights gives rise to a new private property right, the proposed accounting for emission
rights has struggled to engage in any real changes in the existing practice. For instance,
as MacKenzie (2009, p448-449) points out:
the advantage, for corporations, of classifying an ‘emission right’ as a financial
instrument would have been that it would make available the ‘hedge accounting’
treatment permitted under IAS 39. If allowances could ‘be treated as the hedging
instrument of a forecast transaction (i.e. future emissions)’ (IFRIC, 2004, p.20),
then allowances and the corresponding emissions would offset each other. If a
company received N free allowances, forecast emissions of N tonnes of carbon
dioxide, and emitted N tonnes, then its earnings would at no point be affected.
‘Carbon’ would thus remain invisible.
While an intangible asset classification does not allow offsetting of liabilities, a
financial instrument classification would allow offsetting between assets and liabilities,
resulting in no effect in the income statement. This thesis argues that a financial
instrument classification of emission rights proposed by some commentators reveals a
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prioritisation of the maintenance of a business-as-usual scenario, which continues to
render emissions an externality. In other words, it is ecologically irrational and counter
productive to represent emission rights as assets.

Apart from the proposed asset recognition, this thesis argues that presenting purchased
emission rights as a liability is also contradictory to the underlining ecological intent of
ETS. This approach has a number of fundamental flaws, for instance, the proposed
liability recognition is an “end-of-pipe” approach, which is “contrary to the current
preferred emphasis upon the pollution source, rather than the output” (Gibson, 1996,
p659). From a social ecological perspective, recognising a liability only after emissions
are already in the atmosphere is not only an unethical, but also ineffective approach to
emissions reduction. Schmidheiny (1992, p99, cited from Gibson, 1996, p660) argues
that “The commonsense, precautionary response to burgeoning pollution problems is to
seek to prevent pollution before it happens”. In other words, it would be more effective
to control the source of emissions rather than charging for emissions when they are
already in the atmosphere. Furthermore, the proposed liability recognition of emission
rights also raises an ethical question: should emitters only recognise a monetary
obligation when they need to pay to obtain the rights to emit? As Gibson (1996, p660)
warns, “by concentrating on emissions only, the accounting process may actually be the
cause of a failure to protect society from some of the most harmful pollution”. The
proposed liability recognition of emission rights only reinforces a business-as-usual
mindset, which regards emissions as legitimate and justifiable so long as emitters settle
the obligation to purchase rights to offset. While presenting purchased emission rights
as liability is conceptually pure, it could potentially distract emitters from making
ecologically rational decisions.
8.2.3 THE ROLE OF HUMANS IN NATURE IN A MAINSTREAM ACCOUNTING
APPROACH

A mainstream accounting approach to emission rights suggests that as wealth
maximisers and nature’s superior, emitters have the ‘right’ to exploit nature for
economic benefits. In contrast, social ecology assumes that humans are capable of
taking advantage of our privileged status to strive towards an ecologically rational
society (Bookchin, 1980). Social ecology believes that humans, as powerful members of
the natural world, have a responsibility to act as nature’s guardians. Informed by social
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ecology, this thesis presents an ethical question of: is it our responsibility to reduce
emissions, or is it morally justifiable to possess the right to emit, so long as we can
afford to do so?

While a mainstream accounting approach represents emission rights as a privilege (an
asset), a social ecology approach highlights a sense of responsibility and an obligation
to reduce emissions. A responsibility, in accounting terms, should be translated into an
obligation (hence, a liability) of the emitting entity, rather than an asset. The proposed
asset recognition of emission rights under a mainstream approach merely emphasises
the right to emit, rather than a responsibility to reduce emissions (Hayward, 2007).
Hayward (2007) argues that in the debate over climate change, policy makers tend to
lose sight of the fact that successful emissions reduction depends on the notion of a
responsibility to reduce, instead of right to emit. Furthermore, Hayward (2007, p435)
questions “whether the concept of rights should have any place at all in the pursuit of
emissions reduction”. A mainstream accounting approach to emission rights not only
represents the notion of a privilege, but also an inherent right to emit. For instance,
Milne (1996b, p687) raises the question of “do the utilities own the rights to pollute”?
The proposed government grant classification of emission rights suggests that
accounting standard setters regard emission rights as an inherent right of emitters. It
sends a misleading message, which could distract emitters from making socially and
ecologically rational decisions, for instance, lobbying the government for more free
government assistance instead of reducing emissions. Underlying a government grant
classification of emission rights is the notion that “polluters have obtained pollution
rights for free, that society has had its clean air rights appropriated without
compensation, or that society is subsidizing polluters” (Milne, 1996b, p690).
8.2.4 THE ROLE OF MAINSTREAM ACCOUNTING IN A WIDER SOCIAL AND
ECOLOGICAL CONTEXT

Birkin (1996, p233) suggests that the role of accounting is “central” to our
environmental crisis. Mainstream accounting is an integral part of capital markets as it
provides information to inform economically rational market activities and provide
transparency. Milne (1996a, p139) describes a mainstream accounting approach as
“short-term and narrow, both in terms of the affected people and the affected
environment”. While accounting for emission rights represents efforts to encourage
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sustainability, the narrow and exclusive mainstream accounting approach adopted in
IFRIC 3 runs counter to the underlining ecological intent. For instance, the proposed
mainstream accounting representation of emission rights as tradable assets is
inconsistent with their ecological substance as instruments of discharging an
environmental obligation. IFRIC 3 emphasised merely market attributes of emission
rights as a private property right, instead of social and ecological attributes.
Furthermore, Gibson (1996) argues that recognising emission rights as assets can lead to
dangerous social and environmental implications. For instance, Gibson (1996, p659)
suggests that:
The danger is that the accumulation of what appear to be valuable pollution
allowances in the balance sheet may be perceived by management to be a viable
alternative to these other advantages when making their corporate performance
decisions. In this way, once again, the intention of the pollution allowance
system to reduce pollution may be subjugated.
Lohmann (2009) provides an example of multinational corporations such as Intel,
Campbell and Aerojet buying emission rights to offset their emissions to avoid
installing carbon efficient equipment, and as a result, the total emissions level has
increased. This thesis argues that the reality is, emitters do not have to be making
genuine emissions reduction to profit. For instance, the proposed separate asset/liability
recognition of emission rights suggests that emitters should not be compelled to hold
emission rights solely for compliance purchases. Furthermore, the effect of a separate
asset/liability recognition model is a measurement mismatch, which would potentially
encourage emitters to sell excess emission rights for a windfall profit in order to offset a
loss in the income statement.
Consistent with social ecology, Dierkes and Antal (1985) argue that accounting
information has social impacts and should serve to change business behaviour.
Accounting for emission rights fits into a new accounting framework that “requires the
subordination of traditional economic criteria to criteria based on social and ecological
values” (Milne, 1996a, p155). Consistent with social ecology, Rubenstein (1994, p29)
suggests that an expanded definition of accounting should take into account:
the economic, intellectual and natural capital consumed in producing goods and
services for trade and for promoting public welfare as well as the natural and
intellectual capital preserved and the wealth created for future used, according to
the conventions mutually agreed upon by the stewards of these borrowed
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recourses and the stakeholders-in present and future generations-to whom they
are accountable.
Hopwood (2009, p434) suggests that accounting for emission rights can play a
significant role in the facilitation of a “more harmonious relationship between the
human and natural worlds”. This thesis argues that whether or not accounting can
facilitate a harmonious relationship between humans and nature depends on how nature
is represented in accounting. This critique highlights that a mainstream accounting
approach, which externalises social and ecological costs and informs economically
rational decision-making, is inconsistent with the notion of accounting for emission
rights, which seeks to internalise ecological costs and inform ecologically rational
decision-making.
8.3 SUMMARY: ACCOUNTING FOR EMISSION RIGHTS CREATES AN
ILLUSION OF CHANGE
Accounting has been recognised as a social and ideological practice (e.g. Burchell et al,
1980; Cooper, 1995; Lehman & Tinker, 1987; Llewellyn and Milne, 2007; Arrington &
Francis, 1989, 1993; Arrington & Schweiker, 1992; Lehman, 2005). While ETS gives
rise to new agendas in accounting, what has been demonstrated in IFIRC 3 discourses,
however, is an endeavour to maintain the status quo. Table 8 below summarises key
differences between a mainstream accounting and social ecological approach to
accounting for emission rights.
Table 8: A comparison of approaches of accounting for emission rights
(Zhang-Debreceny et al, 2009, p24)

Mainstream

Social Ecology

Control: exclusively controlled by an entity

Responsibility; humans maintain position as
‘environmental managers’: nature guardianship

Probable future economic benefits or sacrifice

Long-term intergenerational sustainability

(short term)
Only measurable economic benefits (gained and

Non-monetary social and ecological benefits

lost)
A result of past transaction

Co-existence prioritised
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As illustrated in Table 8, while emission rights qualify as assets from a mainstream
accounting perspective, they represent an environmental obligation and hence should be
recognised as a liability from a social ecological perspective. The proposed asset and
liability recognition of emission rights is divorced from the underlying ecological
substance. The proposed intangible asset and government grant classifications present
emission rights as a commodity, privilege and an inherent right to emit, rather than an
‘obligation’ to reduce. The proposed liability recognition represents an “end-of-pipe”
approach to emissions reduction (Gibson, 1996, p659).

While social ecology does not completely reject the notion of accounting for the
environment, it does recognise that the common ground between a mainstream
accounting approach and environmental accounting is limited. The mainstream
accounting approach adopted by the IASB/IFRIC lacks consideration of ethical values.
The absence of ethical considerations and a short-term focus on economics in a
mainstream accounting approach are considered a dangerous ‘recipe’ from a social
ecological perspective. As Hopwood (2009, p435) questions:
Can, one wonders, the ethical considerations of the environmentalists be
transferred to the economic market place? Or will the values of the market place
overwhelm those of the environmental sphere, introducing a totally new set of
unanticipated consequences and actions which are likely to be to the longer term
detriment of the original concerns?
Social ecology recognises that maintenance of the status quo and a business-as-usual
scenario produce counter-productive social and ecological consequences in our
ecological crisis. The proposed recognition of emission rights is an example of “a
business-case discourse that constrains corporate accountability, shapes the thinking of
organisational actors, and potentially imprisons them within an ideological hegemony”
(Llewellyn & Milne, 2007, p809). Underneath an impression of a rational and ‘good’
standard lies a rhetoric constructed by the IASB to create an illusion that a mainstream
accounting approach can provide a way forward in our ecological crisis. The IASB’s
efforts to account for emission rights within the constraints of a mainstream accounting
approach “presents little more than an illusion of change” (McDonough & Braungart,
1998, p4, cited from Milne et al, 2006, p805). Llewellyn and Milne (2007, p813)
suggest that “any changes in practice cannot occur without discursive change because
practice is in accordance with explicit codes”. Dillard (1991, p9) also points out that:
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if the images of existence are not directed toward alternative ideological mirrors
…then accounting will continue to reinforce and reify the social system from
which it emanated.
While the notion of accounting for emission rights represents efforts to internalise an
environmental externality, the mainstream approach adopted in IFRIC 3 merely creates
an illusion of change at best, as any real changes necessary to reduce emissions are
absent from a mainstream accounting approach.
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND
FUTURE RESEARCH
9.1 CONCLUSION
The withdrawal of IFRIC 3 suggests that the IASB and its constituents have not found a
way forward concerning accounting for emission rights. The proposed accounting
recognition of emission rights in IFRIC 3 demonstrates a mainstream accounting
approach, evidenced by its consistency to the existing Framework and accounting
standards. This thesis regards the absence of international authoritative guidance on
accounting for emission rights as an opportunity to pause and reconsider this
unprecedented issue.
The findings of CDA in this thesis highlight a number of deficiencies in a mainstream
accounting approach to emission rights. First of all, the debate surrounding the
subsequent asset classification of emission rights suggests that the notion of emission
rights cannot be easily and comfortably assigned to any existing accounting
classification. The rationale behind the proposed accounting recognition of emission
rights in IFRIC 3 follows the logic of “this item is like previous items we classified as
X, so this should also be classified as an X” (MacKenzie, 2009, p447). While the
proposed mainstream accounting classifications of emission rights demonstrate
conceptual purity, they “gave rise to uncomfortable consequences” (Cook, 2009, p460).
Furthermore, the IASB’s efforts to address accounting for emission rights via the IFRIC
are constrained by the existing accounting framework, which has long been criticised
for lacking the capacity to address the environment. CDA reveals that a mainstream
accounting approach to emission rights continues to reinforce a business-as-usual
scenario, which runs counter to the ecological intent of ETS. This thesis (re)examines
accounting for emission rights from a social ecology perspective and argues that while
emission rights possess some characteristics of intangible asset, provisional liability and
government grant, the proposed accounting classifications of emission rights are
inappropriate in a wider social and ecological context. From a social ecological
perspective, IFRIC 3 is a “rejection of the real implications of a new phenomenon”
(Cook, 2009, p463). Informed by social ecology, this thesis argues that accounting for
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emission rights should not only inform economic, but also ecological rationality.
Furthermore, this thesis argues that mainstream accounting cannot capture the
ecological substance of emission rights, as it only informs economic rationality.
Consistent with social ecology, the notion of accounting for emissions rights seeks to
internalise an environmental externality. From a social ecology perspective, social and
ecological considerations should be the cornerstones of accounting for emission rights,
instead of economic considerations alone. Geno (1995, p.176) argues that:
If human societies are to come to grips with their relationship to, and
interdependence on, natural capital in the form of indispensable resources for
survival, institutions such as accounting and economics must face the moral as
well as technical challenges in accounting for sustainability.
While this thesis advocates the idea of accounting for emission rights, it concludes that
a mainstream accounting approach is not equipped to address it appropriately. As Birkin
(1996, p237) asserts, mainstream accounting does not have the ability to “contain the
complex and interdependent series of events attendant upon any action within even the
isolation of the business arena”. The complex nature of emission rights and the
complexity of accounting for emission rights are outside the scope of a mainstream
accounting framework. The IASB’s decision to provide accounting guidance for
emissions trading through the IFRIC is merely a convenient ‘bandaid’ approach, which
results in an illusion of change.
The analysis of IFRIC 3 discourses suggests that the environmental purpose of ETS
cannot be achieved if an anthropocentric mindset persists. Without evaluating the
underlying ethical considerations of accounting for emission rights, any effort to nudge
emission rights into existing accounting classifications would only sustain the dominant
anthropocentric ideology. Sagoff (1981) argues that while the climate change crisis has
an economic cause, climate change solutions should be ethically rather than
economically motivated. Sagoff (1981, p293) also warns that “an economic cure may be
worse than the disease”.
This thesis presents social ecology as an alternative paradigm and applicable
environmental ethics approach, which challenges the status quo. Contrary to a
mainstream accounting approach, a social ecology approach adopts an anthro-nonhierarchical view of the human-nature relationship, which suggests that humans and
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nature are equal partners who depend on each other for survival. This thesis argues that
social ecology would better inform accounting standard setters on the development of
accounting for emission rights. The tenets of social ecology offer useful insights into the
deficiencies of a mainstream accounting approach in a wider social and ecological
context. Emission rights, when characterised as either assets/liabilities, or government
grants, are represented as a privilege and an inherent right of emitters. In challenging the
anthropocentric view of a mainstream accounting approach, social ecology recognises
that humans have a responsibility and an obligation towards nature as our equal partner.
Informed by social ecology, this thesis argues that the ‘nature’ of emission rights can
best be understood in the light of social ecology which keeps the environment and
humans’ survival at the forefront. The role accounting plays in our climate change crisis
rests on how the environment is accounted for.
To conclude, emission rights can be better accounted for through a new standard that is
not constrained by mainstream accounting concepts; a new standard that is built on a
sense of responsibility, rather than notions of rights and privileges; a new standard that
includes qualitative characteristics of relevance for a society living in a carbonconstrained environment; a new standard that challenges mainstream business
philosophies and practices. Social ecology, as an environmental ethics approach,
enables us, and more importantly, accounting standard setters, to re-examine the
‘nature’ of emission rights, so that accounting knowledge can be used to engage in
positive social changes in a time of an ecological crisis.
9.2 THESIS LIMITATIONS
9.2.1 LIMITATION OF DATA

Due to the importance of recognition criteria prior to measurement, this thesis confines
the analysis to the recognition issues of emission rights. This thesis regards texts from
IFRIC 3, draft IFRIC 3 comment letters and the IASB press releases as a rich source of
data for CDA. Further research could examine the measurement issues of emission
rights.
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9.2.2 LIMITATION OF CDA AS A RESEARCH METHOD

The application of CDA in this thesis is consistent with the objectives of critical
research that examines qualitative data. This thesis also acknowledges the inevitable
personal attachment and preconception of the researcher. As Kincheloe and McLaren
(1994, p140, cited from Locke, 2004, p35-36) suggest, CDA researchers need to
“become aware of the ideological imperatives and epistemological presuppositions that
inform their research as well as their own subjective, intersubjective, and normative
reference claims”. It is inevitable that the analysis and critique in this thesis are
somewhat a reflection of the author’s own ontological and epistemological
presuppositions. As a normative research approach, CDA in this thesis reflects the
author’s own perception of accounting for emission rights to an extent.
Apart from the ideological premises that inform CDA, Van Dijk (1993, p250) also
points out that CDA “pays more attention to ‘top-down’ relations of dominance than to
‘bottom-up’ relations of resistance, compliance and acceptance”. In the context of this
thesis, CDA examines and critiques the role powerful draft IFRIC 3 commentators play
in constructing the dominant discourses and maintaining the status quo. In other words,
the role of other interest groups (e.g. less powerful commentators) and their
resistance/compliance to the status quo is beyond the scope of this thesis.
9.3 FUTURE RESEARCH
Since the withdrawal of IFRIC 3, the IASB has not reached a consensus on accounting
for emission rights. According to IASB (2007), the IASB has decided to activate work
on its Emissions Trading Schemes project in order to resume development on
accounting for emission rights. According to IASB (2010a, para 21):
The Board noted the increasing international use of emissions trading schemes
and the considerable diversity in practice that appears to have arisen in the
absence of authoritative guidance. In addition, the Board noted that it has
received requests from several national standard-setters to address the topic and
that the FASB has added an Emissions Allowances project to its agenda.
Between December 2007 and December 2009, the IASB has held five meetings,
including a joint IASB-FASB meeting in October 2008 (IASB, 2010). However, its
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progress on accounting for emission rights has been relatively slow, evidenced by the
absence of a new standard.

The notion of emission rights trading gives rise to a number of rich research areas. For
instance, accounting for emission rights is at the frontier of contemporary accounting
research and will continue to emerge and evolve over the years to come. Apart from
accounting for emission rights, there are other areas of research that are of international
significance and relevance. For instance, the International Auditing and Assurance
Standards Board (IAASB) is planning to develop an audit framework for emission
rights disclosures (Simnett & Nugent, 2007). The audit and assurance framework of
emission rights reporting can be further explored. Other potential research topics that
could be explored include the impact of emerging ETSs on developing economies, such
as China and India, and alternative approaches (other than market-based mechanisms
under the Kyoto Protocol) to facilitate emissions reduction. Another issue that is worth
exploring in future research is whether the practice of environmental accounting should
be based on a social ecology approach. While this thesis rejects other environmental
ethics approaches, it would be interesting to explore the pros and cons of various
environmental ethics approaches with regards to their application in accounting for
emission rights in more details.
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APPENDIX 1: THE MEASUREMENT OF EMISSION
RIGHTS
The IFRIC (AASB, 2005, para BC 21) concluded that emission assets should be
impaired instead of amortised on the basis that:
a participant realises the benefits of that allowance by surrendering it to settle
the obligation that arises from producing emissions (or by selling it to another
entity). Therefore the IFRIC observed that amortisation, which is the systematic
allocation of the cost of an asset to reflect the consumption of the economic
benefits of that asset over its useful life, is incompatible with the way the
benefits of the allowances are realised.
The IFRIC (AASB, 2005, para BC 21) further noted that “it agreed with those
respondents who highlighted that in some cases such a requirement (precluding
amortisation) could be inconsistent with the requirements of IAS 38”, as IAS 38 does
not prohibit amortisation on intangible assets. The IFRIC therefore decided “not to
proceed with its proposal in D1 that allowances should not be amortised” (AASB, 2005,
para BC 21).
Regarding the measurement of government grants, there are currently two broad
approaches (the capital and income approach) permitted under IAS 20.13. IAS 20,
paragraph 14 and 15 explain that the capital approach to accounting for government
grants recognises government grants as a credit directly to shareholders’ capital,
whereas the income approach recognises grants as income that is passed through profit
and loss. According to IAS 20.23, non-monetary assets and the corresponding grants
can be valued at either fair value or nominal amount (cost). The two allowable
approaches under IAS 20 have raised questions concerning the measurement of
government grants. According to the IFRIC consensus, government grants shall be
recognised initially as deferred income at fair value and subsequently recognised as
income over the compliance period during which the emission rights are issued. For
instance, The IFRIC (AASB, 2005, para BC 27) decided not to measure emission grants
at the amount paid for them (which would be zero) because:
if this treatment were adopted, participants would not recognise allowances
issued free of charge on their balance sheet but they would recognise purchased
allowances. The IFRIC concluded that this treatment would not be a faithful
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representation of the recourses controlled by the participant, because purchased
allowances are indistinguishable from those issued free of charge.
In paragraph BC 28, the IFRIC confirmed the consensus that the proposed fair value
measurement of government grants as deferred income was an appropriate interpretation
of IASB 20 on the basis that it “did not conflict with IAS 20”. The reason behind
elimination of the nominal amount alternative in IAS 20 was because “at an amount
other than their fair value would be inappropriate”.
The proposed accounting for emission rights raised a number of measurement issues,
amongst which the mismatch issue attracted the most criticism. As a result of the
proposed recognition of emission rights, assets shall be measured at historical cost less
any amortisation and impairment losses, and liabilities at the best estimate of the present
market value. As the commentators pointed out, the proposed mixed accounting
treatment of emission assets and liabilities would give rise to a measurement mismatch
of assets and liabilities. Based on the assumption of a liquid market, the market value of
emission rights is expected to increase over time as a result of increasing demand and
limited supply. While emission assets held are measured at historical cost, emission
liabilities are measured at the present market value required to settle the obligation to
deliver additional emission rights to cover actual emissions, thus creating an artificial
volatility to the profit and loss account. In other words, emitters are likely to record a
loss in the income statement at the end of a compliance cycle as a result of recording
emissions liabilities at present market value, which is likely to exceed the historical cost
of emissions assets held. Given the expectation that prices of emission rights would rise
as a result of restricted supply, the cost of settling liabilities would almost always
exceed the value of emission assets held, resulting in a loss in the income statement,
even when all emissions are made within the allowable limit of emission rights held.
While the proposed mixed measurement approach was consistent with the accounting
requirements in existing standards, the majority of commentators expressed concerns
that the mixed measurement model would lead to a distortion of financial statements
and an artificial volatility in an emission rights market.
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APPENDIX 2: A BREAKDOWN OF DRAFT IFRIC 3
COMMENTATORS
Comment letter
code/commentator
1. The Netherlands Council for
Annual Reporting (CAR)
4. Accounting Standards
Board of Japan (ASBJ)
9. CNC-the National
Accounting Council
16. Accounting Standards
Committee (KSR)
21. Germany Accounting
Standards Committee (DRSC)
22. Financial Reporting
Standards Board (FRSB)
23. Norwegian Accounting
Standards Board (NASB)
24. Argentine Federation of
Professional Councils of
Economic Sciences (FACPCE)
27. Australian Accounting
Standards Board (AASB)
28. Council on Corporate
Disclosure & Governance
Singapore (CCDG)
29. Danish Accounting
Standards Committee (FSR)
34. European Financial
Reporting Advisory Group
(EFRAG)
3. Hong Kong society of
Accountants (HKSA)
12. Japanese Institute of
Certified Public Accountants
(JICPA)
15. Institute of Public Auditors
(IDW)
19. The Swedish Organisation
of Certified Public Accountants
(FAR)
25. The South-African Institute
of Chartered Accountants
(SAICA)
32. The Canadian Institute of
Chartered Accountants (CICA)
37. Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and
Wales (ICAEW)
39. Federation of European
Accountants (FEE)
40. London Society of

Industry
Accounting standard
setter/advisory committees

Country
The Netherlands
Japan
France
Poland
Germany
New Zealand
Norway
Argentina

Australia
Singapore

Denmark

Belgium
Professional Accounting
Bodies

Hong Kong
Japan

Germany
Sweden

South Africa

Canada
UK (England & Wales)

Belgium
UK
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Chartered Accountants (LSCA)
14. Syngenta
17. Holcim
26. BP group
30. Roche
38. Royal Dutch Airlines
(KLM)
5. Movement of the French
enterprises (Acteo-Medef)
10. Federation of Swiss
industrial Holding Companies
13. Eurelectric
18. French association of
Private Companies (AFEP)
36. EnergieNed
8. Controller and AuditorGeneral
11. Environment Agency
England and Wales
33. Ministry of Finance
2. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
20. PWC
35. KPMG
6. International Emissions
Trading Association (IETA)
31. Dresden University of
Technology (TUD)

Emissions producers

Industry-affiliated groups

Switzerland
Switzerland
UK
Switzerland
The Netherlands
France
Switzerland
Belgium
France

Government agencies

The Netherlands
New Zealand
U.K (England and Wales)

The Big Four
Non-for-profit

Canada
UK
UK
UK
Switzerland
Germany
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APPENDIX 3: COMMENTS ON THE ASSET
RECOGNITION OF EMISSION RIGHTS
1.

Accounting Standard Setters

DRSC (CL 21), FACPCE (CL 24), CNC (CL 9) and FSR (CL 29) suggested in a
definitive manner that emission rights qualify as separate assets. Others either supported
the separate asset recognition of emission rights in a more tentative manner, or
questioned the proposed separate asset/liability recognition model.
For instance, FRSB (CL 22) pointed out that in general it agreed with the IFRIC’s
interpretations, however, no direct comments were made on whether ETS gives rise to
assets. FRSB (CL 22, para 1) argues that the IFRIC should “defer issuing the
Interpretation until…IAS 38 Intangible Assets has been amended”, suggesting that the
FRSB believes IAS 38 is relevant to accounting for emission rights as emission rights
are (intangible) assets. FRSB (CL 22, para 3) also pointed out that excess emission
rights used for trading purposes could meet the definition of a (financial) asset. It
appears that FRSB regarded an asset classification of emission rights as a given, and the
debate focused largely on the subsequent asset classification of emission rights.
KSR (CL 16, p1) pointed out that “the best solution for emission rights would be
offsetting assets (emission rights) and connected liabilities (liability to deliver emission
rights)”, despite in the following paragraph decided that offsetting emission liabilities
with assets was “unacceptable” after taking into account the potentially negative social
and environmental consequences (CL 16, p1). This suggests that KSR considered the
asset recognition of emission rights as a given. However, KSR disagreed with the
proposed separate asset/liability recognition model as it can generate “misleading
results” and “cause some divergence between assets and liabilities” (CL 16, p1).
ASBJ (CL 4) and CAR (CL 1) argued that assets and liabilities are linked transactions
in substance, hence a separate asset/liability classification could not be justified. In
ASBJ’s words (CL 4, para 4):

we believe that there is inseparable linkage between the allowance and the
obligation, because the allowance granted to a participant in a cap and trade
scheme is accompanied by the obligation to deliver it according to the actual
emission expected in the business activities…we believe that, in order to reflect
the economic substance of the scheme, allowances granted should be treated as
linked together with the future delivery obligations.
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ASBJ also specifically noted that the separate asset/liability recognition of emission
rights could potentially encourage broker’s activities of selling emission rights on their
own before the end of the compliance period to make a profit, and that such activities
“should not be the cornerstone of accounting for emission rights” (CL 4, para4). Having
said that, ASBJ supported an asset recognition of emission rights by suggesting that
“recognition of a purchased allowance as an asset is compatible with the notion of a net
asset, because purchases of allowances are generally intended for the fulfilment of the
obligation to deliver allowances” (CL 4, para 5).
CAR observed that the proposed separate asset/liability model was the result of the
IFRIC placing too much emphasis on the “technical independent existence” of emission
assets and liabilities, when they are in fact “linked in substance” (CL 1, para 1). CAR
also drew reference to EFRAG’s proposal under which holding emission rights and
delivering emission rights to cover an obligation are considered linked transactions.
EFRAG suggests that emission rights should be classified as assets amortised on a
“unit-of-pollution” basis (CL 34, appendix, p 3). EFRAG (CL 34) concluded that the
proposed separate asset/liability model “might be conceptually pure but is too complex
and does not reflect business reality”, despite implying that emission rights are assets in
its proposed alternative accounting approach (CL 34, p2).
The AASB (CL 27) comment letter predominately discussed the accounting treatment
of Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) in Australia. As described in the comment
letter, RECs are credits earned by an electricity generator from the government from the
electricity that is generated using renewable energy. As AASB (CL 27, para a) pointed
out, RECs satisfy the definition of inventories, which are “assets held for sale in the
ordinary course of business” according to IAS 2: Inventories (para 6). Despite pointing
out that RECs meet the definition of inventory, in paragraph (b) of the comment letter,
AASB asserts that “IFRIC D1 characterises emission rights and RECs as intangible
assets”, suggesting that it believed that RECs and emission rights as similar in
substance. It concluded that emission rights should be recognises as “financial assets or
derivatives” (CL 27, para b). While an asset classification of emission rights was
implied in AASB’s comment letter, it appears that the majority of comments focused
specifically on RECs, rather than emission rights. In other words, the AASB’s
comments on draft IFRIC 3 gave an impression of ambiguity and a lack of a definitive
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view on accounting for emission rights. It also indicates that while the AASB regarded
an asset classification as a ‘given’, it was unsure as to which asset classification
emission rights should be classified under.
NASB (CL 23) expressed concerns regarding the mixed measurement issue of assets
and liabilities. However, no explicit comments were made on the recognition issue of
emission rights. CCDG provided very brief and general comments on the draft IFRIC
3, such as “we strongly support the work of the IASB and IFRIC in their efforts to
eliminate the risk of divergent accounting developing in this new area” (CL 28, para 2).
CCDG (CL 28, para 3) also mentioned that “such schemes are not yet prevalent in
Singapore”, which explains why it did not make any specific comments on accounting
for emission rights.
2.

Professional Accounting Bodies

ICAEW (CL 37) explicitly pointed out that they agreed with the IFRIC that emission
rights are separable assets (CL 37, para 6). CICA (CL 32) and LSCA (CL 40) also
agreed that emission rights held are separate assets. However, CICA (CL 32, para 4)
raised concerns about the mismatch effect of the separate asset/liability recognition
model. While IDW (CL 15) did not explicitly comment on if it agrees with the proposed
asset recognition, it implied that an asset classification was regarded as a ‘given’,
evidenced by its statement on the deferred income approach: “in our view, the term
expenditure in IAS 37 means the consumption or depletion of assets (i.e. the emission
rights) as reflected in the financial statements” (CL 15, p 2). Despite the fact that IDW
implied that an asset exists, it did not agree with the proposed separate asset/liability
model of emission rights. According to IDW (CL 15, p 3), there is:
a direct connection between the allowances held and the liability to return
allowances. Furthermore…IAS 37.51 is not applicable, because gains from the
expected disposal of assets cannot arise if assets are used directly to settle an
obligation.
SAICA (CL 25) held the view that emission rights are assets under some circumstance.
For instance, SAICA (CL 25, p 2) was not “convinced that an asset exists” when a
government allocating emission rights free of charge to emitters, as “at the time of
receiving those rights from government, there is no expectation that future economic
benefits will flow to the enterprise, as per the definition of an asset”. However, SAICA
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(CL 25, p3) further explained that “where participants emit pollutants lower than the
rights received an asset exists, only when these excess rights will be traded”. In other
words, it regarded excess purchased emission rights used for trading as assets.
FEE (CL 39) supported the proposed asset recognition of emission rights. While FEE
made references to EFRAG’s comments, unlike EFRAG, it provided full support of the
separate asset/liability model as “although many entities will hold the allowances solely
for the purpose of setting their obligations, the degree of link between the asset and the
liability may be difficult to establish” (CL 39, p 1).
JICPA (CL 12) expressed strong disagreement of the IFRIC consensus. While there was
no mention as to whether JICPA agreed an asset exists or not, JICPA implied that the
proposed separate asset/liability recognition approach to emission rights could lead to a
measurement mismatch on assets and liabilities.
FAR (CL 19) and HKSA (CL 3) prepared very brief comments concerning the draft
IFRIC 3. While FAR agreed that emission rights are assets, HKSA did not comment on
the asset recognition of emission rights.
3. Industry-affiliated groups
Acteo-Medef (CL 5) concluded that emission rights qualify as inventories according to
IAS 2 Inventories (CL 5, p1). In other words, it regarded an asset recognition of
emission rights as a ‘given’. The fact that Acteo-Medef commented on assets and
liabilities separately implies that it also agreed with the proposed separate asset/liability
model.
The Federation of Swiss Industrial Holding Companies (CL 10) agreed that emission
rights are intangible assets, despite expressing concerns about the measurement
mismatch of assets and liabilities. It also pointed out that despite the expectation that
majority of emission rights would be held for compliance purposes, the proposed
separate asset/liability model “has the potential to lead to the creation of artificial
trading based solutions to match both gains and losses in the profit and loss account”
(CL 10, p3).
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Eurelectric (CL 13) implied that emission rights are assets, evidenced by its view that
“the right to emit pollutants as a result of the authorisation for operating the asset” (CL
13, p, 2). Eurelectric supported EFRAG’s proposed linked transactions approach to
emission rights, suggesting that despite the fact that Eurelectric regarded emission rights
as inherently assets, it considered the proposed separate asset/liability model as “not
feasible” (CL 13, p 3). Similar to Eurelectric and EFRAG’s analysis, AFEP (CL 18)
also held the view that assets and liabilities are linked transactions and hence emission
rights should simply be amortised on a “unit-of-pollution” basis, as opposed to
recognising them as separate assets and liabilities (CL 18, p3).
EnergieNed (CL 36) argues that the separate asset/liability recognition model (described
as a ‘hybrid’ approach in paragraph 1) was “unnecessarily complicated” (CL 36, para
1). EnergieNed also briefly mentioned the applicability of IAS 39 in accounting for
emission rights, suggesting that it held the view that tradable emission rights are
financial instruments.
4.

Government Agencies

The Controller and Auditor-General NZ (CL 8) did not comment on the asset
recognition of emission rights, despite stating that “in general we agree with the
proposals in the Interpretation” (CL 8, p 1).
The Ministry of Finance Canada (CL 33) emphasised the absence of ETS in the
province of British Columbia. Despite the lack of any explicit/definite comments on the
asset recognition of emission rights, the Ministry of Finance (CL 33, p 1) suggests that
“we have assumed that so long as the rights are issued without cost to the organization
and permit the normal operation of the asset there would be no required write down”. It
implies that the Ministry of Finance considered emission rights to be assets. No
comments were made about whether or not the Ministry of Finance agreed with the
proposed separate asset/liability recognition model.
The Environmental Agency England and Wales (CL 11) held the view that companies
should report income earned from “environmental assets” on an environmental profit
and loss statement (CL 11, para 2.5), although the comment was not directed at
accounting for emission rights specifically. It pointed out the usefulness of IAS 38
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Intangible assets in accounting for emission rights, suggesting that it considered
emission rights as assets. While Environmental Agency England and Wales considered
emission rights to be assets, it noted that the separate asset/liability recognition model of
emission rights fails to “identify the accounting treatment of emissions with the
environmental intent of a cap and trade scheme” (CL 11, para 6.3). Furthermore, it
proposed an alternative recognition of “an intent to emit CO2 by a participant in a
scheme…recognising this intent to emit is to recognise that the value of an allowance is
primarily influenced by the avoidance of penalties that it represents” (CL 11, para 6.4).
It is interesting to see that the Environmental Agency England and Wales chose to
introduce non-accounting concepts such as ‘intent to emit’ as an alternative to the
Framework definition of asset.
5.

Non-for-profit organisations

IETA (CL 6, p 1) held the view that “there is no overall ‘better solution’ under existing
GAAP” regarding the accounting treatment of emission rights. IETA suggested a
number of possible asset classifications of emission rights, implying that it considered
emission rights as inherently assets, and the real debate focused on ‘what kind of asset
is it’, rather than the question of ‘is it an asset’? Despite the fact that no direct
comments were made on the separate asset/liability model proposed in the draft
interpretation, the two alternative approaches proposed in IETA’s comment letter under
which assets and liabilities are accounted for separately suggests that it supported the
proposed separate asset/liability recognition model. Despite endorsing the separate asset
recognition of emission rights, IETA (CL 6, p 4) argues that a measurement mismatch
“has the potential to lead to the creation of artificial trading based solutions to match
both gains and losses in the profit and loss account”. It suggests that IETA believed it
would be inappropriate to have an accounting standard that could potentially encourage
trading instead of compliance. An internal contradiction emerged when IETA did not
challenge the separate asset/liability recognition model, despite the fact that it was
concerned about the measurement mismatch of assets and liabilities (caused by the
separate recognition approach) and its potential effect on emission rights trading.
TUD (CL 31) provided ad hoc comments on a couple of measurement issues. No
comments were made on the asset recognition of emission rights.
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6.

The Big Four

Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (CL 2) supported the IFRIC consensus that emission rights
held are separate assets. PWC (CL 20) did not explicitly comment on the asset
recognition of emission rights. However, PWC implied that emission rights held are
assets, evidenced by referring to them as “a non-monetary asset” (CL 20, p 1), and
“disposed intangible asset” (CL 20, p 2). No comments were made about the separate
asset/liability recognition model, implying that PWC did not seek to challenge that
aspect of the asset recognition.
In KPMG (CL 35)’s lengthy comment letter, it agreed that emission rights held should
be recognised as separate assets. According to KPMG (CL 35, p2):
As noted in the draft interpretation, allowances granted have an independent
existence. While an entity may choose to use allowances by delivering them
back to the government, it cannot be compelled to do so and instead may sell
them, purchasing sufficient allowances at a later date to cover its emissions
during the reporting period.
7.

Emissions producers

As BP (CL 26, p 2) argues:
Although the rights to emit pollutant do appear similar in nature to assets such as
fishing licences and import quotas, we suspect that it is more difficult to halt a
production process and restart it than it is to cease importation for a period or to
lay up a fishing boat.
BP was also not convinced that tradable emission rights qualify as intangible assets, due
to the “difficulties in arriving at a reliable value, other than cost, in the early years of the
operation…when the market for allowances is very illiquid” (CL 26, p2). BP pointed
out that in the case of a trader or broker, emission rights represent “inventory of the
trade because a market price will probably be available for marginal transactions” (CL
26, p2). It suggests that despite BP’s objection of an intangible asset recognition, it
concluded that a simpler approach would be to recognise emission rights as a
prepayment to reflect the substance of ETS, which is also an asset category. It appears
that BP was less concerned about whether emission rights qualify as assets, and more
concerned about the subsequent asset classification of emission rights. While BP agreed
that ETS gives rise to assets, it was not in favour of the separate asset/liability
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recognition model. For instance, as BP (CL 26, p 3) suggests, “we believe that it
requires over-complicated accounting and results in a grossing-up of the assets and
liabilities that is inappropriate and not helpful to users of the accounts”.
Syngenta (CL 14) considered emission rights to be assets. However, Syngenta was
concerned about the timing of asset recognition, and the asset classification of emission
rights. For instance, it proposed that emission rights should only be recognised as
(intangible) assets after they have been certified in the context of a restricted scheme
like the UK CCL scheme, which only allows participants to sell excess emission rights
that are certified by accredited audit agencies (CL 14, para 2). Despite agreeing that
emission rights are assets, Syngenta pointed out that “emission rights it holds are linked
to liabilities for emissions which are highly likely to arise from the entity’s operations”
(CL14, p3). In other words, Syngenta disagreed with the IFRIC’s conclusion that assets
should be accounted for separately from liabilities.

KLM (CL 38) implied that an asset recognition of emission rights was a given. It held
the view that emission rights possess characteristics of a number of asset types,
depending on how they are used. KLM also pointed out that “a separate asset should be
recognised only where rights are acquired for consideration” (CL 38, p 4). It suggests
that KLM agreed that purchased emission rights should be classified as separate assets,
consistent with the IFRIC consensus.

Holcim (CL 17) was more concerned about the measurement mismatch issue that would
arise as a result of the proposed separate asset/liability recognition model than the initial
asset recognition itself, as the majority of its comments focused on measurement. The
alternative accounting approaches proposed in Holcim’s comment letter bears striking
similarities to those proposed by the EFRAG, under which assets and liabilities were
considered linked transactions. Holcim (CL 17, p3) pointed out that “the accounting
treatment proposed in the exposure draft also has the potential to lead to the creation of
artificial trading based solutions to match both gains and losses in the profit and loss
account”. Interestingly, this argument was also raised by the Federation of Swiss
Industrial Holding Companies (CL 10).

Roche (CL 30) regarded emission rights as assets. Roche suggests that emission rights
held should be classified as assets, and “additional rights requiring to be purchased
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should be treated similarly” (CL 30, p 2). In other words, while Roche regarded an asset
recognition of emission rights as a given, it did not agree with the proposed separate
asset/liability recognition model.
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APPENDIX 4: COMMENTS ON THE LIABLITY
RECOGNITION OF EMISSION RIGHTS
1.

Accounting Standard Setters

DRSC (CL 21) pointed out that it agreed with the IFRIC consensus that a liability
should be recognised whenever emissions are made.
FRSB (CL 22) noted that it agreed with the IFRIC’s interpretations in general. Further,
none of the specific concerns raised in its comment letter challenged the proposed
liability recognition of emission rights, implying that FRSB supported the IFRIC
consensus on the liability recognition.
KSR (CL 16) suggests that in order to avoid divergence in measurement, the IFRIC
should “point at the alternative treatment of IAS 38 as the only one possible treatment in
the matter of emission rights” (CL 16, p1). In other words, it rejected the proposed
liability recognition and proposed that the recognition and measurement of emission
rights should be covered under only IAS 38 Intangible Assets and hence, there was no
need to create a parallel liability.
ASBJ (CL 4) held the view that only emission rights purchased to offset excess
emissions meet qualify as a liability as per the Framework definition. Furthermore,
ASBJ (CL 4, para 6) argues that:
a participant should recognise provisions in accordance with IAS 37 because it
is a liability of uncertain timing or amount during the compliance period. A
participant should recognise a liability at the end of the compliance period, and
derecognise them together with allowances when the actual amount of emissions
are certificated by a proper organisation.
In other words, ASBJ believed that an emitter should only recognise a provisional
liability at the end of a compliance period, as oppose to the IFRIC’s conclusion that a
liability should be recognised whenever emission are made.
Similarly, EFRAG (CL 34) also held the view that an entity should “only recognise an
emission liability when it pollutes more than allowed under its rights held” (p2). CAR
(CL 1) and FSR (CL 29) both noted that they agreed with EFRAG’s conclusion that an
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emission liability should be recognised only to the extent that an entity’s emissions
exceed the allowable limit of the emission rights held. CNC (CL 9, p2) also argues that
“as long as the company meets its objectives (i.e. there is no evidence that the company
will emit more or less pollutants than the level of allowances received), there should be
no P/L impact”.
NASB (CL 23), AASB (CL 27), FACPCE (CL 24) and CCDG (CL 28) did not
comment on the liability recognition issue of emission rights.
2.

Professional Accounting Bodies

IDW (CL 15) agreed with the IFRIC consensus that ETS gives rise to “a liability for the
obligation to deliver allowances equal to emissions that have been made” (p1). ICAEW
(CL 37) and CICA (CL 32) also fully supported the IFRIC consensus on liability
recognition.
LSCA (CL 40) challenged the proposed liability recognition and suggests that “a
liability should be recognised, to the extent that it (an entity) is required to settle that
liability by buying allowances, or by incurring a cash penalty” (CL 40, para C).
Similar to LSCA’s view, SAICA (CL 25, p3) also raised the question of “whether a
liability arises if the participants are acting in accordance with the rights allocated to
them”, since there is “no outflow of economic benefits”. In other words, SAICA
believed that emitters should only recognise a liability when “they have, or will, emit
more pollutants than the rights allow, and they know they will be obliged to pay a
penalty or purchase more rights” (CL 25, p3).
HKSA (CL 3), FAR (CL 19), JICPA (CL 12), and FEE (CL 39) did not provide any
comments on the liability recognition of emission rights.
3.

Industry-affiliated groups

Acteo (CL 5), Eurelectric (CL 13) and AFEP (CL 18) all held the view that a liability
should only be recognised when an entity emits more than the allowed emissions limit.
For instance, Acteo (CL 5, p2) criticised the IFRIC’s approach for:
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putting too much weight on the form of the scheme and not enough on the
substance of what the entire scheme is aimed at, which is to penalise entities that
would not remain within agreed limitations of tons of pollutants emitted.
The Federation of Swiss industrial Holding Companies (CL 10) suggested two possible
alternative approaches of accounting for emission rights. While treatment A recognises
emission rights as separate assets and liabilities, treatment B proposes treating emission
rights as intangible assets amortised on a “unit of consumption” basis (CL 10, p4). In
other words, the Federation of Swiss industrial Holding Companies endorsed an
approach which simplifies the recognition and measurement of emission rights by
eliminating the parallel liability element in accounting for emission rights.
EnergieNed (CL 36) did not comment on the liability recognition issue.
4.

Government agencies

The Environmental Agency England and Wales (CL 11) and Controller and AuditorGeneral NZ (CL 8) did not comment on the liability recognition issue of emission
rights.
The Ministry of Finance Canada (CL 33) did not explicitly comment on the liability
recognition of emission rights either. However, as it explains:
At year-end they must produce sufficient emission rights to cover the amount of
emissions. If they have operated within the limit set them by the rights held, they
will have no cash costs and must merely offer up the rights. If they have emitted
more than the amount for which they have rights they must acquire extra rights
or pay the penalty. In either case they must pay the cost. But the true impact on
the organization is just the extra rights they hold and sell or pay to acquire…
However, instead of using these costs there will be a constant revaluing of the
expenses. This revaluation will be based on circumstances to tally outside their
control. Frustration will develop due to the fact that, even when they have
already acquired the necessary rights to settle the liability, their total costs will
still be changing (CL 33, p 2).
It suggests that the Ministry of Finance in Canada did not agree with the IFRIC’s
conclusion that a liability must be recognised whenever emissions are made, regardless
of whether the emitter holds sufficient emission rights to cover its emissions or not, on
the basis that it would create fluctuating costs of compliance.
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5.

The Big Four

Deloitte (CL 2, p 2) agreed with the IFRIC’s conclusion that “a separate liability for the
obligation to deliver emission rights should be recognised…to the extent emissions have
been made”.
KPMG (CL 35, p 3), on the other hand, did not agree that “a liability will arise in all
cases”. Consistent with the definition of a liability as per IAS 37.10, KPMG argues that
only excess emission rights granted or purchased to cover additional emissions will
result in a liability to deliver additional emission rights to cover the shortfall in rights.
PWC (CL 20) did not comment on the liability recognition issue of emission rights.
6.

Emissions producers

BP (CL 26) and Roche (CL 30) both likened emission rights to a prepayment of future
environmental obligations and argue that there was no need to create a parallel liability,
as the liability would have already been settled before emissions are made, as long as
the emissions made are within the limit of the emission rights held. Holcim (CL 17) also
suggested eliminating the parallel liability element. For instance, similar to EFRAG’s
approach, the alternative accounting treatment B proposed by Holcim also eliminates
the parallel liability by amortising emission assets on a “unit of consumption” basis (CL
17, p4).
KLM (CL 38) rejected the IFRIC’s conclusion that a liability would arise whenever
emissions are made. The definition of a liability in IAS 37.10 was quoted to justify its
view that “no liability will arise to tile extent that allowances held cover emissions” (CL
38, p4).
Syngenta (CL 14) proposed that in the context of a UK Climate Change Levy (CCL)
scheme 20 , “no liability for emissions would be recorded during the compliance period
unless emissions were expected to exceed the target” (CL 14, para 2). In other words, it

20

As explained in paragraph 2, the UK CCL scheme is similar to an ETS except that “participants cannot
sell their emission rights freely. They can only sell excess emission rights when the accredited audit
agency has certified that actual emissions have been lower than the agreed targets. Also, those emission
rights can only be sold within prescribed time frames.
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disagreed with the IFRIC’s conclusion that a liability arises whenever emissions are
made.
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APPENDIX 5: ALLOCATING EMISSION RIGHTS FOR
LESS THAN THEIR FAIR VALUE GIVES RISE TO A
GOVERNMENT GRANT
1.

Accounting Standard Setters

KSR (CL 16), FACPCE (CL 24), AASB (CL 27), CCDG (CL 28) and NASB (CL 23)
did not address the government grant recognition issue in their comment letters.
FRSB (CL 22), CAR (CL 1) and ASBJ (CL 4) questioned the suitability of the IFRIC’s
decision to issue an interpretation of IAS 20 when it was under IASB revisions.
However, no specific comments were given on whether allocating emission rights gives
rise to a government grant, as the comment letters focused predominately on the
measurement of government grants.
While CNC (CL 9) did not comment on whether or not they agreed with the proposed
government grant recognition, it argues that the proposed measurement of government
grants was not a sound interpretation of IAS 20. For instance, as explained in (1)
General Comments:
Allowances are considered as non-monetary assets…recognised at fair value.
However this paragraph (referring to IAS 20.23) suggests an alternative (“record
both asset and grant at a nominal amount”) that is not retained by IFRIC. We
think an interpretation should retain all relevant principles and options of
applicable standards.
In other words, while CNC accepted a government grant recognition of allocated
emission rights, it disagreed with the proposed measurement of government grants.
FSR (CL 29, p 2) explicitly asserts that “it is our opinion that the free allocation is
regarded as a government grant”. As it explains:

Provided that the contributor (the Government) allocates such emission rights
free of charge to the individual enterprises, it would be regarded as a
government grant, as the contributor has paid for such emission rights (through
the project investment). The contributor has thus provided a service that is
passed on free of charge (CL 29, p 2).
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In other words, FSR believed that allocating emission rights for less than their fair value
gives rise to a government grant because the cost of emissions would be carried by the
government, and the right to emit would be passed onto eligible emitters free of charge.
DRSC (CL 21) also agreed that allocating emission rights gives rise to a government
grant. EFRAG (CL 34) did not explicitly comment on the government grant recognition
issue, however, in the illustrative example in the appendix, emission rights allocated
free of charge were recognised as deferred income (government grant), implying that
EFRAG also endorsed the proposed government grant recognition.
2.

Professional Accounting Bodies

IDW (CL 15), ICAEW (CL 37) and LSCA (CL 40) agreed with the proposed
government grant recognition of allocated emission rights.
JICPA (CL 12) disagreed with the government grant recognition that was in accordance
with IAS 20, however, no specific reasons were given in its comment letter. CICA (CL
32, para 7) suggests that measuring government grants “on a historical cost basis,
because of the existing requirements of IAS 20…is inconsistent with the current trend to
fair value accounting”. However, no comments were given on the proposed government
grant recognition issue.
HKSA (CL 3, para 2) suggests the proposed deferred income treatment of government
grants restricts “certain treatments” permitted in IAS 20, such as “recognising the grants
at nominal value and recognising the grants as a reduction in the carrying amount of an
asset”. Furthermore, HKSA (CL 3, para 2) suggests that “the most appropriate approach
would be to eliminate options from IAS 20”, as “the attempt of the IFRIC to issue an
interpretation to restrict certain treatments currently permitted under IAS 20 for a
specific subset of government grant…would in effect create two different bodies of
GAAP”. In other words, HKSA asserts that a simpler approach would be to eliminate
the government grant element from accounting for emission rights.
SAICA (CL 25, p 2) suggests that it is “inappropriate to issue an interpretation, which
caters for deferred income. Therefore consideration should be given to deferring this
draft IFRIC in order that it aligns with the revision of IAS 20”. In other words, it
questioned the IFRIC’s decision to issue an interpretation in accordance with IAS 20 as
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it would create inconsistency between the interpretation and standard after its revision.
SAICA also pointed out that the IFRIC did not follow the government grant
measurement as per IAS 20. 12, hence “inappropriate and could be perceived as
creating a new element of balance sheet items, beyond the Framework” (CL 25, p 2).
Despite raising concerns regarding the measurement of government grants, SAICA did
not explicitly comment on the proposed government grant recognition itself.
FEE (CL 39, p 2) asserts that the IFRIC should specify the government grant (deferred
income) as “other operating income, separately from the expense arising from an
increase in the liability, as the latter exists independently of whether allowances were
obtained free or at a price below market price”. Despite commenting on the
measurement of government grants, FEE did not challenge the proposed government
grant recognition of emission rights.
FAR (CL 19) did not comment on issues regarding government grants.
3.

Government agencies

The Controller and Auditor-General NZ (CL 8) disagreed with the proposed deferred
income measurement of government grants under IAS 20 and argues that government
grants “should be recognised as income because it meets the definition of income in the
Framework. In addition, the amount does not meet the definition of any of the elements
of the balance sheet and should therefore not be recognised in the balance sheet” (para
1). However, no comments were made regarding the proposed government grant
recognition itself.
The Ministry of Finance Canada (CL 33, p 1) held the view that an allocated emission
right is “closer to a tax credit than a grant or windfall as recorded under this
interpretation” to emitters.
The Environmental Agency England and Wales (11) did not comment on issues
regarding government grants.
4.

Emissions producers

KLM (CL38, p 2) disagreed with the proposed government grant recognition of
emission rights on the basis that:
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tile substance of such schemes is to restrict emissions and to charge a penalty
where limits were breached rather than to provide government assistance. It is
worthy of note that an emissions right represents an allowance from government
designed simply to mitigate a potential cost…that does not in our mind represent
a government grant, which typically is designed to mitigate third party costs. It
would be more correct in our view, therefore, to ignore tile ‘grant’, on the
grounds that it is not the sort of grant envisaged by IAS 20. In these
circumstances, a cost would arise when pollution occurs that is not covered by
available allowances…such an approach enables a more meaningful presentation
of emission costs, as well as being easier to grasp by readers of financial
statements.
Roche (CL 30, p 1) referred to the government grant element as a “complication”,
despite the fact that its counter-proposal included a government grant element.
While BP (CL 26, p 3) did not explicitly comment on the government grant recognition
of emission rights, it did suggest a simplified approach of ‘recognising a prepayment for
the cost of the allowances at the cap level...amortising this cost pro-rata the emissions
produced…”. It implies that BP held the view that the government grant element should
be eliminated to simplify accounting for emission rights.
Holcim (CL 17) did not explicitly comment on issues regarding government grants in its
comment letter, although allocated emission rights were accounted for as a government
grant (deferred income) in its illustrative example (see the appendix on page 5).
Similarly, Syngenta (CL 14) also treated allocated emission rights as a government
grant in its illustrative example (see p 4), despite making no explicit comments on
government grant issues.
5.

Industry-affiliated groups

Eurelectric (CL 13) explicitly rejected the IFRIC’s proposal that allocating emission
rights gives rise to a government grant on the basis that the proposed government grant
recognition does not reflect the substance of ETS, which charges a penalty to emitters
when they emit above the allowable emissions limit, rather than allowing entities to
emit at no cost. Eurelectric (CL 13, p 3) concluded that “there is not any deferred
revenue (government grant) to be recognised, but a liability as soon as the entity
emissions are above the permitted level”.
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Acteo-Medef (CL 5, p 1) also disagreed with the proposed government grant
recognition on the basis that:
At no point in time indeed it makes sense to consider that the entity has made a
gain, just because it has been granted the authorisation to produce within
contractual limits without incurring penalties.
AFEP (CL 18)’s comments on government grant focused on the measurement aspect of
IAS 20. For instance, AFEP (CL 18, p3) argues that “to reflect the substance of
transactions, grants and related rights should be valued in the same way, in compliance
with the principle in IAS 20.23”. While AFEP proposed that allocated rights and
purchased rights should both be measured at either fair value or nominal/cost, it made
no comments on the government grant recognition itself. EnergieNed (CL 36) also did
not explicitly comment on the government grant recognition.
The Federation of Swiss industrial Holding Companies (CL 10) did not explicitly
comment on the government grant recognition. However, it did propose two accounting
alternatives which both recognise allocated emission rights as government grants
(deferred income).
6.

The Big Four

PWC (CL 20) only commented on the measurement aspect of government grants. For
instance, it questioned the IFRIC consensus, which “eliminates the choice inherent in
IAS 20.23, where both a non-monetary asset and the related grant may be recorded at
nominal value” (CL 20, p1). While PWC questioned whether the IFRIC was allowed to
step outside existing accounting standards within its jurisdiction, no comments were
made on the government grant recognition itself.
Similarly, Deloitte (CL 2, p1) argues that the IFRIC’s proposal eliminates allowed
alternatives of accounting for government grants in IAS 20, which “create confusion as
to the role of the IFRIC”. Deloitte also expressed concerns regarding the uncertainty of
government grant requirements as a result of IAS 20 revisions. Despite concerns
regarding the measurement of government grants, Deloitte explicitly endorsed the
proposed government grant recognition of allocated emission rights.
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KPMG (CL 35) agreed with both the proposed government grant recognition (and
measurement) and the IFRIC’s interpretation of IAS 20.
7.

Non-For-Profit

TUD (CL 31) did not comment on government grant issues.
IETA (CL 6) proposed two alternative treatments of emission rights, in which the
allocated emission rights were recognised as a government grant (deferred income).
IETA also asserts that the IFRIC should consider delaying the interpretation till after the
revisions on IAS 20.
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